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CHAPTER 1
Locus of Control in Empirical
Microeconomics - An Introduction
“The foundation of political economy and, in general, of every social science, is evidently
psychology. A day may come when we shall be able to deduce the laws of social science from




1.1 Personality Psychology and Behavioral Economics
Interdisciplinarity can, without a doubt, be named as one of the major trends in modern
economic research. Although it was common practice in other disciplines since their day one
and also economics was rich of interdisciplinary ideas in its early years, for a long time the
majority of economists was certain that they could explain the world’s states by solely relying
on their own models and theories. Understanding and predicting human behavior, thus, was
widely restricted to fitting the behavior of humans into the concept of a perfectly informed,
fully rational, utility maximizing homo economicus. Although this “Econ” is without a doubt
the greatest achievement of microeconomic theory, economists were criticized for their sim-
plification of the world mainly because the lines between normative and positive economics
started to blur. In the words of Richard Thaler, economists forgot that “... we do not live in
a world of Econs. We live in a world of Humans” (Thaler, 2015, p.16). For many decades,
economists ignored that the original idea of the homo economicus was to describe how humans
should logically behave instead of how they actually behaved. Thus, for a long time individual
deviations from the rational choice and utility maximization frameworks were attributed to
idiosyncratic shocks and added into error terms. (Thaler, 2015)
Nevertheless, especially the rise of modern behavioral economics has tremendously changed
the economic discipline. Economists started to differentiate between normative and positive
approaches. Especially empirical microeconomics is now largely motivated by describing hu-
man behavior and decision making as accurately as possible and thus identifying whether
and why the homo sapiens does deviate from the theoretical prescriptions for the homo eco-
nomicus. Thanks to this return to the traditional virtues of the economic theory, the concept
of economic actors being “Econs” can unfold its full potential of being a powerful guideline
for the analysis of individual behavior throughout the life-cycle. Empirical economic research
which is guided, but not driven, by these underlying core concepts of economics while at the
same time taking into consideration most recent evidence from all other social as well as nat-
ural sciences has a tremendous potential of getting one step closer to understanding human
behavior.
Especially psychological theories and ideas have enriched economic research in the past
decades. The Nobel laureates Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler as well as their various
colleagues made psychologically motivated theory fit for economic models. Nowadays, con-
cepts and models from psychology are ubiquitous in economics. One of the most prevalent
psychological concepts in modern empirical microeconomics are personality traits and their
influence on economic decision making and economic outcomes. In line with the well-known
definition by Roberts (2009, p.140), personality traits can be defined as “...relatively endur-
ing patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain
ways under certain circumstances”. Although this definition is widely spread and largely ac-
cepted, the literature is more than discordant on what those patterns actually include. In
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1.1. PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
line with Borghans et al. (2008, p.974) most economists nevertheless assume that personality
traits concern “all dimensions on which people differ from one another”.1 In addition to cog-
nitive skills, which mainly describe an individuals problem-solving abilities, economists often
assume personality traits to be a bundle of all inherent skills which are not directly related to
knowledge and ability and thus often label them as “non-cognitive skills”. (Borghans et al.,
2008) Almlund et al. (2011, p.5) describe personality as a “strategy function for responding
to life situations”.
In the past few years, personality traits have increased in importance for the explana-
tion of various types of individual behavior and decision making in microeconomic studies.
The increasing availability of survey-based measures of psychological concepts made it more
and more attractive for applied economists to investigate this psychological black box behind
human behavior. Most notably thanks to the work of James Heckman and his various coau-
thors, modern economists do not have doubts about the important predictive power of these
non-cognitive skills for economic outcomes which has been found to exceed that of cognitive
abilities (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001). Especially, their ex-
tensive research on the famous Perry Preschool Program2 was a milestone in demonstrating
that these traits actually do greatly matter for individual economic outcomes (Heckman et al.,
2013). Motivated by their seminal work, the economic literature is continuously growing and
has found important effects of personality traits e.g. on earnings as one of the hot topics
within economics (Mueller and Plug, 2006; Nyhus and Pons, 2005).
Based on the fundamental ideas from traditional economic theory as well its extensions
through modern behavioral economics, individual differences in decision making are largely
simplified to originate in three important idiosyncratic components, which are 1) constraints
and opportunities, 2) preferences as well as 3) beliefs and expectations. (Gintis, 2006) In line
with the growing motivation to understand the psychological black box behind individual
decision making, personality traits have been empirically found to be important determinants
of all three aspects and thus are important components of choice models in all sorts of decision
making situations (Borghans et al., 2008; Almlund et al., 2011).
Exactly this is the point at which this thesis makes its contribution. It presents three
studies (Chapters 2-4) which consider one specific taxonomy of personality, the so called locus
of control and its important role for decision making in three distinct domains of the life-cycle
which are labor market mobility, labor force participation as well as risky health behavior.
In doing so, it contributes to the growing empirical literature on the tremendous importance
1 For more details on the psychological literature on aspects and dimensions of personality see e.g. McAdams
and Pals (2006) and Roberts et al. (2006a).
2 The Perry Preschool Program was a large randomized control trial targeted at disadvantaged African
American pre-school children with low cogntive skills in the US in the early 1960s. The children were followed
through the age of 40 which enabled researchers to identify effect of the intervention on earnings, education,
crime and many other socio-economic outcomes. Over the years dozens of studies have analyzed the returns of
the program. See e.g. Heckman et al. (2010) for an overview over the literature.
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of this trait for individual behavior and economic decision making. Additionally, Chapter 5
crucially adds to the literature, by discussing the most prevalent problem in the literature on
the predictive power of personality traits for individual decision making: the danger of reverse
causality and attenuation bias through issues with the stability and measurement validity of
personality traits.
The further parts of this introduction are structured as follows. Section 1.2 gives a de-
tailed introduction into the theory behind locus of control and the psychological literature
on the concept as well as the survey-based measurement of the trait. Subsequently, Section
1.3 introduces the previous literature on behavioral implications of locus of control. Finally,
Section 1.4 summarizes the contributions of the thesis as well as the single studies.
1.2 A Primer into Locus of Control
The facets and aspects of individual personality are highly complex. The most prominent
taxonomy of traits is the so-called Big Five which consist of the traits openness, conscien-
tiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism (McCrae and Costa Jr, 2008; John and
Srivastava, 1999). Those traits are widely assumed to cover the majority of inter-individual
differences in inherent characteristics. Nevertheless, during the past years, another important
trait has made its way into the center of attention especially in empirical economics: the
theory of internal versus external control of reinforcement, or locus of control (LOC).
1.2.1 The Taxonomy of Internal versus External Control of Reinforcement
The most prevalent definition of locus of control is still the one given in the seminal work
by Julian B. Rotter. According to this, locus of control is the “generalized attitude, belief, or
expectancy regarding the nature of the causal relationship between one’s own behavior and its
consequences” (Rotter, 1966, p.2). The basic idea emerged from Rotter’s social learning theory
(Rotter, 1954) which assumes a fundamental relationship between previously experienced
reinforcements, expectations about future reinforcements and current behavior. According
to Rotters theory, individuals experience rewards and punishments to their behavior. These
reinforcements then again strengthen their expectations on future consequences to their own
actions. Nevertheless, it is likely that “...an event regarded by some persons as a reward or
reinforcement may be differently perceived and reacted to by others.” (Rotter, 1966, p.1).
This individual difference in the subjective expectations about “the nature and effects of
reinforcement” (p.2) is resumed by an individual’s perception of control. Rotter assumed
that these expectancies are not only specific to certain situations but can very likely be
generalized over large sets of individual behavior and are thus a dispositional trait. The locus
of control, as it is largely called in modern psychological and economic research, thus describes
an individual’s subjective belief about the causal relationship between own efforts and abilities
and life’s outcomes. Consequently, it describes the location (“locus”) of control being either
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internal or external. Individuals who believe that future outcomes are mainly driven by own
efforts and abilities have an internal locus of control as they perceive their individual control
to be rather high. By contrast, individuals who mainly attribute life’s outcomes to external
factors such as fate, luck, a higher power or other people have an external locus of control
as they perceive their individual control to be low. Although Rotter’s article was not the
first which attempted to formalize and measure perceptions of control (see e.g. Phares, 1957;
James, 1957), it was especially in the years after Rotter’s seminal work that locus of control
has become an inherent part of the core concepts of personality psychology and the work of
Rotter (1966) as well as a the prominent review article by Lefcourt (1966) became two of the
most cited articles in the field (Lefcourt, 1992). Over the years, the general idea of control
beliefs has been extended to various concepts of domain-specific perception of control such as
e.g. in health (Wallston et al., 1976), politics (Davis, 1983) as well as economics and finances
(Furnham, 1986).
1.2.2 Interdependencies with Other Constructs
Although there was also considerable criticism especially concerning the measurement of the
construct (see e.g. Brewin and Shapiro, 1984), locus of control gained more and more pop-
ularity with every study which was able to identify important psychological and behavioral
consequences such as e.g. for motivation or self-control (see e.g. Skinner, 1996; Lefcourt, 1982;
Rosenbaum, 1980). Nevertheless, an important discussion which has not come to an end yet
concerns the unique feature of locus of control and the independence of the construct from
other prominent taxonomies of traits. For example, Skinner (1996) was able to identify more
than 100 constructs which reflect aspects of perceived control such as e.g. mastery, helpless
and autonomy. Throughout the literature, locus of control is quite frequently related to promi-
nent concepts such as self-esteem, self-efficacy and confidence (Hill, 2011). Also, the question
of whether LOC is only a sub-trait of the Big Five as the taxonomy which captures all core
facets of individual personality is still heavily discussed. (Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001). Espe-
cially Timothy A. Judge and his colleagues discussed the interdependencies between locus of
control and other constructs such as self-esteem, self-efficacy and emotional stability (i.e. neu-
roticism) by proposing an underlying lower-dimensional factor called “core self-evaluation”.
(Judge et al., 2002; Judge and Hurst, 2007; Bono and Judge, 2003; Judge et al., 2003) Similar
attempts to relate locus of control especially to the concept of self-efficacy have been made
e.g. by Pearlin and Schooler (1978) and Ajzen (2002). Although they are closely related, a
distinct difference between the concepts of self-efficacy, self-esteem and locus of control can be
stated. As summarized by Cobb-Clark (2015), locus of control refers to the causal relationship
between own behavior and life’s outcomes in general whereas self-efficacy rather describes the
individual belief in the personal ability to be capable of acting effectively to bring about de-
sired results in a specific task. Thus, while self-efficacy describes whether an individual thinks
that she is able to perform a certain task, locus of control describes whether successfully
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performing a task will affect future outcomes after all. Self-esteem again rather describes the
overall confidence in own abilities in general. According to Hill (2011), the crucial difference
to locus of control lies in the processing of negative reinforcements. Thus, individuals with
an internal locus of control might very well develop a low self-esteem as they also directly
attribute negative reinforcements to their own actions and thus failures.
1.2.3 Measurement and Scales
Psychological Tests and Survey Measures In line with other personality concepts, lo-
cus of control, too, is traditionally measured using a variety of tests and self-reports with
the basic idea of identifying individual differences. (Borghans et al., 2008) Rotter and his
colleagues elaborated a 29-item forced-choice test in order to obtain a quantitative measure
of the underlying construct. In their list of 29 pairs of statements, they thus asked survey
respondents to e.g. decide whether “Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has
little or nothing to do with it” or “Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right
place at the right time.” (see Rotter, 1966, p.11) Since then, a vast number of different scales
have been developed in order to capture this latent trait within surveys and psychological
tests (see e.g. Lefcourt, 1982, for an comprehensive overview). Nevertheless, while the main
goal of these scales developed by psychologists is to draw a picture of the trait which is as
accurate as possible, in order to isolate it from other related facets of the individual person-
ality, empirical economists are rather interested in the practicability of the measurement in
the context of large-scale surveys. As surveys are limited in the array measures they include,
the survey-based measurement of personality traits in general and locus of control in specific
is extremely restricted to a small, reduced set of questions or items (Borghans et al., 2008).
As is comprehensively described by Cobb-Clark (2015), there is thus a distinct tradeoff be-
tween getting to the core of the concept one wants to analyze and nevertheless being able to
utilize survey-based measures, which is nevertheless largely ignored in “economist’s laissez-
faire approach” (p.3). Yet, a growing psychological literature on the reliability of reduced-set
survey-based measures (see e.g. Roberts et al., 2011) additionally increased the attractively of
these concepts to economists in the past years. In most surveys, respondents are asked to rate
their agreement with a series of statements on Likert-scales ranging from strong disagreement
to strong agreement.
International Surveys and their Current Locus of Control Scales Nevertheless, the
modules which are assumed to capture locus of control still noticeably differ between surveys.
Herein lies an important potential source of differences in the empirical results based on the
different surveys. Table 1.1 gives an overview over the available modules in three of the largest
international surveys.
Researchers working with the Australian “Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA)” solely make use of items from the Mastery Module developed by Pearlin
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Table 1.1: Locus of Control Scales in International Surveys
SOEP HILDA NLSY79
(1) How my life goes depends on me (1) I have little control over the
things that happen to me
(1a) What happens to me is my own
doing
(2) Compared to other people, I have
not achieved what I deserve
(2) There is really no way I can solve
some of the problems I have
(1b) Sometimes I feel that I don’t
habe enough control over the direc-
tions my life is taking
(3) What a person achieves in life is
above all a question of fate or luck
(3) There is little I can do to change
many of the important things in my
life
(2a) When I make plans, I am almost
certain that I can make them work
(4) If a person is socially active, she
can have an effect on social condi-
tions
(4) I often feel helpless in dealing
with the problems of life
(2b) It is not always wise to plan too
far ahead, because many things turn
out to be matter of good or bad for-
tune anyhow
(5) I have the experience that others
have a controlling influence over my
life
(5) Sometimes I feel that I am being
pushed around in life
(3a) In my case, getting what I want
has little or nothing to do with luck
(6) One has to work hard in order to
succeed
(6) What happens to me in the future
mostly depends on me
(3b) Many times we might just as
well decide what to do by flipping a
coin
(7) If I run up against difficulties in
life, I often doubt my own abilities
(7) I can do just about anything I
really set my mind to do
(4a) Many times I feel that I have
little influence over the things that
happen to me
(8) The opportunities that I have in
life are determined by the social con-
ditions
(4b) It is impossible for me to belief
that chance or luck plays an impor-
tant role in my life
(9) Inborn abilities are more impor-
tant than any efforts one can make
(10) I have little control over the
things that happen in my life
Source: SOEP waves 1999,2005, 2010 and 2015, HILDA 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2011 and NLSY79 1976 and 2014.
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and Schooler (1978) in order to capture locus of control. As this module by definition has the
intention to capture self-efficacy rather than locus of control, these studies largely abstract
from the differences and rather rely on the similarities between the concepts. (see e.g. Cobb-
Clark et al., 2016; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2011; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014) As opposed to
this, the “National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)” also captures the Pearlin
Mastery scale as a measure for self-efficacy but additionally comprises a four-item abbreviated
version of the original forced choice questionnaire by Rotter as a measure of locus of control
(see NLSY79, 2019, for an overview). The measurement of locus of control in the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which will also be the basis of the studies presented in the
following chapters, is based on a psychometric scale specifically developed for the SOEP
by Helmut Nolte based on the evaluation of an older set of items in Nolte et al. (1997).
The developed scale was, in the original conception, intended to cover internal and external
locus of control but additionally also attitudes towards fairness or justice (item 2) as well as
individual vs. collective orientation (item 4) with one item each (Richter et al., 2013). The
list contains statements which are very close to the original statements by Rotter but some
items are also very similar to those contained in Pearlin’s Mastery module. The literature
using this measure is relatively disjoint about the question which items should be used for
the construction of the locus of control scale. In line with Specht et al. (2013), at least seven
out of the ten items can be combined into an overall scale with good reliability. While Specht
et al. (2013) and Richter et al. (2013) suggest to exclude items 4, 6 and 9, many studies rests
upon the original concept by excluding item 2 and 4 from the list (see e.g. Pinger et al.,
2018). In addition to this multiple other combinations of included and excluded items exist in
the literature (see e.g. Berger and Haywood, 2016; Schnitzlein and Stephani, 2016; Caliendo
et al., 2014; Heywood et al., 2017).
Factor Analysis and Latent Traits Most of these studies, including those presented in
the following chapters, base their decision about included and excluded items upon exploratory
factor analysis. Independent from the SOEP and the choice of items, also Borghans et al.
(2008, p.978) note that the concept of factors is “...(c)entral to [...] recent empirical work
at the intersection of economics and psychology”. Factor analysis has the goal of identifying
clusters within the surveyed modules in order to isolate quantitative measures of the latent
factors underlying the theoretical constructs. See for example Borghans et al. (2008) for a
comprehensive introduction into factor analysis as well as a discussion of the importance of
the concept of factor for the interface between personality psychology and economics. While
the earlier literature on economic consequences of locus of control largely abstracted from
the importance of factor analysis and the resulting loadings for the construction of the latent
trait, especially the more recent studies now rely on confirmatory factor analysis in order to
predict latent traits. This was mainly motivated by the work of Piatek and Pinger (2016), who
discuss important issues with attenuation bias if a simple average with equal weights is used
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instead of the predicted factor, which allows for a sample-driven weighting of the included
items.
1.3 Previous Literature - Locus of Control, Behavior and
Economic Outcomes
The increasing availability of survey-based measures of locus of control especially in large
longitudinal household studies in Germany and Australia has led to a large body of studies
which attempt to identify the predictive power of locus of control for individual decision
making and behavior in various domains.
In this literature, locus of control is widely assumed to be an incentive-enhancing prefer-
ence, in line with the theoretical discussion by Bowles et al. (2001). As an increased internal
locus of control is associated with an increased belief in the impact of own actions on own
outcomes, most of the existing literature theoretically connect locus of control and individual
behavior through the enhancement of efforts and investments into future outcomes.
It was especially in the past two decades, that economists have begun to explicitly in-
corporate locus of control as well as other personality traits into their economic models of
decision making in order to understand why they seem to matter for the behavioral outcomes
we observe (see e.g. Cobb-Clark, 2015; Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008). Much of
the growing strand of literature on the behavioral implications of locus of control was initiated
and motivated by the work of Coleman and DeLeire (2003) on the effect of LOC on human
capital investments. Not only were they the first who analyzed how LOC affects educational
outcomes, but their study was a seminal work for the theorisation of the effect of LOC on
beliefs about returns to investments in line with the argument about incentive-enhancing pref-
erences proposed by Bowles et al. (2001). In their model, they argue that individuals with an
internal locus of control have stronger beliefs into the effect of their educational investments
on future wages and thus invest more. They, additionally, provide empirical evidence for their
arguments using data on US adolescence. Also Heckman and Kautz (2012) and Mendolia and
Walker (2014b) find important effects of locus of control on educational attainment in ado-
lescence and Caliendo et al. (2016) and well as Offerhaus (2013) add evidence for educational
investments in adulthood.
Large parts of the earlier economic literature, which related economic outcomes, such as
wages, and locus of control attributed the effects to differences in levels of non-cognitive skills
(Andrisani, 1977; Duncan and Dunifon, 1998; Goldsmith et al., 1997). As opposed to this,
the literature which emerged after the work of Coleman and DeLeire (2003) also consider
behavioral implications of LOC such as e.g. differences in the investment into human capital,
as indirect drivers of observed differences in the economic outcomes (Heineck and Anger, 2010;
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Piatek and Pinger, 2010; Semykina and Linz, 2007; Groves, 2005; Schnitzlein and Stephani,
2016).
Not only did the work of Coleman and DeLeire (2003) change the lines of arguments
in the literature on wage effects of locus of control, but it also launched a new strand of
literature, which focused on the effect of LOC on investments into future economic outcomes.
Caliendo et al. (2015b), McGee (2015) and McGee and McGee (2016), for example, discuss
and analyze the effect of LOC on job-search behavior via different subjective beliefs about
returns to search. In line with these findings, studies by, for example, Uhlendorff (2004) as
well as Gallo et al. (2003) provide evidence that internal job seekers indeed have higher
reemployment probabilities and shorter unemployment periods on average.
Moverover, multiple studies also relate locus of control and occupational choice and at-
tainment. Heywood et al. (2017) provide evidence that internal individuals sort into jobs with
performance appraisals as they appreciate that these jobs allow them to demonstrate their
value and achieve their goals. Closely related to the existing evidence by Andrisani (1977),
Cobb-Clark and Tan (2011) find that especially internal men are on average more likely to
sort into jobs with personnel responsibility, i.e. they are significantly more likely to be in man-
agerial positions, and also more likely to be education professionals. Eventually, Ahn (2015)
adds empirical evidence that individuals with an internal LOC are on average observed to
perform job-to-job transitions which improve their wages more often. Furthermore, internals
have not only been shown to be more likely to become self-employed but they are additionally
also more successful entrepreneurs. (Caliendo et al., 2014; Hansemark, 2003; Rauch and Frese,
2007). In accordance with all these results, Ng et al. (2006) conduct a meta-analysis based on
which they are able to conclude that an internal LOC improves individuals job satisfaction
and job motivation.
However, locus of control has not only been related to individual behavior and outcomes
on the labor market. For example Cobb-Clark et al. (2014), Mendolia and Walker (2014a)
and Chiteji (2010) provide evidence that locus of control and the related concept self-efficacy
are associated with less risky and more conscious health behavior. Additionally, Lekfuangfu
et al. (2018) find an important effect of LOC on parental investments. Also the role of locus of
control for behavior on the financial market has been repeatedly analyzed especially in the past
years. Hence, Cobb-Clark et al. (2016) find that households with an internal reference person
on average have higher savings rates while Salamanca et al. (2016), Pinger et al. (2018) and
Kesavayuth et al. (2018) relate an internal locus of control and financial investment decisions
and financial risks. Salamanca et al. (2016) show that internal individuals are more likely
to invest into risky assets and Kesavayuth et al. (2018) support their findings by showing
that internal individuals are in general more willing to take financial risks. As opposed to the
pervasive mechanism of differences in expectations about future returns, both studies argue
that a likely mechanism behind an effect of LOC on risky financial behavior are differences
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in the risk perceptions. Individuals who have an internal LOC simply perceive less variance
in risky assets because they believe that, through their own actions, they are more in control
of future outcomes compared to those with an external LOC. In line with this, Pinger et al.
(2018) provide experimental evidence that internal individuals are also more likely to make
inconsistent risk choices and more likely to fall for the hot hand fallacy. As is notes by Cobb-
Clark (2015), this new strand of literature adds an interesting new perspective to the role
of LOC for economic decision making as it proposes an alternative mechanism which can
also be applied to other investment decisions such as human capital and health as also these
investment decisions are associated to risk and uncertainty.
As a third highly relevant mechanism for economic behavior and outcomes, Buddelmeyer
and Powdthavee (2016) as well as Schurer (2017) find an important insurance effect of LOC
against negative life events such as in specifically health shocks. While Buddelmeyer and
Powdthavee (2016) show, that internal individuals experience a less severe reduction in life
satisfaction as a reaction to e.g. own and and others’ serious health shocks as well as crime,
Schurer (2017) provides evidence that individuals with an internal LOC are less likely to drop
out of the labor force after they experienced a health shock.
A comprehensive overview over the literature on locus of control in labor economics is
also given in Cobb-Clark (2015). A more detailed discussion of the existing literature in the
specific domains of female labor force participation, migration decisions as well as risky health
behavior are presented in the literature reviews of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The growing body of
literature on the stability of personality traits is discussed in detail in the literature review of
Chapter 5.
1.4 This Thesis - Contributions and Main Findings
1.4.1 Behavioral Implications of Locus of Control (Chapter 2-4)
In line with the increasing awareness for the role of personality traits for economic decision
making, the present thesis makes its core contribution especially to the growing empirical
literature on the explanatory power of the personality trait locus of control for individual
behavior. It does so by presenting three studies (Chapters 2-4) on the important role of LOC
for decision making in three distinct domains of the life-cycle which are labor market mobility,
labor force participation as well as risky health behavior.
Besides the focus on locus of control, the distinct feature of all three studies is that
they not only identify the empirical relationship between locus of control and the concerned
decision situation but they also make a considerable effort to carefully introduce locus of
control into the prevalent economic theory behind each of these choice situations. Hence, it
is the common goal of all chapters in this thesis to consider the psychological roots of the
concept, understand the meaning behind it and try to identify the channels of its virtue on
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economic decision making. All studies make an attempt to pin down the knowledge gains
and implications of the findings for traditional economic decision making models by carefully
discussion channels and mechanism within the framework of rational choice theory. The most
prevalent common finding of all studies is that the relationship between personality traits and
economic behavior is a highly complex network of simultaneous impacts which is additionally
highly heterogeneous between situations and individuals. All chapters thus share not only a
common explanatory variable of interest as well as a common data basis, which is the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), but also have a very similar scope as well as theoretical and
empirical approach.
In line with the fifth chapter, all parts of the thesis additionally share their careful consid-
eration of potential risks from reverse causality through doubts about the stability of locus of
control as well as its measurement validity. This issue is “the elephant in the room”, present
in all chapters of the thesis. Besides a careful discussion of potential biases in the empirical
sections of Chapters 2 to 4, Chapter 5 completes the picture by carefully discussion the dan-
ger of reverse causality and attenuation bias through issues with the stability of personality
traits and measurement validity in the specific case of exogenous unemployment shocks. Ad-
ditionally, the implications of Chapter 5 for the other chapters are carefully discussed within
the chapters as well as in section 1.4.2 of this introduction. Consequently, the empirical ap-
proaches of this thesis largely profit from the synergy between economic and psychological
models. The integration of the empirical findings into the more fundamental principles and
theories of economics and psychology is a witness of the important interrelationship between
both disciplines.
Female Labor Force Participation (Chapter 2)
Chapter 2 initiates the discussion by analyzing the implications of LOC for female labor force
participation. Research on female labor force participation has a long tradition in theoretical
and empirical economic research. While a lot of open questions have been answered on the
gender gap in labor market participation, the prevalent heterogeneity between women still
keeps economists and politicians busy. While traditional economic theory attributed unex-
plained differences in decision making to idiosyncratic shocks, more modern approaches are
more and more informed by psychology and thus consider individual differences in tastes, pref-
erences and beliefs as important drivers of decision making. In line with these advancements
in the literature, the paper theoretically discusses the role of locus of control for participation
decisions by incorporating a vector of individual attributes into a woman’s utility and budget
function which captures LOC. The vector of attributes is argued to affect the preferences
for leisure, home production and childcare as well as participation but also the expectations
about monetary returns to participation. In line with the psychological literature, especially
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a crucial importance of LOC for independence preferences as well as subjective beliefs about
returns to effort and investments are proposed to be important mechanisms.
The empirical analysis supports these theoretical considerations. Using data from the
SOEP, internal women are found to have a significantly higher probability of being available
for market production, which also translates into higher employment probabilities at the
extensive margin. These effects are additionally found to be highly heterogenous with respect
to underlying monetary incentives for participation and home production as well as prevalent
social norms for working.
Hence, the paper not only contributes to the literature on the economic importance of
LOC as well as the psychological black box behind participation decisions but is also able
to more generally identify important interdependencies between monetary constraints and
opportunities as well as inherent preferences and attributes in the decision making process.
Internal Migration (Chapter 3)
In a quite similar manner, Chapter 3 discusses the role of LOC for regional labor market
mobility within Germany. The study theoretically models internal migration based on job
seekers who form subjective beliefs about the return to search effort that are related to their
locus of control. In line with the findings in Caliendo et al. (2015b), internal job seekers are
predicted have higher subjective expectations about the returns to their search efforts and
thus search more intensively. Given the relationship between search effort and geographic
search area, this implies that individuals with a more internal locus of control will send
more applications to other geographic regions than individuals with a more external locus
control. These considerations are supported with an ancillary analysis using data from the
IZA Evaluation data which identifies a significant positive relationship between having an
internal LOC and applying for jobs for which individuals would have to move. In a situation
in which job search precedes migration decisions, this increased geographic distant search is
assumed to lead individuals to migrate more frequently. Nevertheless, if job search occurs
post-migration, locus of control and internal migration are expected to be unrelated.
The implications of the model are tested using SOEP data via which the exact region of
residence can be identified for every household. The empirical analysis identifies a distinct
positive effect of an internal LOC on the general self-reported willingness to move as well as
the probability of moving between regions.
Consequently, also this paper not only contributes to the literature on the behavioral
implications of LOC and the psychological determinants of migration decisions but also makes
a more fundamental contribution to the literature by demonstrating that assumptions about




Alcohol Consumption (Chapter 4)
A prove that the importance of LOC for decision making cross the boarders of labor economics
is provided within Chapter 4. The chapter is devoted to the question of whether LOC is
also able to explain alcohol consumption as an important domain of risky health behavior.
The existing empirical literature on alcohol consumption shows that drinking is linked to
extreme risks for the consumer’s physical and mental health and thus preventable micro-
and macroeconomic costs such as e.g. through the strain it puts on individual health care
expenditures and labor market perspectives. Nevertheless, it is at the same time associated
with a high level of uncertainty about future consequences, as moderate levels of consumption
have frequently been related to positive outcomes for health and the economic situation.
By making use of the unique information available on drinking behavior within the SOEP,
the study identifies a strongly positive effect of an internal LOC on moderate as well as
heavy drinking which is comparable to effect of traditional preference parameters such as
risk aversion and time preferences. The paper suggests and discusses two likely mechanisms
for this relationship. On the one hand, internal individuals are expected to put a higher
effort into the investment in social and occupational networks and via this have a higher
likelihood to drink as the attendance of social gatherings is often inextricably linked with
alcohol consumption. On the other hand, as uncertainty and the perception of risks play a
crucial role for individual considerations about alcohol consumption, internals consume more
alcohol on average as they believe in or overestimate their personal ability to cope with or
prevent the negative consequences of consumption. Based on a number of ancillary analyzes,
the paper conclude that very likely both channels are at play.
Hence, also this paper again contributes to the literature on behavioral implications of
LOC as well as to the explanation of heterogeneity in individual decision making in a domain
with fundamental economic importance. As opposed to large parts of the existing literature
on the behavioral consequences of LOC also in the area of health, the study is novel in a
sense that it is able to identify potentially negative consequences of an internal LOC. Always
striving for a LOC which is as internal as possible might thus not be the universal solution
for social planners.
1.4.2 The Stability and Exogeneity of Locus of Control (Chapter 5)
Eventually, Chapter 5 importantly contributes to the value all parts of this thesis add to the
body of literature on behavioral consequences of LOC by carefully discussing the stability of
the trait and thus potential problems with reverse causality. As these are without a doubt
“the elephant in the room” in the three other studies as well as in the existing literature on
behavioral implications of personality traits, the methodological contribution is fundamental.
The discussion on the stability of personality traits in general and locus of control in specific,
is one of the central topics of personality psychology since multiple decades and still divide the
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minds. More strikingly, although for example Specht et al. (2013) and Roberts et al. (2006b)
found important variation of LOC and other personality traits with age also in adulthood,
the early economic literature uniformly assumed exogeneity of LOC in their economic mod-
els. It were especially the studies by Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2011, 2013) which motivated
economists to carefully reconsider the stability of those traits. In order add to the assessment
of the stability of LOC, the study, on which Chapter 5 is based, investigates the reaction
of reported LOC to an exogenous unemployment shock. Reassuringly, the empirical analysis
finds no long-lasting effects of job losses due to plant closures on LOC and thus cannot reject
the common assumption of its stability during adulthood. Hence, concerns with respect to
endogeneity of LOC within the models and thus reverse causality can be alleviated. Never-
theless, the study identifies an important temporary deviation in the measurement of LOC
during periods of unemployment and therefore concludes that the reported LOC is affected
by unemployment likely due to a situation-specific effect. The effect holds true independent
from unemployment duration or socio-demographic characteristics and vanishes as soon as
the unemployed find a new job.
The study discusses these identified effects within the well-known trait-state model from
personality psychology. The model accounts for two components: the time-invariant ‘trait’ and
the situational characteristics the measurement takes place in, the so called ‘state’. While the
trait is – in line with the economic definition of personality – a highly enduring or even un-
changing entity, the state is a temporary deviation from it, caused by the interaction between
the survey participant and her current surroundings. Consequently, it is concluded that, rather
than being concerned with reverse causality, the future literature needs to carefully consider
potential measurement issues within LOC. Using the stated LOC as explanatory variable can
lead to biased estimations when the temporary deviation in measurement is not accounted
for. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of the study to identify wether the observed changes
in the stated LOC do have behavioral implications or are pure measurement error.
Remark - Implications of Chapter 5 for the Findings in the Previous Chapters
The implications of these conclusions for the findings in the other three chapters strongly
depend on the nature of the identified state effects. When the state has the same properties
as a measurement error, any estimations which pool individuals with different states will
suffer from an attenuation or endogeneity bias depending on the correlation between its
causing event and the outcome of interest (Bound et al., 2001). If, on the other hand, the
state effect has its own behavioral implications, the reported LOC correctly reflects behavior
at any time. In this case, estimations will be biased as soon as the modeled outcome and the
LOC measurement do not take place within the same state.
The appropriate econometric solutions for both cases therefore stand in sharp contrast.
While the LOC which is observed at time t is the appropriated measure in the second case,
using a lagged LOC which is observed in the same state for all individuals in the sample will
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be sufficient to prevent any harm in the first case. Nevertheless, in addition to the discussion
about employment states in Chapter 5, this might be true for many different states also
related to other important domains such as family status or health. Observing all individuals
in the sample during an exactly identical state thus is not feasible.
The chapter which is affected the most by those considerations is Chapter 2. Due to the
fact that labor force participation as the outcome of interest is at risk of being the causing
event for a potential measurement error in LOC, the findings are in danger of being biased
upwards by endogeneity if women who do not participate in the labor force report lower levels
of LOC and not vice versa. Consequently, this issue is carefully discussed within the study
itself. In a robustness check, the lagged LOC from the last employment spell as well as an
averaged LOC over all available observations are used as alternative measures in order to
assess the severity of the bias (see Table 2.A.5). Reassuringly, the findings are robust against
these adjustments. The risk that the conclusions of the study are affected by the findings in
Chapter 5 is thus rather low.
Large parts of the study, on which Chapter 3 is based, have evolved and were written before
the implications of Chapter 5 became apparent. This is why the implications of Chapter 5
are not discussed in detail within the chapter. Nevertheless, as opposed to Chapter 2, the
risk of endogeneity bias is less strong due to the fact that LOC is always measured before
migration decisions and employment states are included as control variables. A robustness
check which accounts for earlier moves as a potential omitted variable which affects LOC as
well as migration decisions reveals no problems in this respect too (see Table 3.4). As opposed
to this, the findings might rather suffer from attenuation bias caused either by the fact that
individuals are not necessarily observed during the same state or that LOC is not observed in
exactly the same situation in which the decision making takes place depending on whether the
measurement variability has behavioral implications. Reassuringly, a sensitivity check which
uses the first LOC observation in the data (see Table 3.4) as well as an averaged measure of
LOC over all observations demonstrate the robustness in this respect.
The issue is arguably the least severe for the study presented in Chapter 4. This is based on
the assumption that different than labor market participation and regional mobility, alcohol
consumption is no event which can be argued to have severe effects on the measurement of
LOC if we assume that being drunk during the interview is a rather rare exception. Also in
this study employment states are controlled for. Nevertheless, state effects in the measurement
of LOC can still affect the estimated results through attenuation. Consequently, the problem
is discussed within the sensitivity checks. An averaged measure as well as a measure which is
imputed from the first available observation are used without any indication for severe biases
(see Table 4.A.4).
The main takeaway from all these discussions and sensitivity checks nevertheless is that
many, in parts counteracting, mechanisms are at play in the measurement of personality traits
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leading to the conclusion that the perfect timing for the measurement of LOC probably does
not exist. Depending on the nature of measurement errors, the discussed outcome variable and
the considered sample, a prevalent conflict of interests exists. It is, on the one hand, important
to measure LOC as close as possible to the decision situation in order to capture the trait
which actually affected the individual at time t. On the other hand, lagging LOC might be
an appropriate way of preventing endogeneity biases. Consequently, the most appropriate
solution to this problem is a careful discussion of the issues and the use of a number of
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2.1 Introduction
The research on female labor force participation has a long tradition. Triggered by the
growing labor supply of women in the second half of the last century1, a large strand of the-
oretical and empirical research on this new issue has arisen. Nevertheless, the early literature
on female participation in the labor market was largely concentrated on gender gaps in mon-
etary constraints as well as social norms of working in order to explain differences between
the participation decisions of men and women. Based on this literature, we already know a
lot about why women keep on having lower participation rates and wage elasticities than men
and why these variables started converging in the past decades.2 However, differences in the
participation probabilities between women can only be explained by differences and trends
in monetary constraints as well as social norms of working to a limited. While traditional
economic models largely attribute these unexplained differences in decision outcomes to id-
iosyncratic shocks or unobserved constraints and opportunities, modern behavioral economic
and applied microeconomic approaches started to investigate these differences with respect
to unobserved, inherent beliefs and preferences. A growing literature is thus interested in
investigating the psychological black box behind female labor supply decisions as well as, in
a more general sense, individual decision making on the labor market altogether.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the role of a specific personality
trait, which has already been found to have important explanatory power for decision making
especially on the labor market: an individual’s perception of control, also called locus of control
(LOC). LOC can be characterized as a “generalized attitude, belief, or expectancy regarding the
nature of the causal relationship between one’s own behavior and its consequences” (Rotter,
1966) and describes whether individuals believe in the effects of their own efforts and abilities
on their lives’ outcomes. While individuals with an internal LOC (internals) believe that
their own efforts and abilities are rewarded in their future life’s outcome, individuals with an
external LOC (externals) attribute life’s outcomes mainly to luck, chance, fate or other people.
LOC has already been shown to have important effects on economic behavior and decision
making on the labor market3. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, no paper exists yet
which investigates the effect of LOC on female participation decisions in a comprehensive and
detailed manner.
Based on an one-period model of discrete labor supply decisions, which allows for hetero-
geneity in preferences through the incorporation of a vector of personal attributes into the
individual utility function, the theoretical considerations mainly discuss an effect of LOC on
participation probabilities via a difference in the direct marginal utility from participating.
1 See Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Blau and Kahn (2007), Costa (2000), Goldin (1990) and Mincer
(1985) for comprehensive overviews over the trends in female labor force participation during the 20th century.
2 See Section 2.2 for a detailed overview over the literature.
3 See Cobb-Clark (2015) for detailed discussion of the concept as well as an overview of the literature on
LOC in labor economics.
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In line with a similar argumentation in Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) for the effect of LOC on
health investments, women might not only derive utility from the consumption level gener-
ated through participation but also from the act of generating this consumption level itself.
Based on the psychological literature which makes an important connection between locus
of control and independence considerations, this direct non-monetary gain from participation
is expected to be higher for internal women. Internals put a greater weight on the status of
being active in the labor market as they not only derive utility from the consumption level
as an outcome of participation but also from the fact that they themselves had control over
the generation of it. Additionally, potential alternative mechanisms, which can largely be
formalized by differences in the individual budget constraints, are discussed. LOC might, for
example, have an effect on beliefs about returns to investments, such as parental investments,
job search and investments into the future career, but also on objective differences in the
opportunities and constraints, e.g. wages or family income.
Therefore, in the empirical part of the paper, I estimate the direct relationship between
LOC and current labor force participation of a woman in a reduced form approach. The
estimations are conducted using the extensive information available from the Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP, 2017), a large representative longitudinal household panel from Germany. The
SOEP not only includes detailed socio-economic information but also surveys individuals’
locus of control on a regular basis. Using this data, I estimate the average marginal effects of
a woman’s LOC on her probability of participating in the labor force using a random effects
logit estimation conditional on standard socio-economic determinants of participation. In this
context, labor force participation is defined as a general availability for market production
and thus concentrates on the behavioral implications of LOC on labor supply decisions. I find
a significant positive relationship between having an internal LOC and being available to the
labor market. A subgroup analysis reveals that while a strong relationship can be observed
for cohabiting women and women with (young) children, the effect for childless women is
distinctly lower or even close to zero, depending on family status. This indicates a crucial
heterogeneity with respect to underlying monetary incentives to work which is additionally
supported by findings on similar heterogeneity with respect to the available family income
in the household. In addition, a second heterogeneity analysis displays that the estimated
effects are also sensitive with respect to the underlying social norms of working as measured
by regional differences as well as cohort and time trends. Furthermore, additional analysis
reveals important differences between labor market participation decisions at the intensive
and the extensive margin. While the positive effect on labor market availability also translates
into higher labor market activity, as measured by employment probabilities, for all considered
sub-groups. The increased activity can only be observed at the extensive margin. For those
women who do work, LOC has no significant effect on working hours.
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Consequently, it is the objective of the paper at hand to contribute to the existing liter-
ature on the important economic implications of locus of control and to provide additional
empirical evidence on the drivers of women’s labor supply decisions. Hence, the paper’s main
contribution is to add valuable insides to the approach of getting closer to the bottom of
the psychological black box behind female labor force participation decisions by explicitly
considering labor supply decisions as the result of a woman’s inherent personality traits. In so
doing, the paper has two important findings. On the one hand, the paper empirically identifies
important behavioral implications of locus of control in women’s participation decisions above
and beyond traditional monetary incentives and disincentives. On the other hand, especially
the heterogeneity analysis is able to give an idea of how strongly a woman’s preference-driven
labor supply decision is limited by budget constraints as well as exogenously determined social
norms. The second finding is likely to hold true in general, independent from the considera-
tions about locus of control in the present analysis.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 gives a comprehensive overview over the
related literature. Section 2.3 summarizes the theoretical idea of the paper and, based on this,
proposes hypotheses for the empirical analysis. In the empirical part of the paper, Section 2.4
describes the data and the estimation strategy and Section 2.5 presents an overview over the
results of the main estimation, the heterogeneity analysis as well as the additional results for
alternative outcome variables. Section 2.6 summarizes a number of tests for the robustness of
the results. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
The paper at hand significantly adds to two important bodies of economic literature which
are on the one hand the literature on female labor force participation, including determinants
of participation, overall time trends and gender differences, and on the other hand the growing
literature on the economic importance of personality traits in general and the personality trait
locus of control in specific.
The early literature on female labor force participation largely focused on the explanation
of decreasing gender participation gaps as well as the positive long-term trends in female
labor force participation. Inspired by the work of Mincer (1962), especially the increase in the
average wage rate of women was in the center of attention for a long time (see e.g. Mincer,
1985; Smith and Ward, 1985; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Juhn and Murphy, 1997). Large parts of
this decrease in wage inequalities were explained by increasing returns to human capital for
women (see e.g. Autor et al., 2008; Blau, 1998; McGrattan and Rogerson, 2008). Although
the wage rates of women and men did converge and the female wage elasticity fell over time
(Blau and Kahn, 2007; Costa, 2000; Heim, 2007), the participation rate and the average
number of working hours per week of married women in particular are still considerably lower
than that of their partners and the gap in wage elasticities is also still clearly recognizable
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(Evers et al., 2008; Blau and Kahn, 2017). Based on the growing theoretical considerations of
joint family labor supply, empirical studies additionally found a strong and stable response
of female labor supply to changes in their partners’ wages, whereas no such responsiveness
can be identified for men (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974; Lundberg, 1988; Devereux, 2004).
In addition to considerations about wage and cross-wage responses of female labor supply,
the conventional theoretical models were largely focused on overall declines in fertility rates
through, for example, the improvement of fertility control (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey,
2006), the improvement of household technologies (Greenwood et al., 2005), the rise of the
tertiary sector (Cortes and Pan, 2018; Weinberg, 2000; Oppenheimer, 1970) and a generally
increased economic demand (Angrist, 2002; Carodso and Morin, 2018) in order to explain the
observed positive trends (see e.g. Costa, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Mincer, 1985; Smith and
Ward, 1985).
Over the years, multiple new strands of research have evolved, which to a large extent have
focused on alternative monetary factors behind (the lack of) female labor force participation
such as institutional barriers and public policy (e.g. tax incentives, transfer withdrawal rates
and childcare provision) (see e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Hausman, 1980; Eissa and
Liebman, 1996) as well as costs of participation in general (e.g. transportation and childcare)
(see e.g. Cogan, 1980; Gronau, 1973; Angrist and Evans, 1998). However, as summarized by
Blau and Kahn (2007, 2017), all these conventional economic studies were not able to fully
explain the observed trends in female labor force participation and the remaining gender
gaps. Consequently, the economic research started to consider non-economic determinants of
the developments, especially by discussing and empirically analyzing the role of social norms
and gender role attitudes as important non-pecuniary factors (see e.g. Bertrand, 2010; Fortin,
2015; Goldin, 2006; Reimers, 1985; Costa, 2000; Carodso and Morin, 2018). This literature is
in line with the sociological literature on the transformation of traditional gender roles over
time (Cotter et al., 2011; Ross et al., 1983). As stated by Goldin (2006), one key aspect of
the “quiet revolution of women’s employment” since the 1970s is the increasing importance
of work as a key aspect for a woman’s social identity. These considerations are based on
the economic and sociological research on the importance of social purpose as well as eco-
nomic identity and status as non-pecuniary incentives of labor force participation (Jahoda,
1981; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).4 Traditional gender roles and the associated gender dif-
ferences in the acceptance of home production as an alternative to market production (see
e.g. Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986) are crucial drivers of differences in the importance
of these social norms between men and women (see e.g. Bertrand et al., 2015; Knabe et al.,
2016; Charles et al., 2018). Thus, non-pecuniary incentives to work through prevalent social
norms are likely to be crucial especially when explaining gender differences in labor force
4 The main message of this literature is straightforward: individual identity influences economic outcomes
since deviating from socially desirable behavior is costly for the individual (see e.g Clark, 2003; Scho¨b, 2013;
Hetschko et al., 2014).
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participation as well as long-term trends in female participation decisions. Nevertheless, a lot
of unexplained heterogeneity in the decision making between women remains. Consequently,
especially the most recent literature started to investigate the role of inherent personal at-
tributes for female decision making on the labor market. Wichert and Pohlmeier (2010) find
that e.g. the Big-Five personality traits play a significant role in explaining women’s labor
supply. Although they also consider indirect effects through wage-differences, they conclude
that the traits conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness have a crucial direct
behavioral effect on participation decisions.
A second important strand of literature this paper contributes to is the emerging research
linking individuals’ personality to their behavior on the labor market. Especially locus of con-
trol has already been shown to have a tremendous positive effect on “desirable” behavior and
decision making on the labor market in such areas as human capital investment (Coleman and
DeLeire, 2003), job search effort (McGee and McGee, 2016; Caliendo et al., 2015b), occupa-
tional attainment (Heywood et al., 2017; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011), entrepreneurial activity
(Caliendo et al., 2014) and labor market mobility (Caliendo et al., 2015a). Nevertheless, liter-
ature that directly relates female labor force participation to locus of control is scarce. Most
prominently, Heckman et al. (2006) find a significant positive effect of a combined measure
of locus of control and self-esteem on the individual probability of being employed at age
30 for the sample of young individuals from the NLSY79. They show that this relationship
is much more pronounced for females. In a more recent study, Berger and Haywood (2016)
analyze the effect of locus of control on mothers’s return to employment after parental leave.
Using German survey data, they find that women with an internal locus of control return
to employment more quickly. Based on a heterogeneity analysis with respect to the under-
lying flexibility in the women’s occupations, they conclude that the effect is mainly driven
by different subjective expectations about future career costs of maternity leave. That study
is most closely related to the paper at hand. Nevertheless, it concentrates on a very specific
group of women in a rather exceptional stage of life whereas this paper is intended to draw a
much more general picture.
2.3 Theoretical Considerations
2.3.1 Basic Model of Female Labor Supply
In order to discuss and formalize the potential mechanisms through which locus of control
might affect participation decisions of women, an one-period model of discrete labor supply
decisions is considered as the baseline in the following (see e.g. McFadden, 1974; Borghans
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et al., 2008; Almlund et al., 2011). A woman’s within-period discrete participation choice is
based on the maximization of the following utility function:
Ui = Ui(Ci, Li, Hi, Pi; θi) (2.1)
with U being the neoclassical utility function of woman i, which maps her preferences. U
is convex, i.e. increasing in its arguments and twice differentiable (U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0). Ci
is the consumption level and Li is leisure. As an extension to the traditional labor supply
model such as e.g. in McFadden (1974), two new arguments are added to the utility function.
Firstly, Hi captures all sorts of non-market (home) production such as in specific childcare.
Hence, childcare is also allowed to generate a positive utility for woman i. A woman i thus
divides her total amount of time T between leisure, market- and home production. Secondly,
Pi captures the “joy of working”, i.e. the non-monetary benefits from working, independent
from disutility of every hours worked (which is inversely captured by L). Similar to the
argumentation in Cobb-Clark et al. (2014)5, Pi is based on the fact that woman might not only
derive direct utility from the consumption level but also from the behavior they undertake to
generate it. Consequently, utility not only depends on consumption as the monetary outcome
of participation but also is a function of participation itself, independent from how large its
effect on consumption levels might be.
In line with Borghans et al. (2011) and Almlund et al. (2011), the marginal gains from all
arguments depend on a vector of individual attributes θi. Hence, as opposed to the standard
decision making model, the preferences are heterogeneous. Based on the expansion of the
traditional choice model, which allows for non-stochastic personal attributes θi instead of
stochastic idiosyncratic shocks (McFadden, 1974), the potential role of locus of control for
explaining individual differences can be discussed. For simplification, the vector θi is reduced
to the one parameter locus of control by holding all other attributes constant. For intuition,
two groups of women can be defined: Internal women (I) with the vector θI and external
women (E) with the vector θE . In line with its later construction, we assume θi to increase
with internality, i.e. θI > θE .
Woman i chooses the labor force status, which maximizes her utility and fulfills her budget
constraint
yi + w˜i(T − Li −Hi) ≥ Ci + ph(T −Hi) (2.2)
The non-labor income yi summarizes all sources of income which are not generated by the
woman participating in the labor market such as partner’s earnings and capital income. wi
is the potential wage rate of the woman if she decides to supply a positive amount of labor
5 Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) argue that investments into health can have direct effects on individual utility
independent from their outcomes simply through the act of investing which might generate positive utility by
itself.
Page | 25
CHAPTER 2. FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
to the market, i.e. T − Li −Hi > 0, with T being the endowment of time. The woman is not
expected to have perfect information. Thus, w˜i captures the expectations about the potential
wage rate and is a subjective measure, which again depends on individual attributes: w˜i(θi).
The price of the aggregated consumption good is normalized to 1 and ph is the hourly price for
externally provided childcare and housework which is not provided by the woman (T −Hi).
T −Hi could either be provided externally or by the partner in the household. Consequently,
for simplification, ph is assumed to capture the costs of external housework or childcare as
well as the hourly wage of the husband.
Woman i chooses the optimal labor force status LF ∗i which maximizes her utility with the
choice set Bi being either participating (LFi = 1) if T − Li − Hi > 0 or not participating
(LFi = 0) if T − Li −Hi = 0 at the extensive margin:
LF ∗i = argmax
LFi∈Bi
{Ui} with Bi = {0, 1}. (2.3)
As the focus of this paper is to analyze the behavioral aspects of labor force participation,
while leaving the demand side aside, I concentrate on labor force availability as opposed to
actual employment, in the following. This reduces the risk of biased results due to omitted
returns in employment probability in the empirical part.6 In line with the ILO definition of
“labor force”, a woman is thus assumed to participate in the labor market if she is either
already employed or self-employed or if she is unemployed and intends to participate by
indicating that she is searching for a job (see International Labour Organization, 2018). Thus,
LFi also equals one if the woman does not work but is available to the market by searching
for a job. In this simplification, given a certain expected market wage wi, no assumptions
on labor market conditions and frictions are necessary, as LF ∗i only depends on the woman’s
individual decision making processes and not on her exogenous probability of finding a job,
except indirectly through her expectations captured by w˜i. In line with this, conditional
transfer payments which are paid in response to, for example, job search efforts, such as
unemployment insurance to woman i, are also captured by wi.
7 Thus, wi can be labeled as
the “earnings from participation”.
6 Nevertheless, also the employment probability at the extensive and intensive margin is considered as an
alternative outcome variable in a later stage.
7 This assumption might be overly rigorous as welfare fraud is an ongoing political issue and important topic
of the workfare literature. Individuals can abuse social benefits by pretending to search although they might
not be willing to work anyways. Discussing this issue in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
active search and availability to work will be an essential part of the definition of labor force participation in
the empirical analysis instead of just relying on reported labor force status in order to identify truly involuntary
unemployment. The interested reader may refer to the political literature which discusses welfare fraud as an
important topic. (see e.g. Roosma et al., 2016) Additionally, see e.g. Kreiner and Tranæs (2005) for a discussion
of the role of workfare for the separation of voluntary and involuntary unemployment in general.
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2.3.2 Locus of Control and Potential Mechanisms
Based on this underlying model and the definition of locus of control, multiple hypotheses
can be formed about the relationship between LOC (θi) and female labor force participation.
These hypotheses will then guide the empirical analysis in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Mechanism 1 - Preferences The first potential channel suggests that LOC might affect a
woman’s preferences for the different components of the utility function and thus the marginal
utility she derives from participation. Nevertheless, two conflicting hypotheses can be proposed
based on this mechanism. In the framework outlined above, woman might not only derive
utility from the consumption level but also directly from participation in the labor market as
the behavior they undertake in order to generate this level, i.e. Pi as a non-monetary incentive
for participation. In line with the argumentation in Cobb-Clark et al. (2014), internal women
are likely to have a higher preference for being active in the labor market than external




As a psychological reasoning for this, it can be argued that internals prefer to directly affect
their life’s outcomes and thus be independent from external forces. They are more resistant
to external influences and make more independent judgements. (Lefcourt, 1982) The role of
independence considerations for locus of control has already been discussed especially in the
context of early childhood skill formation in the psychological literature. (see e.g. Wichern and
Nowicki, 1976; Hill, 2011) Thus, consumption which is generated based on self-earned income
is valued higher than consumption based on external income such as partner’s earnings or
unconditional social transfers. Based on these theoretical considerations, internal woman are
ex ante expected to be more likely to participate if Pi is increasing with participation.
As opposed to this, in the presence of children in the household, internal women might
consider the effect of their own actions on their children more carefully than external women.
This is in line with the findings by Lekfuangfu et al. (2018) on the strong effect of maternal
LOC on attitudes towards parental style as well as actual parental time investments. Thus
internal mothers might have stronger preferences for home production as they gain higher




If a mother assumes that her efforts in child-rearing has important positive effects on her
children’s outcomes, she is also more likely to stay at home with young children as opposed to
putting them into childcare. This channel would ex ante be associated with a negative effect
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of LOC on participation probabilities in the presence of children in the household as Hi is
decreasing with participation.
Mechanism 2 - Budget Constraints The second proposed channel suggests that LOC
might directly affect a woman’s subjective and objective budget constraints. Firstly, women
might differ with respect to their expected monetary returns to participation driven by dif-
ferences in the subjective expectations about returns to investments. The expected monetary
returns to participation are higher for internal individuals as they believe in the direct causal-
ity between their own efforts and life’s outcomes. Internal women, for example, have higher
subjective job-offer arrival rates (Caliendo et al., 2015b), higher appreciation of future career
costs of non-working (Berger and Haywood, 2016) and higher subjective wage rates. Hence,
they expect higher earnings from participation, i.e. ∂w˜i/∂θ > 0, and thus gain higher utility
from availability for market production as their budget constraints allows for higher returns









Nevertheless, the difference between internal and external women could also be driven
by differences in the objective monetary returns to locus of control and thus indirectly via
different constraints rather than through direct behavioral effects. One potential explana-
tion for this may be positive demand-side responses to an internal LOC, i.e. higher realized
wage rates (see e.g. Heineck and Anger, 2010) which are correctly anticipated by women and
thus incorporated into the decision-making independent from the subjective beliefs discussed
above. Additionally, internal women have been found to select occupations that are less open
for flexible employment paths, i.e. leaving and returning to employment, such as science, engi-
neering or related professions (Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011). These occupations are likely to be
associated with higher future career costs of non-participation and thus higher disincentives
for home production through reduced future wages and employment probabilities. Thus not
only w˜i but also wi itself depends on θi.
Secondly, LOC might also be correlated with the partners’ earnings driven by assortative
mating or mating probabilities in general. Lundberg (2012) for example shows that personality
traits have an important effect on the formation and stability of marriage. In the present case,
it may be the case that internal women tend to marry men with higher or lower earnings or
even tend to be less or more likely to marry at all, which would again affect their own
participation probabilities through yi. It is also possible that assortative mating is important
with respect to the personality of the partner. Women with an internal LOC might be more
likely to mate with men with an internal LOC, which again indirectly influences women’s
participation decisions through their partners’ earnings. Hence, internal women might differ
with respect to their available family income and thus have a higher or lower necessity to work
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in order to achieve their desired consumption level. Nevertheless, these indirect effects of LOC
on participation probabilities via different budget constraints can be largely controlled for in
the empirical analysis in Section 2.6.1.
2.3.3 Effect Heterogeneity
The influence of personality on participation via preferences and beliefs can be assumed to
crucially depend on the overall size of underlying incentives. If monetary and non-monetary
incentives for market or home production are very high, the power of personality to affect
participation probabilities may be comparably low. Thus, the estimated effects are expected to
be highly heterogeneous with respect to the overall size of e.g. yi and Hi, which are determined
by the existence of partners and children in the household as well as the amount of non-labor
income such as partners earnings. Partners earnings and thus the level of family income
have already been found to be negatively associated with female participation probabilities
(Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974; Lundberg, 1988; Devereux, 2004). A single woman without
any other external income sources (yi = 0) thus has to fulfill all her basic consumption needs
with her own market earnings or conditional transfer payments. If wi − ph is assumed to
be non-negative8, the woman has to generate a certain level of wi(T − Li − Hi) and thus
(T − Li − Hi) > 0. If we assume no welfare fraud taking place, this woman will certainly
participate in the labor market since basic welfare benefits follow the workfare principle and
are thus conditional on participation.9 As this considerably constraints her free choice between
market and home production, the power of θi to affect LF
∗
i is expected to be very low.
10
Also the existence of children might interact with the effect of LOC on participation
probabilities because the presence of children is likely to significantly increase the monetary
and non-monetary utility from home production Hi and has thus been found to significantly
reduce labor force participation of women (see. e.g. Angrist and Evans, 1998; Bronars and
Grogger, 1994). If no children are present in the household, the utility from home production
may be too low and home production might thus be a less attractive outside option from
market production. LOC is therefore expected to affect the participation probabilities of
women with (non-adult) children more strongly. On the other hand, the existence of (young)
children could also lead to very high non-monetary incentives for home production, depending
on a woman’s parenting preferences, age of the children and the quality and costs of childcare
options, and thus again reduce the power of LOC.
8 For the specific case of Germany, this assumption is reasonable as childcare costs are relatively low.
9 Adults who receive social transfer payments in Germany are in general required to be available for any
reasonable employment if they are employable (§7 SGB II). Unemployment insurance payments are thus
directly bound to an active job search requirement.
10 This consideration can be slightly softened for single mothers with young children in Germany. In German
law, employment is, amongst others, not “reasonable” if this employment would, for example, endanger the
upbringing of children. As is regulated in §10 SGB II, this applies to children under the age of 3. Thus for
these women, unemployment insurance payments can be assumed to be captured by yi as long as no other
sources of income exist.
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As a third heterogeneity consideration, the population-wide or sub-group specific amount
of non-monetary utility from participation, captured by ∂Ui/∂Pi, is likely to be important. If
the part of the marginal effect which reflects social norms for working, is already very high,
even women who individually gain lower marginal utility from participation (i.e. external
women) still have a high probability of participating as the marginal utility from participation



















with (1) being the group of women which is exposed to high social norms for working and
(2) being the group of women which is exposed to low social norms of working (see e.g.
Jahoda, 1981; Clark, 2003; Hetschko et al., 2014). This is also in line with the idea that, for
example, for men the social norms of “earning your own living” or “being the breadwinner”
are expected to be very high in general independent from their LOC (see e.g. Killingsworth
and Heckman, 1986; Bertrand et al., 2015; Knabe et al., 2016; Charles et al., 2018). The same
might be true for groups of women who are subject to very high social norms of working.
For them the harm from staying at home exceeds the gains from participation independent
from their personal attributes θi. Within the analysed population in the empirical part of the
paper, variation in social norms is expected to be captured by regional differences as well as
cohort and time trends.
2.4 Data and Empirical Identification
On the basis of these theoretical considerations, the goal of this paper is to empirically
analyze the role of locus of control in explaining women’s current labor force participation.
This is done by using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 2017). The
SOEP is an annual representative household panel that follows a general-purpose approach.
It has been studying about 22,000 individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany since
1984. Personal questionnaires are completed by all individuals aged 18 or older. For more
information on the SOEP see Goebel et al. (2018). It contains a measurement of locus of
control over multiple waves, rich information on current labor-market outcomes and family
status as well as the opportunity to connect women to regional information as well as their
partners’ characteristics if they are surveyed in the same household. The data is restricted to
the waves 2000-2015 due to the measurement of locus of control as well as the availability of
the regional information.
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Sample Restriction For the sample restriction process, I only keep women in the tra-
ditional working age, which is defined as 25 to 65 years. As another restriction, all women
who are still in school, academic or vocational education, already in (early) retirement or in
military service are dropped. Additionally, only women who live in single-adult or in couple
households with or without children are kept. All women in multi-generation households or
other unknown household combinations are dropped. Finally, only women for whom it is pos-
sible to observe all the relevant socio-economic control variables are kept. This leaves 57,308
observations for 7,724 women over 15 years in the full sample of all women.
Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of the full
sample (column 1). In addition to the full sample of all women, the descriptive statistics are
also reported for three (non-exclusive) subsamples: (1) all women with biological children
under 1611 (2) non-cohabiting women, i.e. single women or women with a partner outside
their household, and (3) cohabiting women, i.e. married women or women with a partner in
the same household.
2.4.1 Labor Force Participation
Labor force participation (LF) is measured as a binary indicator that indicates a woman’s
availability to the labor market. The focus of this paper is to analyze the behavioral aspects
of labor supply. Thus, labor force participation does not describe a woman’s true labor force
status but her willingness to participate in market production. Concentrating on the avail-
ability to the job market rather than on the actual employment status allows the demand side
to be theoretically and empirically neglected and the risk of selection effects via differences
in employment probabilities to be reduced.
In line with the ILO definition of labor force participation, a woman is counted as being in
the labor force if she is either employed or self-employed or if she is registered unemployed or
non-working (not registered unemployed) but intends to work and is searching for a job (see
International Labour Organization, 2018)12. The robustness of the results with respect to the
definition of the dependent variable is tested and discussed in detail in a sensitivity check in
Section 2.5.4. For this purpose an indicator for labor force activity (employment), indicators
for differences at the intensive margin (e.g. full-time employment) as well as cumulative time
in the labor force during the core working age are used as alternative outcome variables.
11 The sample includes all women independent of their family status. The information on the children is
generated on the basis of the individual birth history of the women available from the SOEP. The sample
thus includes all women who have children under the age of 16 (independent of whether they live in the same
household).
12 Registered unemployed and non-working women are recoded on the basis of the information available
on intention to work, active search and ability to start working from the personal questionnaire. Registered
unemployed women who indicate that they were not actively searching for work in the last 4 weeks are coded
to “not participating” while women who were originally coded as “not working” but indicate that they actively
searched for a job, have the unconstrained intention to work and are ready to immediately start working are
coded to “participating”.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Labor Force Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Children Not Cohabiting
under 16 Cohabiting
mean mean mean mean
Labor Force Status
Employed 0.70 0.62 0.77 0.69
Full-Time (≥ 35 hours) 0.54 0.35 0.68 0.50
Part-Time (15 - 34 hours) 0.37 0.51 0.28 0.40
Marginal (< 15 hours) 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.11
Unemployed 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.05
Self-Employed 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Not-Working 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.16
Maternity Leave 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.04
Outcome: Labor Force Participation 0.82 0.74 0.93 0.79
Observations 57,308 22,219 11,267 46,041
Individuals 7,724 3,617 2,305 6,565
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, own calculations.
Note: Full descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the current labor force status of the women. In the full
sample of all women (column 1), 70% are employed, 6% are self-employed, 7% are unemployed
and in total 17% indicate that they are not working or on maternity leave. If, in addition to
these raw shares, the information on active job search, intention to work and availability to
start working are also considered, a labor force participation rate of 82% results. Due to a
lower share of employed women and a higher share of women who indicate that they are not
working in the subsample of cohabiting women (column 4) as compared to the subsample of
non-cohabiting women (column 3), the labor force participation is distinctively lower for the
former (79% compared to 93%). The same holds true for all women with children under the
age of 16 (column 2).
2.4.2 Locus of Control
Locus of Control is surveyed within the SOEP in the years 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015. Based
on a scale developed by Nolte et al. (1997), respondents were asked how closely a series of 10
statements characterizes their views about the extent to which they influence what happens
in life. A four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘applies fully’) to 4 (‘does not apply’) was
used in 1999, while in 2005, 2010 and 2015 responses were measured on a seven-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (‘disagree completely’) to 7 (‘agree completely’). A list of the items can
be found in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Components of Locus of Control (not imputed)
No Item mean SD
Q: The following statements apply to different attitudes towards life and the future.
To what degree do you personally agree with the following statements?
Scale: 1 (Disagree completely) - 7 (Agree completely)
I1: How my life goes depends on me 5.46 (1.39)
I2: Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve (-) 3.15 (1.76)
I3: What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck (-) 3.53 (1.63)
I4: If a person is socially [...] active, she can have an effect on social conditions 3.71 (1.58)
I5: I have the experience that others have a controlling influence over my life (-) 3.11 (1.66)
I6: One has to work hard in order to succeed 5.91 (1.14)
I7: If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities (-) 3.49 (1.66)
I8: The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions (-) 4.54 (1.43)
I9: Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can make 4.78 (1.31)
I10: I have little control over the things that happen in my life (-) 2.63 (1.47)
Observations 14,214a
Source: SOEP, waves 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33.
Notes: Items marked with a (-) are reversed prior to factor analysis.
a In this table, the item means and SD are computed for the observation waves 1999,2005, 2010 and 2015 only. Imputed values are not
included.
In order to harmonize the scales, the responses from 1999 are reversed and “stretched”.13
Afterwards, an exploratory factor analysis is conducted separately by year in order to inves-
tigate the way these items load onto latent factors.14 Items 1 and 6 clearly load onto the first
factor – which is interpreted as internal LOC –, while items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 clearly load
onto the second factor – interpreted as external LOC. Items 4 and 9 are not included in the
following due to ambiguous loading15. Additionally, similar to the reasoning in Specht et al.
(2013), excluding those two items improves the internal consistency and scale reliability of
the resulting factor as Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) increases from 0.62 to 0.67.
In line with the previous literature (see e.g. Piatek and Pinger, 2016), a two-step procedure
is used in order to create a continuous and unidimensional LOC factor. First, the scores for
items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 are reversed such that all eight items are increasing in internality.16
Second, confirmatory factor analysis is used to extract a single factor for each year. This has
the advantage that it avoids simply weighting each item equally, as averaging would do, and
instead allows the data to determine how each item is weighted in the overall index. Simple
averaging of all items would risk measurement error and attenuation bias (Piatek and Pinger,
13 In line with Specht et al. (2013), this process preserves the relative differences between individuals. The
process results in values of 1, 3, 5 or 7 such that a ‘1’ on the 1999 four-point scale, for example, becomes a ‘7’
on the 2005-2015 seven-point scales.
14 The detailed results from the factor analysis are available upon request. A loading plot pooled for all years
can be found in Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix but the pattern of factor loadings is similar in all years.
15 Item 4 does not clearly load onto either of the two factors and is discarded. Item 9 loads onto the internal
factor but an intuitive attribution based on the item’s wording would point more in the direction of an external
item.
16 These items are marked with a (-) in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Locus of Control
Source: SOEP, waves 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own illustration.
2016).17 The resulting factor is increasing in internal LOC and its distribution is shown in
Figure 2.1.
On the basis of the generated and imputed continuous LOC factor variable, I create a
categorical variable that splits the continuous LOC in three terciles, in order to identify
non-linear relationships. These cutoffs are also illustrated in Figure 2.1.
There is evidence that LOC is relatively stable for the working-age population (see e.g.
Preuss and Hennecke, 2018; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). Nevertheless, in order to minimize
concerns about potential reverse causality, I ensure that the LOC factor is always included
as a pre-market rather than a contemporaneous or post-market measure, i.e. always obtained
prior to t, in line with the argumentation in Piatek and Pinger (2016). Hence, LOC is imputed
forwards lagged by at least one year. That is, LFP in 2000 - 2005 depends on the 1999 locus
of control, LFP in 2006 - 2010 depends on the 2005 locus of control and LFP in 2011 - 2015
depends on the 2010 locus of control.18
17 The sensitivity checks in Section 2.6.2 include a re-estimation of the results using this simple index. The
results do only marginally differ.
18 Based on the findings in Preuss and Hennecke (2018), this procedure does not prevent a bias due to a
temporary measurement error in LOC during periods of unemployment. In line with what is proposed in Preuss
and Hennecke (2018), I thus additionally attempt to correct the LOC measurement by using the LOC which
has been observed during the closest employment spell of these women. The results of these estimations are
presented and discussed in Section 2.6.2. As an additional sensitivity check also the average over all available
LOC observations is used as an explanatory variable.
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2.4.3 Estimation Strategy
For the main empirical analysis, I employ a reduced-form approach to estimate the asso-
ciation between a woman’s propensity to be available to the labor force and her last LOC:
P (LFit = 1) = P (β1 + β2locit−n + β3Xit + β4Pi + β5Rit + β6T + it > 0), (2.9)
where LFit is the indicator for labor force participation of woman i at time t and locit−n is the
locus of control of woman i in the last LOC interview prior to t, i.e. n interviews prior to t with
n = {1, . . . , 6}. In order to identify potential non-linearities in the relationship, the analysis
is repeated with a categorical variable that indicates in which tercile of the LOC distribution
a woman is classified. The vector Xit contains an extensive list of demographic information
(age, religion, region of residence, school and vocational degree, subjective health) and fam-
ily characteristics (partner status, number of children, indicators for children in certain age
ranges). Additionally, family income is approximated by subtracting the reported labor net
income as well as individual unemployment insurance payments from the reported net house-
hold income. The variable is thus assumed to capture all earnings which are not generated
through labor force participation of woman i. It includes partners earnings as well as all other
regular income sources such as unconditional social transfer payments.19 It is contains as a
dichotomous indicator for a low, medium or high family income. Additionally, averaged and
standardized personality and preferences measures Pi (Big Five personality traits and risk
aversion) are included as controls.20
The vector Rit contains a list of regional information corresponding to the local planning
region (“Raumordnungsregion”)21 in which the woman lives at time t. The information is
available from the INKAR data provided by the German Federal Institute for Research on
Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial (BBSR, 2015). The vector includes an indicator for East-
Germany, the unemployment rate, the gross value added, the population density, the median
full-time income of women, the share of children in public childcare for the age groups 1-3 years
and 3-6 years as well as the share of full-time (> 7 hours per day) childcare in the respective
age-groups. Additionally, the median costs for full-time childcare per child are approximated
19 Only earnings-related unemployment insurance benefit, the so called “Arbeitslosengeld I” are subtracted.
Unemployment benefits as part of the basic income scheme for needy jobseeker, the so called “Arbeitslosengeld
II”, cannot be distinguished from other social assistance payments within the household and is thus still
captured within the variable although it still follows the principle of activity. See e.g. Konle-Seidl et al. (2007)
for an overview over the unemployment benefits system in Germany.
20 In a sensitivity check in Section 2.6, I additionally investigate the role of characteristics of the employment
type in the current or last employment spell in order to assess the importance of selection in certain industries
or occupational types. Nevertheless, these variables are assumed to be “bad controls” in the estimation due
to the high risk of endogeneity of those variables in the model (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008, for more
information). See a more detailed discussion of the problem in Section 2.6.
21 The households residential location is classified into one of 96 separate regions using the SOEP geocodes.
Although these regions do not correspond to official local government areas, they are the basis for the federal
German government’s regional planning. In particular, they capture urban centers (along with their associated
catchment areas) and are defined on the basis of commuting flows (see BBSR, 2015).
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based on the information available from all SOEP respondents in the respective region.22 See
Table 2.A.1 for the full list of controls. Finally, the vector T contains year fixed effects.
Equation 2.9 is estimated using a random effects logit model. Hence, it captures the
idiosyncratic error as well as the random individual-specific effect which is assumed to be
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The use of random effects is necessary as it
considers the panel structure of the data and takes care of serial correlation of the error term
it across time for a given individual i. The results presented in Section 2.5 are the average
marginal effects on the probability of a positive outcome assuming that the random effect is
zero.23
As already discussed in the theoretical considerations, the estimated direct relationship
is very likely to be non-linear with respect to monetary and non-monetary incentives as
important decision constraints. Consequently, heterogeneity with respect to the family status
(i.e. existence of a partner and children in the household) and the level of family income as
well as with respect to underlying differences in social norms of working (i.e. region of living,
cohort indicators and period indicators) is considered in a second step. Since not only β2, i.e.
the marginal effect of loc, is regarded to be non-linear, the heterogeneity is examined using
fully separated models for the different subgroups SGit:
P (LFit = 1|SGit) = P (β1 + β2locit−1 + β3Xit + β4Pi + β5Rit + β6T + it|SGit). (2.10)
In order to prevent problems with selection into these sub-groups depending on locus of
control, the LOC is generated, standardized and cut into terciles for each sub-group separately
such that women are always only compared to women in the same sub-group. All results from
the heterogeneity analysis were also replicated using interactions instead of the fully separated
models. The results differ only marginally and can be obtained from the author upon request.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Evidence
Table 2.3 gives first descriptive evidence for the relationship between LOC and labor force
status and participation of the women in the sample. The shares of all labor force statuses
as well as the dependent variable labor force participation are given separately for all three
terciles of LOC. It can be seen that due to a higher share of employed and self-employed
22 In the years 2002, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015 households report detailed information on the childcare
costs per child in the household as well as information on the type and amount of childcare. Based on all
households with a child in full-time public childcare (> 7 hours) in the region, the median over all reported
amounts is calculated.
23 In order to assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of method, the main results were
replicated using a simple logit model with clustered standard errors and a random effects linear probability
model. The estimated results of both alternatives only marginally differ from the random effects logit estimation
in effect size and are available from the author upon request.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics by LOC - Labor Force Status
Low LOC Medium LOC High LOC
[LOCmin, LOCP33] (LOCP33, LOCP66] (LOCP66, LOCmax]
Labor Force Status
Employed 0.67 0.72 0.72
Full-Time Employed 0.53 0.53 0.55
Part-Time Employed 0.47 0.47 0.45
Unemployed 0.10 0.06 0.04
Self-Employed 0.04 0.06 0.08
Not-Working 0.16 0.12 0.11
Maternity Leave 0.03 0.04 0.04
Outcome: Labor Force Participation 0.78 0.82 0.84
Observations 18,912 18,917 19,479
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
women and a lower share of non-working women for the highest tercile, the overall share of
labor force participation is higher for women with a high LOC than for those with a low
LOC. Nevertheless, this descriptive relationship is very likely to be driven by a long list of
socio-demographic characteristics that are associated with a higher participation probability
and a higher LOC, such as education, age and family status (e.g. number and age of children).
2.5.2 Main Results
Table 2.4 presents an overview of the estimated average marginal effects of the continuous LOC
variable and the LOC categories medium ((LOCP33, LOCP66]) and high ((LOCP66, LOCmax])
on labor force participation, with a low LOC ([LOCmin, LOCP33]) being the reference cat-
egory. All the estimations are for the full estimation samples of all women, while gradually
including more and more sets of control variables. In addition, column 1 of Table 2.A.2 in the
Appendix provides an overview of the estimated marginal effects for all the control variables
analogous to the estimation using the continuous LOC variable (columns 7 in Table 2.4).
In line with the descriptive evidence in the previous subsection, the results of the raw
difference, only controlled for year fixed effects, indicate that on average women with a high
or medium LOC are ceteris paribus more likely to participate in the labor force (see column
2). Furthermore, the continuous LOC factor is significantly positive, indicating an increasing
probability of participation with increasing values of LOC (column 1). Including additional
control variables indicates that the raw gap was biased downwards by omitted-variable bias
especially through family characteristics. The effect size increases considerably between be-
tween columns 3 (4) and 5 (6), when partner status, number of children, age of children and
family income are included. Thus, in the full specification (columns 7 and 8), the average
marginal effect is significantly positive and even more pronounced as in the raw difference.
Having a medium or a high LOC increases the probability of being in the labor force by, on
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Table 2.4: Main Results - Average Marginal Effects (Sample: All)
Outcome Variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.012
∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Regional Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Socio-Demographic Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Family Controls 3 3 3 3
Personality Controls 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Full estimation results for the specification in column (7) can be found in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix.
average, 1.3 and 1.4 percentage points compared to having a low LOC. When comparing this
effect to the mean non-participation rate in the full sample of 18 percent (see Table 2.1), this
amounts to a 7.8 percent decrease in the probability of staying at home. Increasing the LOC
by approximately one standard deviation, increases the probability of participation by 0.8
percentage points (column 7).
When comparing the marginal effects of a medium and a high LOC, a non-linearity in the
effect of LOC on the participation probability becomes apparent. While a medium LOC is
associated with an increased probability of participation, this effect flattens out afterwards.
Women with a very high LOC are not significantly more likely to participate than women with
a medium LOC. In line with the one-dimensionality of the LOC scale, the findings indicate
that the effect is mainly driven by a negative impact of being strongly external, rather than
a positive impact of being strongly internal.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity Analysis
Family Status and Children Using these main results for the full sample, Table 2.5
presents the results for the sub-samples based on family status and existence of biological
children under the age of 16. All estimations include the full specification and, for compar-
ison, columns 1 of Table 2.5 give the results for the full sample (equivalent to column 8 in
Table 2.4).24 Fully separated estimations are reported. These subgroup analyses correspond
24 In addition, Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix gives an overview of the estimated marginal effects for all the
control variables corresponding to the estimations in columns 1, 3 and 7. The full results for all other models
can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity Analysis (Marginal Effects): Family Status and Children
All Non-Cohabiting Cohabiting
Children under 16 Children under 16 Children under 16
All No Yes All No Yes All No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.004 0.028∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.014
∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.001 0.023 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 57,308 35,089 22,219 11,267 8,404 2,863 46,041 26,685 19,356
LF = 0 10,526 4,688 5,838 822 380 442 9,704 4,308 5,396


















All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Full estimation results for the specifications in columns (1), (4) and (7) can be found in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix.
to the supposed heterogeneity of the effect of LOC on participation probabilities with respect
to underlying monetary and non-monetary incentives and disincentives to work driven by the
existence of partners and children in the household.
Looking at the estimated average marginal effects for the separate groups, we can see
that the effect is in large part driven by cohabiting women and women with children under
16 in general. Cohabiting women with a medium/high LOC are, on average, ceteris paribus
1.5 percentage points more likely to be in the labor force than cohabiting women with a low
LOC (column 7). For non-cohabiting women, the effect is insignificant and close to zero25.
However, separating the two groups by the children-indicator shows that this difference is
in large part driven by the existence of children in both groups. In the subgroup of women
with children under 16, the effect for non-cohabiting women, i.e. single mothers, (column 6)
is even higher than the effect for cohabiting women with children (column 9). Single mothers
with a medium LOC are, on average, ceteris paribus 2.8 percentage points more likely to be
in the labor force than single mothers with a low LOC. A high LOC increases the probability
of being in the labor force by 2.3 percentage points although not significant due to the small
sample size. In the sub-sample of women without children, the effect is still positive and
significant for cohabiting women (column 8) but zero for non-cohabiting women (column 5).
Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix also provides analog estimation results for mothers depending on
the age of their children. Women with pre-school children exhibit the largest effects (column
3 of Table 2.A.3). Having a high LOC on average decreases a woman’s non-participation
25 Similar insignificant close-to-zero effects can be found for men using the same sample specifications. The
results can be obtained from the author upon request.
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probability by 6 percentage points (18%) if she has pre-school children. For mothers of babies
especially the effect of a high LOC is close to zero. As opposed to this, the effect for women
with “adult” children is still significant and positive.
All these results support the theoretical idea that the effect of LOC on participation
probabilities strongly interacts with underlying incentives and disincentives to work. If the
monetary incentives for market production, such as in the case of single women without chil-
dren, already considerably exceed the decision threshold, personality and preferences have
no power to affect the participation decision. The same holds true for very high monetary
disincentives to work, e.g. in the sample of women with children under the age of one, i.e.
women who are largely eligible for generous parental leave payments. Thus, very high mone-
tary incentives and disincentives to work act in the same direction, i.e. they reduce the power
of LOC.
Also in line with the theoretical considerations, a certain level of monetary and non-
monetary incentives for home production impose the necessary scope of decision making that
is important in order for LOC to change the decision towards working. This is, for example,
given through the social purpose the existence of (young) children adds to home production.
Being independent of monetary incentives, only women who at least consider home production
as an outside option to market production are assumed to be affected by their LOC. If no
young children are present in the household, the utility from home production seems to be very
low and home production is thus a less attractive outside option to market production – such
as in the case of cohabiting women without children (column 8 in Table 2.5) or with school-
age and adult children (columns 4 and 5 in Table 2.A.3). Evaluating the theoretical ideas
on the consequences of very high non-monetary incentives for home production, e.g. through
the importance of care provided by the mother as opposed to outside-household childcare,
is less straightforward as this is highly heterogeneous with respect to individual preferences
about childcare and the quality of alternative childcare options. The theoretical idea that an
internal LOC might be associated with a lower participation probability for mothers due to
considerations about their own influence on children’s outcomes cannot be found in the results
for participation probabilities in general. The effect of LOC on participation probabilities is
robustly positive over all the subgroups considered. Merely the more pronounced non-linearity
in the effects for mothers (especially single mothers) might be driven by this alternative
mechanism.26
Family Income As a more direct measure of differences in the monetary incentives to work,
the approximated family income can be used for the definition of the sub-groups. Family
income is intended to capture all non-labor income y available to a women in the household,
26 The sensitivity check in Section 2.5.4 reveals remarkable differences at the intensive margin, showing that
mothers with a medium LOC are actually less likely to work full-time. This is clear evidence for considerations
about own children’s outcomes being at play when women decide about working hours.
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Observations 18,835 18,783 19,690
LF = 0 1,486 3,822 5,218
LF = 1 17,349 (92%) 14,961 (80%) 14,472 (74%)
All Controls 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
e.g. partners labor income and unconditional social transfers. For a detailed description on
the generation of this variable, see Section 2.4.3. The three sub-groups are generated based
on whether the family income is low, medium or high with the terciles being the cut-offs.
Table 2.6 presents the results of the heterogeneity analysis. All estimations include the full
specification using the dichotomous LOC measure (equivalent to column 8 in Table 2.4). The
sample of all women is used and fully separated estimations are reported.
The observation numbers and reported shares in the bottom panel of Table 2.6 show
that women with a high family income are, in line with expectations, distinctly less likely to
participate in the labor force (74%) as compared to women with a low family income (92%).
The sub-group analysis reveals indication for the expected heterogeneity. While the marginal
effects of a medium LOC are rather consistent, the effect of a high LOC seems to increase
with increasing family income. While internal women with a low family income are on average
only one percentage point more likely to participate, the participation probability for internal
women with a high family income is on average 1.6 percentage points higher than for external
women.
Social Norms of Working In additional to budget constraints, a woman’s decision making
might also be constraint by prevailing social norms for working. If social norms for working
are rather high (such as e.g. for men), decision making based on inherent preferences is consid-
erably constraint. Table 2.7 presents the results of this heterogeneity analysis. All estimations
include the full specification using the dichotomous LOC measure (equivalent to column 8 in
Table 2.4). The sample of all women is used and fully separated estimations are reported.
Firstly, heterogeneity can be expected with respect to differences between the eastern
and western parts of Germany. Due to the long-term socialist political influence in the former
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneity Analysis: Social Working Norms (Sample: All)
Region Cohort1 Observation Period







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.016
∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005 0.031∗∗∗ 0.008 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.021
∗∗∗ 0.003 0.025∗∗∗ 0.004 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 41,770 15,538 18,507 17,747 21049 16,619 23,000 21,049
LF = 0 8,871 1,655 3,959 2,327 4,240 3,782 4,131 2,613
















All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 Cohort Cutoffs: Early - born before 1958, Middle - born 1958-1966, Late - born after 1966.
GDR, the east of Germany has a longer tradition of women’s participation in the labor force.27
Consequently, direct marginal utility from participation ∂Ui\∂Pi is expected to be higher
for eastern German women and the absolute effect of LOC on participation probabilities is
likely to be lower. The observation numbers (columns 1 and 2 in bottom panel of Table 2.7)
support this assumption. The participation probability is with 79% distinctly lower in the
west of Germany than in the east of Germany (90%). The upper panel of columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2.7 presents the marginal effects based on the subgroups of women living in the east and
west of Germany. The results reveal that the significant positive marginal effect of a medium
and a high LOC is distinctively larger for women in the west of Germany. The effect of a high
LOC is not significantly different from zero for women in the east of Germany. The identified
heterogeneity might nevertheless also be driven by differences in the availability of childcare
between the east and west of Germany. Nevertheless, shares of children in public childcare
for different age-groups are included as controls in all estimation models. Additionally, a
heterogeneity analysis with respect to those shares is less clear and gives no indication for
heterogeneity in this respect.28
Based on the continuous decrease in the importance of traditional gender roles over time
in almost all modern Western societies (see e.g. Goldin, 2006), women in later cohorts are
assumed to be more affected by a generalized social pressure to be economically independent
27 The socialist system was characterized by a strong emphasis on the dual-earner/state-carer system of
family labor supply, i.e. an extremely high levels of female labor force participation in combination with an
extensive system-level organization of family-support structures and child care (see e.g. Braun et al., 1994;
Rosenfeld et al., 2004).
28 Results are available from the author upon request.
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from external forces than women of earlier cohorts (Heim, 2007). For the former, ∂Ui\∂Pi
can be assumed to be higher than for the latter. They might therefore have a higher partici-
pation probability independent from LOC as their utility from participation is higher. Thus,
columns 3 to 5 of Table 2.7 present the marginal effects based on the estimations in which
the marginal effect of LOC is calculated fully separated for different cohorts. The cutoffs for
the manifestations of the birth cohort indicator ”early”, ”middle” and ”late” were generated
based on the terciles of year of birth in the full estimation sample, i.e. P (33) = 1958 and
P (66) = 1966, in order to obtain groups of approximately similar size. The results indicate
a strong heterogeneity of the effect with respect to cohort. The distinct marginal effects of a
medium and high LOC on participation probabilities can only be observed for women from
the early cohorts, i.e. born before 1958 (column 3). The effect is distinctly lower for both the
women in the medium as well as in the latest cohorts (columns 4 and 5).
As the heterogeneity with respect to cohort might also be driven by age effects, the hetero-
geneity was repeated by making use of the longitudinal nature of the data. The observations
are thus cut into three groups based on the observation periods 1999-2005, 2005-2010 and
2010-2015. The cutoffs are informed by the LOC observation waves 2005 and 2010. The re-
sults reported in columns 6 to 8 support the identified heterogeneity in the previous sub-group
analysis. The effect size seems to decrease over time, supporting the idea of increasing social
norms for working.
2.5.4 Labor Force Activity, Working Hours and Lifetime Participation
The behavioral implications of LOC on labor force availability has been the center of at-
tention in the theoretical considerations as well as the main part of the empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to investigate whether those static behavioral effects actually
translate into higher employment probabilities and higher average lifetime participation, as
these are the variable with the desired positive macro- and microeconomic consequences in
the long run. If a higher probability of being available to the market for internal women does
not translate into higher employment probabilities, the positive economic implications of LOC
are limited by other unobserved factors such as e.g. market conditions and frictions.
In order to assess the generalizability of the results with respect to the choices made
about the participation indicator as described in Section 2.4.1, three major components of
the dependent variable are investigated: 1) the concentration on labor force availability instead
of labor force activity, 2) the restriction to the extensive margin as well as 3) the focus on an
one-period discrete choice rather than a lifetime perspective on labor force participation.
Table 2.8 starts by giving the results of the investigations with respect to the first two
points. As a first step, the dependent variable is adjusted such that it only captures labor force
activity instead of availability. Thus, the indicator is one if a women is actually employed and
zero if she is unemployed or not-working independent from whether she intents to work by
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Table 2.8: Additional Results (Marginal Effects): Outcome Variable - Labor Force Activity
Sample: All Employed








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.028
∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.010 -0.004 -0.007
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.030
∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.013 -0.006 -0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
Observations1 53,907 20,936 43,376 40,225 13,874 31,548 40,225 13,874 31,548
LF = 0 13,682 7,062 11,828 3,736 2,021 3,350 18,606 9,078 15,828


















All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 Self-employed are dropped from the sample as working hours cannot be determined for them.
searching for a job.29 This alternative definition was neglected in the main part of the empirical
analysis as it captures unobserved returns to locus of control with respect to employment
probabilities and therefore does not concentrate on the behavioral aspects of labor force
participation.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.8 give the results of this new indicator while still concentrating
on the extensive margin. The results indicate that the behavioral changes are fully translated
into higher employment probabilities. The effects are considerably stronger than in the main
estimations. This is likely due to unobserved returns to LOC in employment probabilities.
Having a high LOC thus on average increases the probability of being employed by 3 percent-
age points for the full sample (column 1). This is also true for the sub-samples of mothers
(column 2) and cohabited women (column 3).
In addition to this, columns 4 to 9 give the estimated marginal effects of LOC on partici-
pation indicators at the intensive margin. For the sub-sample of all women who are employed
(LF = 1 in columns 1 to 3), the outcome variable in columns 4 to 6 indicates whether the
woman is employed at least part-time and consequently not marginally employed, defined as
15 contracted working hours per week or more. Additionally, the outcome variable in columns
7 to 9 indicates whether a woman is full-time employed, defined by at least 35 contracted
working hours per week. While LOC positively affects labor force availability as well as par-
ticipation at the extensive margin, no effects can be identified at the intensive margin. This
29 In this specification, self-employed women are set to missing as it is not possible to identify working hours
for these women in the further steps. Nevertheless, the results for the indicator at the extensive margin do not
strongly differ if self-employed women are included. Results are available upon request.
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Table 2.9: Additional Results (Marginal Effects): Outcome Variable - Aggregated
Participation (Sample: 55+)
Sample: Cross-Section - Women 55+
Years in Labor Force 25-55y Years Employed 25-55y
All Kids2 Cohab. All Kids2 Cohab.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
1
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.180 0.216 0.251 0.759
∗∗ 0.782∗∗ 0.622
(0.351) (0.376) (0.402) (0.360) (0.384) (0.406)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.835
∗∗ 0.701∗ 0.716∗ 1.531∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.396) (0.423) (0.381) (0.404) (0.428)
Observations 3,255 2,909 2,640 3,255 2,909 2,640
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 Locus of Control is calculated based on the average over all available LOC observations.
2 The sub-group consists of all women with any biological children at time t independent from their age.
is largely in line with the theoretical idea of LOC mainly affecting the non-monetary gains
from participation independent from the amount of working hours.
Additionally, the lifetime perspective needs to be considered in order to get an idea about
whether this static relationship actually translates into differences for the whole working life.
Thus, in the additional results presented in Table 2.9, the accumulated years in the labor
force as well as in employment between the age of 25 and 55 are the outcome variables of
interest. Using the detailed biographical information available for every SOEP participant,
the aggregated time in the labor force is calculated by adding the years a woman spent in
employment or registered unemployment during those 30 years.30 As no biographical informa-
tion is available on the job-search behavior, I have to rely on the reported labor force status
in order to identify labor force participation here. As job-search is likely to be an important
determinant of true willingness to participate, it has to be taken into account that this is
thus only a rough measure of participation. The cross-sectional estimation sample consists
of one observation per woman in the first available year in the sample in the age of 55 or
later. Only women who have valid information on their labor force status during at least 25 of
those 30 years are considered. The explanatory variable is a measure for the average locus of
control over all available observations. This is largely in line with the sensitivity reported in
Section 2.6.2 and is intended to reduce the problem of regression attenuation in the present
30 A women is assumed to spend a full year in a certain labor force status if she only reports one spell during
a certain year. If she reports multiple spells during one year, she is assumed to have spend an equal share of
the year in either spell and consequently the value (1\number of spells) is added to the counter.
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case as LOC at time t might be measured long after the relevant decision periods.31 The
effects are estimated using a simple linear regression model.
The results presented in Table 2.9 indicate a significant positive effect of LOC on lifetime
labor force availability and activity during those 30 years. Women with a high average LOC
spend on average approximately 0.8 years more in the labor force (column 1) and 1.5 more
years in employment (column 4) during this time.32 The effect is relatively homogeneous with
respect to the marital status as well as indicator for children (of any age) at time t.
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
2.6.1 Controlling for Endogenous Budget Constraints
As has been discussed in the theoretical considerations, differences in the participation
probabilities between internal and external women might also be driven by omitted differences
in the objective budget constraints rather than the proposed differences in preferences or
beliefs. Thus, controlling for them is necessary to identify the direct behavioral effect of LOC
on participation decisions instead of the indirect effects through differences in opportunities
and constraints such as occupational selection, wage differences and assortative mating. The
results from this additional estimations can be found in Table 2.A.4 in the Appendix.
Controlling for those potentially endogenous variables is, however, less straightforward
than expected. Simply including the information on the current or last job would leave us
with a large multicollinearity problem caused by the characteristics themselves, but also by
their availability in general. The information on employment characteristics (occupation and
wage) has to be imputed from the last employment or self-employment spell if a woman is not
(self-)employed at the moment. Nevertheless, it is not possible to observe any information on
employment for a lot of women if they were either never employed or at least never employed
during their time in the SOEP33. This is, by definition, more often the case in the group of
women who do not participate in the labor force at the moment. When controlling for the
employment information, the indicator for non-availability of the information would thus be a
“bad control”, in line with the arguments by Angrist and Pischke (2008), as it is highly multi-
collinear with the labor force participation indicator. Not only are external women more likely
to be observed outside the labor force at the moment, but they are also more likely never to be
31 Although smaller in magnitude, the effects are still significant if instead the imputed LOC at time t is
used. Results are available upon request.
32 The lower estimates for labor force participation are likely to be driven by the rough measure of partici-
pation here as no information on job search is available and also all other alternative labor force statuses such
as retirement and education influence the overall number of years. As internal women are observed to spend
less years in registered unemployment, this drives the estimated results downwards.
33 The problem can be slightly weakened by using information on the very first employment of women given in
the biography questionnaire, which is answered by every SOEP-respondent. If no information on occupational
type or industry is available during the time in in the SOEP, this information is used. Nevertheless, no wage
information is available from the biographical data.
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observed in the labor force, and the indicator could just as well be a dependent variable in the
estimation model. To disentangle the endogeneity problem from the true effects of controlling
for occupational characteristics and wages, column (1) of Table 2.A.4 starts by reducing the
observation sample to the women who are observed in occupation during their time in the
SOEP at least once. In line with expectations, the estimated effects for the LOC drop if the
sample is reduced, indicating an endogeneity problem in the observability of information.
The estimated effects from this reduced sample are taken as the new baseline in the following
in order to eradicate parts of the bad controls problem. Nevertheless, it has to be taken
into account that also the occupational information themselves are potentially endogenous.
Therefore, the presented results have to be interpreted with care.
Occupational Choice Column 2 of Table 2.A.4 starts by adding potentially omitted in-
formation on the industry and occupational type of women in their current or last job as
measures of occupational selection based on locus of control. Nevertheless, if the last occupa-
tional type and the last industry classification are included, the estimated effects for LOC do
not change. Hence, this can be taken as an indication of no severe bias through omitted occu-
pational information in the main estimations. An effect of LOC on participation probabilities
via occupational selection and differences in the expected future costs of non-participation
can thus be rejected.
Wage Differences Secondly, it is necessary to consider wage returns to LOC as potential
omitted drivers of the identified effects. In order to investigate the importance of this channel,
a proxy for the expected wage from working has to be included as a control variable. Column
3 of Table 2.A.4 presents the results of the sensitivity check in which additionally to the
occupational information also the net labor income of the last observed working spell is
included as a proxy for the expected wage of a potential future employment. If the reduced
sample is used and the last labor net income is included as a control variable, this does not
further change the estimated coefficient for LOC. The coefficient of the last net labor income
has the expected positive sign. Omitted variable bias can therefore be rejected with respect
to a demand-side response to LOC via higher expected wages, too.
Assortative Mating - Partner’s Wage and Personality As a third set of variables
that might explain parts of the estimated relationship, information on a woman’s partner has
to be controlled for. Fortunately, the SOEP makes it possible to merge cohabiting women
with their partners. Thus, columns 4 to 6 of Table 2.A.4 present the results of the sensitivity
check in which the partner’s current net labor income as well as the continuous LOC factor
of the partner is included as an additional control variable for cohabiting women. In line
with the procedure in the paragraphs above, the results of the baseline estimation for the
reduced sample of all women for whom it is possible to merge the partner’s wages and locus
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of control are presented in column 4 of Table 2.A.4. As can be seen in columns 5 and 6,
the results do not change if partner’s net income and LOC are included as control variables,
indicating that the results of the main estimation are not severely biased by assortative
mating. As partners labor income is already captured by the indicator for family income
in the main estimations, the effect of partners income is, although significantly negative,
rather small. Partners LOC has no significant effect at all. Admittedly, remaining concerns
about various other possible interdependencies between partners such as those with respect to
gender attitudes cannot be completely ruled out. Internal women might, for instance, be more
likely to mate with men who have more tolerant gender attitudes and are thus more likely to
participate. These characteristics are assumed to be largely captured by the partner’s locus of
control and earnings. The fact that the positive relationship between LOC and participation
decisions can also be identified for single mothers, however, provides some reassurance that
assortative mating does not drive large parts of the estimated relationship.
2.6.2 Locus of Control Construction and Imputation
As a second important set of sensitivity checks, the construction and imputation of the
locus of control as explanatory variable is tested. Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix presents the
results of three alternative forms of construction and imputation of the LOC factor: (a) a
simple index, (b) an average over all observations as well as (c) an imputation from the
closest employment spell. All checks are conducted using the full estimation sample and the
full set of control variables. The baseline results are replicated in columns 1 and 2. Columns
3 and 4 provide the re-estimated effects when varying the construction of the LOC factor in
the observation years. Instead of using the results of the factor analysis, the “simple index”
assumes equal weights of all 8 items used, and a simple average over all item responses is
calculated. The results differ only marginally from those in the baseline.
Secondly, the timing of the LOC measurement and thus the imputation approach is tested.
As Preuss and Hennecke (2018) pointed out, there is a considerable risk of reverse causality or
attenuation bias due to temporary measurement errors in the LOC. Using the same data from
the SOEP, they found a significant negative short-run effect of exogenous job-loss on LOC
for individuals who are still unemployed during the LOC interview. Based on an extensive
sensitivity check, they conclude that this is likely to be driven by temporary state-dependent
reporting in the LOC for unemployed individuals even though LOC can be assumed to be
stable in the long-run. Due to the fact that employed and non-employed individuals are pooled
in my estimation sample, there might be a risk of biased results due to a measurement bias in
LOC, which would, by definition, be greater in the group of non-participating women due to a
higher share of non-employed individuals in this group34. In order to circumvent this measure-
34 While in the group of participating women potentially only some of the women, i.e. those who are un-
employed, might have a state-bias in their observed LOC, the share is expected to be greater in the group of
non-participating women as 100% of women in this sample might be affected by such a state-bias.
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ment problem, two alternative approaches are implemented. Firstly, instead of the forward
imputed LOC, a variable which averaged all available LOC observations of an individual be-
tween 1999 and 2015 is used as the explanatory variable. This approach is likely to reduce
the attenuation bias in the LOC due to temporary measurement errors to a minimum. The
results of this alternative estimation are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.A.5. In line
with expectations about biases due to regression attenuation, the estimated effects increase
considerably if this alternative LOC measure is used. This gives indication for a downward
bias due to measurement error in the LOC variable in the main estimations. Although these
new results might again be biased upwards by reverse causality, the main estimations are
likely to only be lower bounds of the true effects.
Using the average LOC nevertheless does not solve problems with reverse causality if the
measurement error is selective as women who are not employed in t have a higher probability
to also be not employed in the periods before and after t. Those women thus always report
a lower LOC due to their non-activity on the labor market. Therefore, additionally the LOC
observation during the closest employment or self-employment spell to t is used. The two
conditions for imputing the LOC observation from a period t + x or t − x into t are that
(a) LOC has to be observed in that year and (b) the woman is observed to be employed or
self-employed in that year.35 Nevertheless, this approach has one main caveat: by imputing
from the closest employment spell, all women who are never observed in (self-)employment
are lost. This is largely in line with the problems discussed in the first paragraph of the
sensitivity section. Never being observed in (self-)employment is highly endogenous to the
model in line with the argumentation above. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.A.5 thus check
the effect of the LOC variable in the baseline model, using only the sample of women for
which the LOC variable from the closest employment is observed. As expected, although still
positive and significant, the estimated effect is now considerably smaller, indicating a problem
with endogeneity in the observability of employment spells. Based on this reduced sample,
columns 9 and 10 present the results for the alternative approach of imputation for the LOC
factor. When using the reduced sample, the alternative LOC variable actually increases the
estimated effects. Thus, if the main estimations are at risk of being biased, this is likely to be
a bias towards zero as opposed to an overestimation of effects.
2.7 Conclusion
How do women make decision about their labor force participation at a given point in
time and what factors determine heterogeneity in participation probabilities between and
within genders? This is a question economists have already been interested in for many years
35 I also allow for backwards imputation to avoid problems with sample size. This is based on the assumption
that, besides measurement bias in LOC through non-employment, non-employment has no long-term effect on
LOC based on the findings in Preuss and Hennecke (2018).
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of fruitful theoretical and empirical research. Nevertheless, we are still far from solving the
puzzles within this long-lasting “hot topic” in labor economics. While a lot of open questions
have been answered on the gender gap in labor market participation with especially wages
gaps and differences in social norms for working and gender roles being key determinants
of the differences between men and women, the prevalent within-gender heterogeneity still
keeps economists and politicians busy. When getting to a point at which standard economic
theories are unable to fully explain individual decision making with observed opportunities
and constraints, traditional approaches often contribute remaining heterogeneity to stochas-
tic idiosyncratic shocks (see e.g. McFadden, 1974; Borghans et al., 2008). Nevertheless, with
the advancement of modern behavioral economics and applied microeconomics in combina-
tion with an increased availability of comprehensive survey-data, economists got more and
more interested in understanding the psychological black box behind unexplained individual
differences.
In line with this, especially in the last couple of years, empirical economic research was
increasingly informed by ideas from psychology. A huge body of empirical literature provides
evidence for the importance of especially personality traits for individual decision making in
various domains of the individual life-cycle. This paper contributes to this line of research
in the context of female labor force participation by theoretically and empirically discussing
the role of the personality trait locus of control for differences in participation probabilities
between women. Due to the rich facets of the construct locus of control, it can be assumed to
influence multiple components of a woman’s maximisation problem when choosing the optimal
labor force status. Nevertheless, in line with the existing literature, a crucial role of LOC for
independence preferences and expected returns to investment decisions and thus a positive
relationship with the direct marginal utility from participation but also home production
through subjective monetary and non-monetary gains is expected.
Based on the theoretical considerations, a reduced form estimation of the relationship
between LOC and a woman’s probability of being available to the labor market is the center
of the empirical analysis. Using a random effects logit model, I find that internal women, i.e.
women who believe in the importance of their own efforts for life’s outcomes, are on average
more likely to be available to the labor force. LOC thus adds explanatory power to the
participation decision above and beyond traditional socio-economic factors as well as other
preferences measures. Hence, the paper significantly adds to the existing economic literature
on female labor force participation as well as the important economic consequences of locus
of control by suggesting and empirically identifying distinct behavioral implications of LOC
in the participation decision. Hence, the paper primarily contributes to the investigation of
the psychological black box behind female labor force participation and additionally broadens
the knowledge on the economic importance of locus of control.
Page | 50
2.7. CONCLUSION
On the other hand, a heterogeneity analysis identified an interesting sensitivity of the
effect with respect to given monetary constraints as well as prevalent social working norms.
This suggests that inherent traits, preferences and tastes are only able to inform participation
decisions if the underlying budget constraints are fulfilled and if the decision-making is not
constrained by exogenous imposed social norms. It seems natural to argue that this is not a
phenomenon which is specific to locus of control but very likely also translates to other mea-
sures of psychological traits and economic preferences. This neatly fits into the recent findings
by Falk and Hermle (2018), who identified a similar importance of economic development for
gender-inequality on the macro-level.36
The identified role of locus of control for a woman’s decision-making process as well as the
prevalent importance of exogenous constraints in the relationship has crucial implications for
the widespread political discourse about low labor force participation rates of women. When
discussing and evaluating political measures targeted at increasing participation rates, such as
active labor market policies, quotas or childcare availability and costs, it is therefore extremely
important to understand the boundaries of monetary incentives set by latent psychological
characteristics. Considerations about the effectiveness of active labor market policies need to
be aware of the large component in individual decision making which cannot be influenced by
monetary incentives as it is based on inherent personal attributes and preferences for either
participation or home production. As opposed to this, the results from the heterogeneity anal-
ysis also illustrates that preference-based decision making is massively bounded by exogenous
monetary and non-monetary constraints. Reducing them would presumably raise individual
welfare as individual’s freedom of choice is increased. Although locus of control arguably is a
trait which is of specific interest for participation considerations, due to its focus on effort and
independent action, those findings are highly relevant also above and beyond this special case
and the considerations are likely to be universally valid also for other traits and preferences.
36 They identified that higher levels of economic development as well as gender equality favor the manifes-
tation of gender differences in economic preferences under the rational that greater availability of material
resources removes the universal goal of subsistence and more gender-equal access to those resources allows
women and men to express preferences independently from each other.
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2.A Appendix
Figure 2.A.1: Factor Loadings of the LOC Variable
Source: SOEP, waves 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015, version 33, own illustration.
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Table 2.A.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Children Not Cohabiting
under 16 Cohabiting
mean mean mean mean
Family Controls
Family Status .
Single 0.13 0.08 0.68
Partner not in HH 0.06 0.04 0.32
Partner in HH 0.10 0.09 0.13
Married 0.70 0.78 0.87
Number of Children 1.62 2.03 1.19 1.72
Children Age Indicators
Child under 1 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.03
Child 1 - 3 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.07
Child 3 - 7 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.14
Child 7 - 16 0.28 0.72 0.20 0.30
Family Income
Low 0.33 0.22 0.86 0.20
Medium 0.33 0.37 0.09 0.39
High 0.34 0.42 0.05 0.42
Socio-Demographic Controls
Age Categories
25 - 34 Years 0.21 0.31 0.28 0.19
35 - 44 Years 0.30 0.52 0.27 0.31
45 - 54 Years 0.31 0.16 0.28 0.31
55 - 65 Years 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.19
Religion
Non 0.32 0.27 0.37 0.31
Christian 0.64 0.67 0.61 0.65
Muslim 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Other 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
In Bad Health 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.13
Highest School Degree
No School Degree 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Lower Secondary School 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24
Middle School 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.41
Highschool 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.26
Other School 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
Highest Vocational Degree
No Vocational Diploma 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
Apprenticeship 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.43
Higher Technical College 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.29
College or University Degree 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.23
Regional Controls
East-Germany 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.27
Unemployment Rate 9.08 9.00 9.13 9.07
Gross Value Added 54.00 53.75 54.54 53.86
Population Density in 100 5.36 5.06 6.31 5.13
Median Full-Time Income Women 2551.62 2559.18 2565.92 2548.12
Public Childcare
Children under 3y in Care 23.08 21.59 24.39 22.75
Share of Full-Time Care (<3y) 44.98 43.38 46.01 44.72
Children 3 - 6y in Care 92.31 92.15 92.33 92.30
Continued on next page...
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... continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Children Not Cohabiting
under 16 Cohabiting
Share of Full-Time Care (3-6y) 37.04 35.01 38.31 36.72
Median Costs for Full-time Care 98.37 99.56 97.36 98.62
Personality Controls
Willingness to take risk (std., avg.) -0.20 -0.18 -0.10 -0.22
Openness (std., avg.) 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.01
Conscientiousness (std., avg.) 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.07
Extraversion (std., avg.) 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.10
Agreeableness (std., avg.) 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.19
Neuroticism (std., avg.) 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.16
Observations 57,308 22,219 11,267 46,041
Individuals 7,724 3,617 2,305 6,565
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A.2: Main Results (Marginal Effects) - Full Results
All Children under 16 Cohabiting
(1) (2) (3)








Family Status (Ref.: Single)
Partner not in HH 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.019)




Number of Children -0.020∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Has Child under 1 -0.750∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Has Child 1 - 3 Years -0.314∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Has Child 3 - 7 Years -0.044∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Has Child 7 - 16 Years -0.005 0.027∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.009) (0.004)
Family Income (Ref.: Low)
Medium -0.039∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
High -0.085∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Socio-Demographic Controls
Age Categories (Ref.: 25 - 34 Years)
35 - 44 Years 0.013∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
45 - 54 Years 0.007 0.038∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
55 - 65 Years -0.068∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.084∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.046) (0.010)
Religion (Ref.: No Religious Affiliation)
Christian 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.010) (0.006)
Muslim -0.053∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.029) (0.020)
Other -0.034∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.018)
In Bad Health -0.025∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
Highest School Degree (Ref: No Degree)
Lower Secondary School 0.018 0.071∗∗ 0.015
(0.015) (0.029) (0.020)
Middle School 0.065∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.033) (0.018)
Highschool 0.067∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.027) (0.015)
Other School 0.031∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.013) (0.027) (0.017)
Highest Vocational Degree (Ref.: No Vocational Diploma)
Apprenticeship 0.032∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
Higher Technical College 0.044∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
College or University Degree 0.053∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Regional Controls
East-Germany -0.004 -0.005 0.013
(0.020) (0.042) (0.023)
Unemployment Rate -0.002∗∗ -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gross Value Added -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Population Density in 100 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Median FT Income Women -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public Childcare
Children under 3y in Care 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Full-Time Care (<3y) -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Children 3 - 6y in Care 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Full-Time Care (3-6y) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Median Costs for Full-time Care 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personality Controls
Willingness to Take Risk (std., avg.) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007 0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Openness (std., avg.) -0.004 -0.003 -0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Conscientiousness (std., avg.) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Extraversion (std., avg.) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Agreeableness (std., avg.) -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Neuroticism (std., avg.) -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 57,308 22,219 46,041
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.A.3: Heterogeneity Analysis: Age of Children
Children under 161 Adult Child
Baby Toddler Pre-School School Age
0-1 1-3 3-7 7-16 over 16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.021 0.018 0.041
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.003 0.044 0.060
∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.032) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 1,565 3,392 7,314 12,050 23,873
LF = 0 1,319 1,747 2,400 1,820 4,165
LF = 1 246 (16%) 1,645 (49%) 4,914 (67%) 10,230 (85%) 4,165 (86%)
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 The groups are not mutually exclusive. Women are included if they have at least one child in the respective age-group.
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Table 2.A.4: Additional Results (Marginal Effects): Confounders (Sample: All)
Sample: Ever Employed Sample: With Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.010
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Occupational Type in Last Employment (Ref.: Blue-collar Worker)
White-collar Worker 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Civil Servant 0.023∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Other Occupations -0.068∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022)
Not Available -0.062∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Industry in Last Employment (Ref.: Manufacturing)
Agriculture -0.033∗∗ -0.031∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Mining, Quarrying, Energy, Water 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)












Public Service 0.011∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)




Not Available -0.073∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
(Last) Net Labor Income (KEUR) 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002)
Partner
Net Labor Income (KEUR) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Partners LOC Factor (cont.) 0.000
(0.002)
Observations 53,751 53,751 53,751 39,915 39,915 39,915
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.5: Sensitivity Analysis (Marginal Effects): Locus of Control (Sample: All)
Full Sample Filled Employment Sample
Baseline Simple Index1 Average2 Baseline Closest
Employment3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.014
∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 57,308 50,129 50,129 50,129 50,129
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2000 - 2016, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 LOC Factor for each year is calculated using a simple average of all 8 items. The Index is then imputed using the same rule as in the
baseline.
2 LOC Factor is calculated for each year as in the baseline but is imputed as an average over all available LOC observations.
3 LOC Factor is calculated for each year as in the baseline but is imputed from the closest LOC observation in which the individual was
employed or self-employed and not from the last LOC observations.
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CHAPTER 3
Locus of Control and Internal Migration
This chapter is based on joint work with Marco Caliendo, Deborah Cobb-Clark and Arne
Uhlendorff.
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3.1 Introduction
Internal migration is fundamental to the process of economic adjustment. The large-scale
movement of workers in response to relative economic opportunities shapes the nature of
economic disparity across geographic regions (see Blanchard et al., 1992; Niebuhr et al.,
2012) and, in many countries, is a key driver of regional demographic change (e.g. Borjas
et al., 1992; Gabriel and Schmitz, 1995). Internal migration in principle reduces labor market
rigidities, including structural unemployment, allowing markets to operate more efficiently.
Policy makers therefore often wish to support the unemployed in migrating to stronger labor
markets, while at the same time discouraging migration in response to more generous welfare
benefits (e.g. De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Valletta, 2013). Incentives to promote internal
migration such as lump sum grants, housing vouchers, employment and relocation services,
and subsidized moving costs have been used in a variety of countries with mixed success (see
Caliendo et al., 2017, for a review). In particular, while incentives may lead to more internal
migration, employment outcomes are not always improved as a result.1
Economists generally conceptualize internal migration as a fairly standard human cap-
ital investment in which individuals (and households) weigh the current costs of migration
against the appropriately discounted future returns. Migration occurs whenever the expected
benefits outweigh the expected costs. In other contexts, however, traditional models of this
sort are increasingly giving way to models with more realistic psychological foundations. The
result has been a deeper understanding of the important role that psychological traits (e.g.
personality, non-cognitive skills, perceptions of control, etc.) play in most economic decisions.
It is important that we begin to also incorporate the key insights of behavioral economics into
models of the migration decision. Many psychologists argue, for example, that while unfavor-
able economic conditions may make emigration either more or less likely, the decision to stay
or go rests largely on individual personality (Boneva and Frieze, 2001). In particular, Frieze
and Li (2010) argue that mobility decisions are driven by individuals’ desire to change their
lives in ways that better satisfy their achievement, power, and affiliation motivations, while
Bauernschuster et al. (2014) find that better educated and more risk-tolerant individuals are
more likely to migrate across cultural (linguistic) regions which, the authors argue, stems
from their lower psychic costs of migration. We need to know more about which psychological
traits predispose certain individuals to migrate and why.
The goal of this paper is to advance the literature by incorporating locus of control into an
economic model of internal migration. Locus of control can be characterized as “a generalized
attitude, belief, or expectancy regarding the nature of the causal relationship between one’s
own behavior and its consequences” (Rotter, 1966, p.2). Those believing that life’s outcomes
1 Katz et al. (2001); Ludwig et al. (2005); Kling et al. (2007) and Ludwig and Kling (2007), for example,
investigate the effectiveness of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program – introduced in the 1990s in the
U.S. – and find that it successfully relocated families to better neighborhoods and partly improved their health.
However, there was no significant effect on either educational or labor market outcomes.
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are due to their own efforts have an internal locus of control, while those believing that
outcomes are due to external factors (e.g. luck) have an external locus of control. We begin
by modelling migration across domestic labor markets as the outcome of a job search process.
Because they believe that search effort influences the offer arrival rate, individuals with an
internal locus of control are predicted to engage in more intensive, geographically-dispersed
job search – and if job search precedes migration – be more likely to migrate as a result. We
then empirically test the relationship between locus of control and the propensity to migrate
across regions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 2017). We find that
not only do individuals with an internal locus of control express more willingness to migrate,
they do in fact migrate more often. Moreover, having an internal locus of control has an effect
similar in magnitude to that of key demographic and human capital characteristics such as
the presence of children in the household or educational attainment.
Explicitly modeling internal migration as the result of a job search process is an impor-
tant contribution to the existing migration literature. Research in labor or urban economics
frequently models residential location and job search in tandem (e.g. den Berg and Gorter,
1997; van Ommeren et al., 1999; Eliasson et al., 2003; Lutgen and Van der Linden, 2015).
Migration research, on the other hand, typically either ignores any wage uncertainty (Borjas
et al., 1992) or simply assumes that migration decisions occur before destination wages are
realized (e.g. Harris and Todaro, 1970; Hunt, 2006; Arntz et al., 2011; Kennan and Walker,
2011). Consequently, internal migration decisions depend solely on expected (actual) home
vs. destination wages and any job search is simply subsumed in the aggregate employment
probabilities. This lack of attention to the role of job search is surprising given that it is
often disparities in unemployment rates rather than wage levels that empirically drive inter-
nal migration (e.g. Treyz et al., 1993; Parikh and van Leuvensteijn, 2002). Importantly, we
demonstrate that assumptions about the timing of job search have fundamental implications
for the pattern of internal migration that results. Conditional on skills, internal migration in
the standard model is predicted to be unidirectional with high-skilled individuals migrating
to regions where their skills are more highly valued and low-skilled individuals migrating in
the opposite direction (Borjas et al., 1992). In contrast, modeling internal migration as the
result of a job search process implies that those skills that lead to more intensive (or more
productive) search in the destination labor market will lead to multidirectional internal mi-
gration, i.e. an increased propensity to migrate overall. Moreover, we adopt a more behavioral
approach to modeling job search by assuming that job seekers do not know the true job offer
arrival rate, but instead form subjective beliefs – related to their locus of control – about the
impact of search effort on the probability of receiving a job offer. This provides a theoretical
connection between locus of control and internal migration.
Our empirical findings also make an important contribution by adding weight to the
emerging literature linking individuals’ perceptions of control to their human capital invest-
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ments through the returns that they anticipate. In particular, locus of control is related to
investments in education (e.g. Wang et al., 1999; Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Heckman and
Kautz, 2012; Mendolia and Walker, 2014b); health behaviors (e.g. Wallston et al., 1978; Step-
toe and Wardler, 2001; Chiteji, 2010; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014; Mendolia and Walker, 2014a);
employment-related training (Offerhaus, 2013; Caliendo et al., 2016) and job search (e.g.
Caliendo et al., 2015b; McGee, 2015; McGee and McGee, 2016).2 To our knowledge, however,
only one other study explicitly considers the relationship between locus of control and migra-
tion. Toney et al. (1985) find no difference in the locus of control of migrant and non-migrant,
middle-aged men captured in the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey. We reconsider this is-
sue in a model that minimizes the likelihood of reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
Our finding that having an internal locus of control is associated with a higher propensity to
migrate across regions represents not only a new stylized fact, but also a potential basis for
targeting internal migration incentives.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the relevant
economic and psychological literature on migration. In Section 3.3, the theoretical framework
linking locus of control to job search and the migration decision is presented. Section 3.4
describes the data in detail, while in Section 3.5 we present our main empirical results. Section
3.6 provides a discussion of our main findings and Section 3.7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
Economists have a long history of studying migration. Researchers taking a macro per-
spective typically analyze the relationship between migration flows and macro-economic con-
ditions, while others adopt a micro perspective by focusing on single individuals (or house-
holds) and studying the migration decision-making process. Given our research questions,
we are particularly interested in the micro-economics literature on internal migration and in
the psychological evidence on the psychosocial traits that predispose certain individuals to
migrate.
Drawing on the seminal work of Hicks (1932), Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969) and Harris
and Todaro (1970), modern economic models of the migration decision are typically based on
the maximization of expected income across regions, given migration costs and employment
probabilities that are less than one. Seen in this light, it is easy to understand why economists
view migration as an important form of human capital investment. Borjas et al. (1992) argue,
however, that, while perhaps suitable for studying immigration, the above framework is too
restrictive to capture internal migration because it predicts that migration flows will be uni-
directional, i.e. all individuals have an incentive to move from low- to high-income regions. In
response, the authors incorporate the Roy (1951) selection model into the migration decision
2 For an overview of this literature see Cobb-Clark (2015).
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thus accounting for spatial differences in the return to skill. This extension results in two-way
migration flows with high-skilled workers migrating to regions where their skills are more
highly valued and low-skilled workers migrating in the other direction. Conditional on skill
level, however, migration flows remain unidirectional and, in the face of constant migration
costs, this theoretical framework does little to explain why certain individuals might always
be predisposed to migrate.
Given this framework, it is not surprising that empirical economists have largely focused
on analyzing the way that migration patterns are shaped by skill levels, networks, migration
costs and macro-economic conditions.3 People’s propensity to migrate has been linked to
their age and gender (e.g. Stillwell et al., 1996; Owen and Green, 1992); education and skill
level (e.g. Levy and Wadycki, 1974; Arntz, 2010; Wozniak, 2010); individual social networks
(e.g. Rainer and Siedler, 2009); marital status (e.g. Graves and Linneman, 1979); employment
status (e.g. DaVanzo, 1978) and the business cycle (e.g. Saks and Wozniak, 2011). Internal
migration is also a function of the costs of migration and regional disparities in social and
economic circumstances as reflected in population size (density) and distance (e.g. Andrienko
and Guriev, 2004; Anjomani, 2002; Greenwood, 1997), the cost of living (e.g. Cseres-Gergely,
2004), price differences (e.g. Giannetti, 2003); real wages (e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2011),
unemployment rates (e.g. Ederveen et al., 2003; Alecke et al., 2010), labor demand (Wozniak,
2010), labor productivity (Alecke et al., 2010), public safety (e.g. Sampson and Wooldredge,
1986), social assistance (e.g. Enchautegui, 1997; Giulietti and Wahba, 2013), climate and
environmental quality (e.g. Marchiori and Schumacher, 2011; Andrienko and Guriev, 2004),
and local infrastructure (e.g. Andrienko and Guriev, 2004).
Sociologists, demographers, and psychologists, on the other hand, all have a long tradition
of studying the psychosocial traits that lead some individuals to be more likely to migrate
irrespective of the economic conditions. Toney et al. (1985) attribute the first discussion of
possible migrant-nonmigrant differences in psychological traits to Thomas (1938), a demogra-
pher and sociologist whose seminal work laid the foundation for migration research in the first
half of the 1900s (see Greenwood and Hunt, 2003, for a discussion). Early researchers linked
migration to a desire for social advancement (Touraine and Ragazzi, 1961) and the fulfillment
of their achievement, affiliation, and power motivations (Frieze and Li, 2010). Morrison and
Wheeler (1978) coined the term “pioneering personality” to describe individuals who con-
stantly feel the need for novel experiences and thus like to change their residence. Since then
researchers have found relationships between migration decisions and both economic prefer-
ences such as risk-attitudes (Jaeger et al., 2010; Bauernschuster et al., 2014; Bonin et al.,
2009) as well as personality traits such as openness to experiences (Koenig and Cunningham,
2001; Jokela, 2009), extraversion (Jacobs and Koeppel, 1974; Jokela, 2009) and agreeableness
3 For reviews of the economics literature on internal migration see e.g. Borjas et al. (1992); Greenwood
(1997); Lucas (1997); Etzo (2008).
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(Jokela, 2009).4 Finally, there is some evidence that an internal locus of control is associated
with a modest increase in the willingness to move (Hines et al., 1974), but not migration itself
(Toney et al., 1985).
In light of this empirical evidence, it is interesting that the migration literature is vir-
tually silent on the role of job search per se in internal migration decisions. Early studies
simply ignored any uncertainty associated with employment opportunities in either the send-
ing or destination labor market rendering the migration decision a simple comparison of wage
levels in the two locations. Since Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), it has be-
come more common (though not universal) to assume that post-migration employment is not
guaranteed. Kennan and Walker (2011), for example, model the optimal migration trajec-
tory in the context of a dynamic search problem with multiple destination choices. Critically,
however, migration is assumed to take place before destination wages are realized making
the migration decision a function of expected income (see e.g. Treyz et al., 1993; Borjas,
1999; Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009; Alecke et al., 2010; Kennan and Walker, 2011).
Effectively, the job search process boils down to a simple draw from the destination wage
distribution.
In contrast, urban and labor economists view residential moves and job changes as being
mutually dependent. Lutgen and Van der Linden (2015), for example, propose a model in
which unemployed job seekers search across multiple regions and decide to migrate whenever
they receive an acceptable job offer outside their local labor market. Models of job search thus
incorporate the inherent tradeoffs associated with either commuting or moving in the event
an acceptable job offer is received (see Rouwendal, 1999; van Ommeren et al., 1999, 2000b;
Eliasson et al., 2003; Buchinsky et al., 2014). Commuting time involves disutility, leading
workers to trade off higher wages (den Berg and Gorter, 1997; van Ommeren et al., 2000a) or
make job changes (Zax, 1991; Zax and Kain, 1991) in exchange for lower commuting costs.
Importantly, Zax (1994) shows that while job changes and residential moves can be substitutes
in the case of intra-regional (local) mobility, they are most likely complements in the case of
inter-regional (long-distance) mobility because commuting is not a viable option.
In what follows, we draw these strands of the literature together by incorporating locus of
control into an economic model of internal migration that accounts for job search. The result
is a more nuanced understanding of the process of internal migration, and the important role
that job search and psychosocial traits like locus of control play in migration decisions.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
We begin with a conceptual framework in which households migrate from one geographic
region to the next whenever the expected benefits of migration exceed the expected costs. We
4 See Boneva and Frieze (2001); Frieze and Li (2010) for a review.
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abstract from the choice of migration destination in order to focus on the discrete decision
to stay or to go. Migration is modelled as a function of relative incomes, rather than relative
utilities, in order to avoid the unnecessary complexity of considering migration based on
regional amenities. Given our research focus, we pay particular attention to the benefits
deriving from differences in labor market opportunities rather than from disparity in prices
or social benefits.
Our interest is in understanding internal migration as the outcome of a job search process.
However, we are agnostic about the relative timing of migration and job search, allowing
for migration that occurs both before and after wages are realized. Geographic regions are
assumed to be non-overlapping, ruling out commuting as a substitute for migration when inter-
regional job changes occur. Finally, individuals are assumed to be rational. However, unlike
standard job search models, we assume that individuals have subjective beliefs – related to
their locus of control – about the impact of search effort on the job offer arrival rate.
This section proceeds as follows. Drawing on Borjas et al. (1992), we first discuss a stan-
dard model of internal migration which ignores job search.5 We then extend this model to
consider the implications of allowing potential migrants to engage in job search related to
their locus of control. Finally, we consider the importance of the relative timing of job search
and migration for the pattern of internal migration that results.
3.3.1 Internal Migration Ignoring Job Search
Following Borjas et al. (1992), individuals are assumed to have a single productive skill
(xi) which has return βO in the origin labor market (O) and βA in the alternative labor market
(A). Thus, wages in the origin are given by: wOi= βOxi and in the alternative region wAi =
βAxi. Unlike Borjas et al. (1992), we assume that employment is uncertain and individuals
receive a wage offer only with probability pA in labor market A and pO in labor market O.
Households migrate whenever the net returns to migration are positive, that is whenever:
pAwAi − pOwOi − C > 0
(pAβA − pOβO)xi − C > 0, (3.1)
where C corresponds to a fixed cost of migration. Migration does not change individuals’ skill
levels, rather people migrate from O to A whenever the expected returns to their skill are
higher in A (net of migration costs) than in O. Thus, the return to migration is generated
by spatial differences in the returns to productive skills (β) and the probability of receiving
a wage offer (p).
It is interesting to consider what this model implies about the nature of migration flows.
As Borjas et al. (1992) note, migration flows are predicted to occur in two directions: highly-
5 See also Hunt (2006); Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009); Arntz et al. (2011) who adopt this frame-
work.
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skilled individuals have an incentive to migrate to regions in which skill is more highly valued
and low-skilled individuals have an incentive to migrate in the opposite direction. Conditional
on skill level (xi) migration flows are unidirectional.
6 There are no barriers to internal migra-
tion as there would be across international borders. Thus, the internal migration of workers
is expected to contribute to equalizing the return to skill across domestic labor markets until,
in equilibrium, there is no incentive for further migration (see Borjas, 2000). Nothing in this
simple framework explains why migrants with a particular skill xi have a predisposition to
migrate irrespective of their origin location. In the literature, bidirectional migration flows
are usually introduced by idiosyncratic shocks. This often goes along with the assumption
that these shocks are independent of observed characteristics and uncorrelated over time (see
e.g. Nenov (2015) for a recent contribution that assumes idiosyncratic preference shocks for
the migration decision).
3.3.2 A Model of Internal Migration with Spatial Job Search
We now consider a model in which employed and unemployed workers move to another
region if they receive a job offer in that region which is above their reservation wage.
The probability of receiving a job offer depends on the job search effort s. Empirical
researchers typically measure search intensity as: i) the number of applications made within a
specific time frame (Caliendo et al., 2015b); ii) the amount of time spent on search (McGee,
2015); or iii) the number of search channels utilized (Van Den Berg and Van Der Klaauw,
2006; Van Den Berg et al., 2009). Instead, we argue that search effort can be characterized
by the geographic distance D between the home region and the location of the potential
employer.
This seems to us to be plausible. While the internet has reduced the information cost
differential associated with searching in remote vs. local labor markets, workers will have
additional knowledge about local firms and better access to local networks, job search agencies,
and the like, all of which, everything else equal, facilitate local search. Searching over a greater
geographic distance requires that workers increase their search effort. This implies that the
geographic distance between the origin and alternative regions will be a function of search
intensity with ∂D∂s > 0.
7
Unlike in the standard job search model, we assume that individuals do not know the exact
relationship between their own search effort s and the job offer arrival rate λ(s). Instead, we
assume that each person has a subjective belief about the impact of his or her search effort
6 This is trivially true here because we consider only one type of skill, but would also be true if we allowed
for a “skill profile”. Conditional on each element of that skill profile, migration would be unidirectional.
7 See Guglielminetti et al. (2015) who also develop a model of spatial job search in which search in remote
areas is more costly. Job seekers take this into account when making decisions over their search intensity and
search range. Based on recent data, Skandalis (2019) provides evidence that job seekers who apply for jobs
in reaction to media stories that plants need to hire many workers live relatively far away from the growing
plant, while job seekers living close to these plants do not apply for jobs in response to these stories with a
higher probability. These findings suggest that information frictions increase with geographical distance.
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on the job offer arrival rate. This subjective belief is characterized by individuals’ locus of
control, i.e. the degree to which they believe that there is a causal link between their own
actions (search) and future outcomes (offer arrivals).
Subjective beliefs are given by λ˜(s, loc), and those with an internal locus of control believe
that an increased search effort results in a relatively large increase in the job offer arrival




Caliendo et al. (2015b) present a job search model for unemployed workers which relies on
the same assumption, while Ahn (2015) applies the same idea to an on-the-job search model for
employed workers. Here we allow individuals to search for jobs both during unemployment
and on the job. For simplicity, we assume that the search process does not differ between
employed and unemployed workers. The job offer arrival rate λ(s) and search costs c(s) are
the same for employed and unemployed workers. This implies that individuals accept every
job offer with a wage above the unemployment benefit level b in case of unemployment and
above the current wage w in case of employment. Therefore, the reservation wage simply
corresponds to the current benefit level and wage, respectively.
Individuals choose their optimal search effort by equating the marginal costs of job search
with the marginal benefits associated with additional search. The benefit of additional search
is the increased probability of receiving a job offer paying more than the current wage or the
unemployment benefit level, respectively. One can easily show that – because they expect a
higher return to their search effort – individuals who have a more internal locus of control
search more intensively than those with a more external locus of control (see Ahn, 2015;




Given the relationship between search effort and geographic search area, this implies
that individuals with a more internal locus of control will send more applications to other





0. Although we cannot test this directly using SOEP data, we conduct an ancillary analysis
of unemployed German job seekers using an alternative data source – the IZA Evaluation
Dataset (Arni et al., 2014).8 We find in Table 3.B.2 that internal job seekers have an average
maximum search distance (234 km) which is larger than that of their external counterparts
(130 km). Moreover, estimation of a series of logit models with a rich set of controls reveals
that internal job seekers are also significantly more likely to apply for jobs that would require a
8 The IZA Evaluation Dataset contains survey information for a sample of individuals who entered unem-
ployment in 2007 and 2008 in Germany. A nine percent random sample from the monthly unemployment inflows
was selected for interview. In wave 1, 17,396 interviews were completed. A detailed discussion of our ancillary
analysis including information about the IZA Evaluation Data, variable measurement, estimation strategy as
well as descriptive statistics and full estimation results can be found in the Supplementry Appendix 3.B.
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residential move (see Table 3.B.4). By searching more intensively across a broader geographic
region, those with an internal locus of control are expected to be more likely to apply for –
and be offered – jobs outside of their local labor markets.
3.3.3 Empirical Predictions
What are the empirical implications of incorporating locus of control into the internal
migration decision through the wage returns that individuals expect? The answer depends
critically on whether job search occurs before or after migration.
Migration before job search: Let us first assume that individuals migrate before des-
tination wages are realized. Ex ante, the impact of any post-migration job search is simply
captured in the aggregate employment probabilities conditional on their optimal search effort
pA(s
∗) and pO(s∗).9 Because individuals’ search intensity depends on their locus of control,
these employment probabilities will also be a function of their locus of control. We can there-
fore rewrite equation (3.1) as follows:
pA(s
∗(loc))wAi − pO(s∗(loc))wOi − C > 0
(pA(s
∗(loc))βA − pO(s∗(loc))βO)xi − C > 0 (3.3)
In this simple case, workers migrate whenever – conditional on their skill level xi – their
expected wage gain from migrating exceeds the costs of doing so. In perfectly competitive
labor markets, with perfect information and no mobility costs, the process of internal mi-
gration leads the returns to skill and employment probabilities to adjust so that in equilib-
rium expected wage differences across geographic locations equal migration costs. That is
pA(s
∗(loc))βA − pO(s∗(loc))βO) = C and there is no further incentive for workers to migrate.
Importantly, this process of labor market adjustment operates similarly in more realistic
models that account for location-specific factors like the supply of land, local amenities, and
housing costs in the migration decision. Roback (1982), for example, retains the assumption
of perfect competition, but models internal migration in the context of identical workers with
homogenous preferences over nominal wages, housing costs, and local amenities. Similarly,
Moretti (2011) extends this framework by introducing idiosyncratic preferences for locations
which also determine the degree of labor mobility. In both cases, internal migration is driven
not by expected wages, but by a comparison of the indirect utility obtainable in different
locations. As before, however, labor market competition ensures that the spatial movement
9 Job search may also affect individuals’ expected wage paths. Those who search more will have a faster
wage growth over time, because they have a higher probability of finding a job with a higher wage than their




of workers continues until they are indifferent between locations, and there is no longer an
incentive to migrate (Moretti, 2011).10
Thus, when migration occurs before job search and the realization of wages, the process of
internal migration reduces the return to migration – whether measured in terms of expected
wages or utility – until in equilibrium workers have no incentive to migrate. Consequently,
there is nothing in this economic framework to explain multidirectional migration; that is,
why some individuals might have a permanent incentive to migrate. Given this, our empirical
prediction is that P (Mit|Internal) = P (Mit|External) where Mit is an indicator of migration
for individual i at time point t. In contrast, many other social scientists believe that some
individuals have personalities that predispose them to migrate (Touraine and Ragazzi, 1961;
Morrison and Wheeler, 1978; Boneva and Frieze, 2001; Frieze and Li, 2010).
Migration after job search: Let us now consider internal migration that occurs only as
the result of a successful job search. Because individuals with an internal locus of control
perceive higher returns to their search effort, they search more intensively across a broader
geographic area, i.e. ∂D∂loc > 0. The job offer arrival rate increases with search intensity implying
that those with an internal locus of control will receive job offers in the alternative labor
market more frequently than those with an external locus of control. Consequently, having an
internal locus of control results in a greater propensity to migrate. When job search precedes
migration, disparity in the search behavior of individuals with an internal locus of control
predisposes them to migrate – even when the labor market is in equilibrium. Thus, we expect
that P (Mit|Internal) > P (Mit|External).
Summary: Does migration occur before any job search or is the reverse true? The reality,
of course, is that both can occur and we are unaware of any evidence indicating whether one
dominates the other. In the case of immigrants and refugees, for example, both pull (e.g. family
reunification) and push factors (e.g. natural disasters, persecution, civil wars, etc.) are almost
certain to lead some individuals to migrate before they know their destination labor market
outcomes. It is more likely, however, that internal migration is the consequence of a successful
job search. van Ommeren et al. (1999), for example, note that while researchers typically make
an assumption about the sequential ordering of the decision to change residences or to change
jobs, there are sound theoretical reasons to expect that job moves trigger residential moves,
but not the reverse. This is because there is a high probability that any increase in commuting
costs associated with a job change can be reduced by a residential change. There is a much
10 The theoretical prediction that internal migration contributes to eliminating regional disparities has em-
pirical support. Blanchard et al. (1992), for example, find that the main mechanism that re-establishes labor
market equilibrium after a demand shock appears to be labor mobility rather than job creation or job migra-
tion. Similarly, Topel (1986) carefully accounts for the dynamics of wage and employment changes and finds
that positive shocks to labor demand increase nominal wages in a local labor market. Interestingly, this is not
only true for current but also expected future demand shocks.
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lower probability that any increase in commuting costs stemming from a residential move can
be mitigated through a job change. We believe that this logic is particularly compelling in
our case because we are explicitly focused on inter-regional migration involving substantial
commuting costs across labor markets. Nonetheless, migration in our data will no doubt
encompass both phenomena.
Therefore, given our theoretical framework, we expect there to be little relationship be-
tween migration and locus of control if migration predominately occurs before job search
begins. We expect that an internal locus of control will be associated with an increased
propensity to migrate across labor markets if job search prior to migration dominates. Con-
sequently, we turn to the data to empirically discriminate between these alternatives.
3.4 Data
The data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which is an annual rep-
resentative panel study that collects detailed information about the socio-economic circum-
stances of approximately 22,000 individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany (see
Wagner et al., 2007, for details). These data are useful for our purposes because they provide
measures of locus of control (and other personality traits) and identify the geographic location
of the households in which individuals are living. Specifically, residential location is identified
by geocodes which correspond to local planning regions (“Raumordnungsregionen”) which
broadly correspond to labor markets. This allows us to merge SOEP data with information
on regional economic conditions, e.g. GDP, population density and unemployment rates.11
We restrict our study period to 1999-2015, as regional information are not available after
2015 and locus of control is first observed in 1999. Our population of interest is individuals
between the ages of 25 and 55 who are not pensioners, on maternity leave, or in the military.
We necessarily make a number of sample restrictions. Specifically, we exclude respondents
with item non-response for the key variables of interest. We lose approximately six percent of
our sample because we are unable to observe migration behavior, while item non-response in
any one of the eight items underpinning the locus of control scale decreases our sample size
by approximately one third.
We include all person-year observations available from the panel structure of the SOEP and
consider this in our estimations using clustered standard errors. Thus, our estimation sample
consists of 109,234 observations (53,141 men and 56,093 women) for 16,241 individuals (7,746
men and 8,495 women). See Table 3.A.1 for an overview of the sample loss associated with
each selection criteria. Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix summarizes the key descriptive statistics
for the sample.
11 These data come from the INKAR database provided by the Federal Institute for Research on Building,
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development.
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Figure 3.1: Average Net Migration 1999-2015 in Local Labor
Markets, per 1000 inhabitants
Source: INKAR 2018, own illustration
3.4.1 Measuring Internal Migration
Our indicator for internal migration is based on SOEP geocodes which allow us to classify
each household’s residential location into one of 96 separate regions. Although these regions
do not correspond to official local government areas, they are the basis for the federal German
government’s regional planning. In particular, they capture urban centers (along with their
associated catchment areas) and are defined on the basis of commuting flows (see BBSR,
2015). Researchers typically use the planning region as the unit of analysis when investigating
issues such as geographic disparity in labor market conditions (e.g. Du¨tsch and Struck, 2014),
employment growth (e.g. Fritsch and Noseleit, 2013) and regional mobility patterns (e.g.
Jaeger et al., 2010; Arntz, 2010). We use these regions to identify inter-regional mobility that
corresponds to a change in labor markets. Specifically, our indicator of internal migration
takes the value 1 if the household’s geocode changes between t and t+ 1; and 0 otherwise.
Figure 3.1 depicts the average net migration flow (per 1,000 inhabitants) between regions
in Germany over the period 1999-2015.12 While most regions in East Germany are character-
12 The pattern is similar if we rely on SOEP data rather than on the INKAR administrative data suggesting
that our SOEP estimation sample is comparable.
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ized by net out-migration (light shading), the major cities – such as Berlin, Munich, Hamburg
and Frankfurt – as well as the surrounding areas are characterized by net in-migration (dark
blue areas). This is consistent with previous findings. In particular, Arntz (2010) and Niebuhr
et al. (2012) conclude that although the migration flow from East to West Germany began
declining in 2001, it remains quite pronounced. Relative to other countries in the European
Union, regional mobility in Germany is relatively high (Bonin et al., 2008), though it is low in
comparison to non-European countries such as the United States or Australia (Puhani, 2001;
Bonin et al., 2008).
In addition to actual migration, we also observe self-assessed willingness to move in 1999,
2009 and 2014. In these three years, respondents were asked “Could you imagine moving
away from here because of family or career reasons?”. We use this information to create a
binary indicator that takes the value 1 for individuals responding “yes”; and 0 for individuals
responding “it depends” or “no”. We observe self-assessed willingness to move for 11,033
(17,181) individuals (observations).
3.4.2 Measuring Locus of Control
In 1999, 2005, 2010 and 2015, SOEP respondents were asked how closely a series of 10
statements (items) characterized their views about the extent to which they influence what
happens in life. A four-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (‘applies fully’) to 4 (‘does
not apply’) was used in 1999, while in 2005, 2010 and 2015 possible responses corresponded
to seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘disagree completely’) to 7 (‘agree completely’).
A list of these items can be found in Table 3.A.2. In order to harmonize the scales, 1999
item responses are reversed and “stretched”.13 We conduct an explanatory factor analysis
separately by year in order to investigate the way these items load onto latent factors.14 The
pattern of factor loadings is similar in all three years. Items 1 and 6 clearly load onto the
first factor – which we interpret as internal locus of control – while items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10
clearly load onto the second factor – interpreted as external locus of control. Items 4 and 9
do not clearly load onto one factor or the other and are discarded.
Consistent with the previous literature (see, e.g., Piatek and Pinger, 2016; Cobb-Clark
et al., 2014), we use a two-step process to create a continuous locus of control index. First,
we reverse the scores for items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 so that all eight items are increasing in
internal locus of control. Second, for each year, we use factor analysis to extract a single factor
and mean standardize it. This has the advantage of allowing us to avoid simply weighting
each item equally, as averaging would, and instead allow the data to drive how each item
is weighted in the overall index. Simple averaging risks measurement error and attenuation
13 This process preserves the relative differences between individuals. The process results in values of 1, 3, 5
or 7 so that a ’1’ on the 1999 four-point scale, for example, becomes a ‘7’ on the 2005-2015 seven-point scales.
14 The loading plots and the detailed results from the factor analysis are available upon request.
Page | 74
3.5. EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND RESULTS
bias (Piatek and Pinger, 2016). Our locus-of-control index LOCit is therefore increasing in
internal locus of control and its distribution is shown in Figure 3.A.1 in the Appendix.15
There is evidence that locus of control is relatively stable for the working-age population
(see e.g. Cobb-Clark, 2015; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). Nevertheless, in order to minimize
concerns about potential reverse causality, we ensure that our locus of control index is always
measured prior to the period in which we observe the migration decision. That is, migration
in 2000-2004 depends on 1999 locus of control, migration in 2006-2009 depends on 2005 locus
of control, migration in 2011-2014 depends on 2010 locus of control and migration 2015-2016
depends on 2015 locus of control. In addition to the continuous measure, we also create an
indicator of “internal” locus of control which takes the value 1 for those with locus of control
indexes above the median; and 0 otherwise. Finally, we test the robustness of our results to
different specifications of this indicator in Section 3.5.3.
3.4.3 Locus of Control and Internal Migration
Overall, 1.5 percent of the individuals in our sample moved across regions between t and
t+1 with men (1.5 percent) being slightly more likely to migrate than women (1.4 percent)(see
Table 3.1). Moreover, one in four individuals (25.1 percent) report that they are definitely
willing to migrate for family or career reasons, while a further 43.0 percent report that they
would consider migrating under some circumstances.
Those with an internal locus of control are significantly more likely (1.7 percent) to move
across regions than are those who are external (1.3 percent). This pattern is also supported by
the kernel densities computed separately for movers and non-movers in Figure 3.A.1 (bottom
panel). Similarly, those with an internal locus of control are significantly more likely to express
a willingness to migrate and significantly less likely to rule migration out.
Is an expressed willingness to migrate related to actual migration behavior? We consider
this question and find that both men and women who do in fact migrate between t and
t+ 1 are significantly more likely to have reported a willingness to migrate in t. Specifically,
while only 24.0 percent of non-migrants report a willingness to migrate, nearly 71.0 percent
of migrants did the same in the period prior to their move (see Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix).
3.5 Empirical Approach and Results
3.5.1 Estimation Strategy
Our theoretical model predicts that internal migration and internal locus of control will
be positively related if job search precedes migration and unrelated if job search follows
migration. We have no prior about the relative timing of job search and migration, making
15 A test of internal consistency yields a Cronbach’s α reliability statistic (Cronbach, 1951) between 0.66 and
0.68 indicating that the eight items are reliable which is in line with previous studies (Richter et al., 2013).
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Table 3.1: Descriptives of Outcome Variables by Locus of Control
All Externals Internals
All
Internal Migration between t and t+ 1 0.0146 0.0127 0.0165∗∗∗
[109,234] [54,720] [54,514]
Could Imagine Moving Away
No 0.3194 0.3291 0.3098∗∗∗
It Depends 0.4301 0.4370 0.4232∗
Yes 0.2505 0.2339 0.2670∗∗∗
[17,181] [8,559] [8,622]
Men
Internal Migration between t and t+ 1 0.0148 0.0129 0.0166∗∗∗
[53,141] [25,599] [27,542]
Could Imagine Moving Away
No 0.3121 0.3229 0.3022∗∗∗
It Depends 0.4272 0.4372 0.4179∗
Yes 0.2607 0.2399 0.2799∗∗
[8,362] [4,014] [4,348]
Women
Internal Migration between t and t+ 1 0.0144 0.0125 0.0165 ∗∗∗
[56,093] [29,121] [26,972]
Could Imagine Moving Away
No 0.3263 0.3347 0.3175 ∗∗∗
It Depends 0.4328 0.4367 0.4286
Yes 0.2408 0.2286 0.2539 ∗
[8,819] [4,545] [4,274]
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Number of observations in square brackets. Significance stars in the last column refer to significance level of t-test for mean
equivalence between Externals and Internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the link between locus of control and migration an empirical question. Consequently, we
employ a reduced-form approach to estimate the association between individuals’ locus of
control and their propensity to: i) express a willingness to migrate; and ii) to actually migrate
across regions. Specifically, our estimation equations are as follows:
P (Wit = 1) = P (θ1 + θ2LOCit + θ3Xit + θ5PTi + τ1Rit + τ2T + it > 0) (3.4)
P (Mit+1 = 1) = P (β1 + β2LOCit + β3Xit + β5PTi + γ1Rit + γ2T + ηit > 0) (3.5)
where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, and Wit and Mit+1 capture the stated willing-
ness to migrate (at time t) and actual migration behavior (between t and t+ 1) respectively.
Further, LOCit is locus of control and θ2 and β2 are our parameters of interest. We generate
interpretable estimates of θ2 and β2 by constructing our locus of control measure such that it
is predetermined at the time of the migration decision in order to minimize concerns about
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reverse causality. In addition, we include a detailed set of controls to reduce the potential
for unobserved heterogeneity (omitted variable bias) to confound our estimates. Hence, Xit
includes standard socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, nationality, marital
status, number of children, household income, home ownership, and disability status) as well
as controls for education (school degree, vocational education, university degree) and job char-
acteristics (current labor force status, occupational classification, tenure and unemployment
experience). PTit is a vector of individual personality traits averaged over all years (Big Five
traits and risk attitudes). Finally, Rit captures regional conditions (dummy for East Germany,
unemployment rates, gross value added and population density in the origin region) and T is
a vector of year-dummies.
All these factors have been shown to be important in explaining internal migration (see
e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2011; Ederveen et al., 2003; Jokela, 2009; Alecke et al., 2010; Jaeger
et al., 2010). Some of our controls (e.g. employment history or education) may themselves
be a function of locus of control. We will investigate the robustness of our results by leaving
out these potentially endogenous regressors from our regressions in Section 3.5.3. Descriptive
statistics for the variables in our analysis are reported in Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix.
Equations 3.4 and 3.5 are estimated using logit models with standard errors clustered at
the person level. All estimated effects are presented as average marginal effects in percent-
age points. We estimate three alternative specifications. The first controls only for year and
regional indicators (T and Rit). The second adds controls for socioeconomic and job charac-
teristics (Xit), while the third also controls for Big-Five personality traits and risk attitudes
(PTit). Models are estimated separately by gender using one of two alternative measures of
locus of control: i) a continuous measure; and ii) an indicator for having a locus of control
greater than the median, i.e. being internal. Table 3.2 (willingness to move) and Table 3.3
(actual internal migration) provide an overview of the key results, while full estimation re-
sults for our preferred specification – including all groups of control variables – are available
in Tables 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 in the Appendix.
3.5.2 Locus of Control and Internal Migration
Individuals with an internal locus of control are more likely to report that they would
consider moving for family or career reasons. Moreover, this relationship is robust to the
inclusion of a detailed set of controls (see Table 3.2). Controlling for personality traits and
risk aversion leads to an increase in the estimated effects of locus of control (see columns (3)
vs. (5) and (4) vs. (6) respectively).
Specifically, each standard deviation increase in individuals’ internal control tendencies
results in a one percentage point (p.p.) increase in the likelihood that individuals respond
“yes” when asked if they are willing to migrate (see column 5). Those with an internal
locus of control, i.e. those above the median, are 2.5 percentage points more likely to report
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Table 3.2: Logit Estimation Results (Marginal Effects): Willingness to Move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
All Individuals
LOC Factor (std.) 1.171∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.354) (0.369)
LOC Factor > Median 2.910∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.462∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.684) (0.695)
Observations 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181 17,181
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.015 0.057 0.057 0.065 0.065
Men
LOC Factor (std.) 1.742∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.515) (0.543)
LOC Factor > Median 3.759∗∗∗ 2.885∗∗∗ 3.443∗∗∗
(0.998) (0.993) (1.008)
Observations 8,362 8,362 8,362 8,362 8,362 8,362
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.024 0.071 0.071 0.081 0.081
Women
LOC Factor (std.) 0.545 0.387 0.450
(0.484) (0.485) (0.501)
LOC Factor > Median 1.941∗∗ 1.320 1.629∗
(0.938) (0.937) (0.958)
Observations 8,819 8,819 8,819 8,819 8,819 8,819
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.008 0.052 0.052 0.059 0.060
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Regional Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Socio-Economic Controls 3 3 3 3
Personality Controls 3 3
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard
Errors are clustered on person-level.
Full estimation results for specification (6) can be found in table 3.A.4, in Appendix 3.A. The full estimation results for specifications (1)
- (5) can be obtained from the authors.
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being willing to move relative to those with an external locus of control (see column 6).
Unfortunately, previous evidence linking locus of control to a willingness to migrate is virtually
nonexistent making it difficult to compare results. The exception is early research by Hines
et al. (1974) who also find a positive correlation between internal locus of control and self-
assessed willingness to migrate in a very small sample (n=53) of undergraduate students. Our
results provide evidence that this finding is pervasive in a much broader population. Overall,
25.1 percent of our estimation sample reports being prepared to migrate implying that the
disparity associated with locus control amounts to a difference of approximately 10.0 percent.
This is of the same order of magnitude as having an university degree (3.3 p.p), being a white-
collar worker (2.3 p.p.), or being married (-3.1 p.p) and is larger than the effect associated
with having an additional 1,000 Euro in household income (0.4 p.p) (see Table 3.A.4 in the
Appendix for full estimation results). The relationship between willingness to move and locus
of control is generally stronger for men than for women. Men with an internal locus of control,
i.e. those above the median, are 3.4 percentage points more likely to report being willing to
move (relative to those with an external locus of control) while the effect for women is only
1.6 percentage points.
Turning to Table 3.3, we see that individuals with an internal locus of control are also
more likely to migrate between labor market regions from one year to the next than are
those with an external locus of control. Specifically, individuals who are internal have a 0.2
percentage point higher probability of moving each year than do external individuals (column
6). While small, this effect is economically meaningful given that the annual rate of internal
migration on average is only 1.5 percent. Thus, the estimated effect of an internal locus of
control translates into a 13.0 percent higher probability of moving.
This is comparable to the effect of an additional child in the household (-0.3 p.p.) and
is larger than the effect of two more years of unemployment experience (-0.2 p.p.) (see Ta-
ble 3.A.5). Our continuous measure of locus of control is also positively associated with in-
creased migration (column 5), however, this association is not quite significant at conventional
levels. These findings are in contrast to those of Toney et al. (1985) who find no relationship
between geographical mobility and locus of control for middle-aged, white men captured in
the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey.
There are several important things to note about these empirical results. First, the rela-
tionship between internal migration and locus of control is largely unaffected by the inclusion
of a wide range of additional controls. For example, controlling for personality traits (Big
Five) and risk aversion does not change the estimated effect of the binary indicator for the
full sample (column 6 vs. column 4). The effect for the continuous measure slightly decreases
and becomes insignificant, but is qualitatively very similar (column 5 vs. column 3). For the
sample of men the point estimates are even increasing after controlling for personality traits
and risk aversion, while they are decreasing in the sample of women. Thus, locus of control has
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Table 3.3: Logit Estimation Results (Marginal Effects): Internal Migration between t and
t+ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
All Individuals
LOC Factor (std.) 0.152∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.064
(0.042) (0.043) (0.046)
LOC Factor > Median 0.365∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.189∗∗
(0.082) (0.081) (0.083)
Observations 109,234 109,234 109,234 109,234 109,234 109,234
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.004 0.127 0.127 0.130 0.130
Men
LOC Factor (std.) 0.123∗∗ 0.067 0.077
(0.062) (0.066) (0.070)
LOC Factor > Median 0.355∗∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.250∗∗
(0.120) (0.123) (0.126)
Observations 53,141 53,141 53,141 53,141 53,141 53,141
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.005 0.118 0.118 0.120 0.121
Women
LOC Factor (std.) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.075 0.052
(0.056) (0.056) (0.061)
LOC Factor > Median 0.365∗∗∗ 0.150 0.125
(0.113) (0.108) (0.111)
Observations 56,093 56,093 56,093 56,093 56,093 56,093
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.006 0.147 0.147 0.150 0.151
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Regional Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Socio-Economic Controls 3 3 3 3
Personality Controls 3 3
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard
Errors are clustered on person-level.
Full estimation results for specification (6) can be found in table 3.A.5, in Appendix 3.A. The full estimation results for specifications (1)
- (5) can be obtained from the authors.
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important additional explanatory power in models of the migration decision over and above
that associated with both personality traits and more traditional economic drivers including
job characteristics, regional economic conditions, family structure, and preference parameters
(e.g. risk-attitudes).
Secondly, the overall relationship between internal migration and locus of control is largely
driven by men. Men with an internal locus of control are not only more likely to report a
willingness to move than are men with an external locus of control, they are on average
also 17.3 percent (0.3 p.p.) more likely to migrate than external men. At the same time
locus of control is not significantly related to the migration behavior of women.1617 These
gender differences are consistent with a growing literature showing that there is a gender-
specific relationship between locus of control and many labor market outcomes including
wages (Semykina and Linz, 2007), occupational attainment (Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011),
job search (Caliendo et al., 2015b), employment-related training (Offerhaus, 2013; Caliendo
et al., 2016), selection into jobs with performance appraisal (Heywood et al., 2017), and
entrepreneurship (Hansemark, 2003).
Our results are consistent with job search preceding internal migration for the majority
of individuals. In particular, our theoretical model predicts that locus of control will be
unrelated to internal migration if individuals migrate prior to engaging in job search. In
contrast, we find a positive relationship between the propensity to migrate and having an
internal locus of control suggesting that migration for many individuals results from successful
job search. Interestingly, van Ommeren et al. (1999) reach a similar conclusion arguing that
it is theoretically more plausible that job search precedes migration than the reverse.
The relationships between migration and the other independent variables are very much
in line with prior expectations and the earlier literature (see Tables 3.A.4 and 3.A.5). Age
has a significant U-shaped effect on willingness to move and a significantly negative effect
on the probability of internal migration. Although the effect of locus of control on internal
migration differs by gender, men are not, ceteris paribus, significantly more likely to migrate.
Rather being married, being a home-owner or having more than three years of job tenure
are all associated with significantly less willingness to move and lower propensities to actu-
ally migrate. On the other hand, self-assessed willingness to move as well as actual internal
migration are significantly higher for the more educated, the unemployed, white-collar work-
ers as well as people in West Germany. Interestingly, the probability of internal migration is
16 Interestingly, in our anciliary analysis of unemployed job-seekers where the effect of locus of control is
stronger on the migration decisions of women than those of men (see Table 3.B.4). This is likely driven by the
selectivity of women into the IZA sample. Whereas 66 percent of the women in the SOEP are married/live
with a partner, this is only true for 44 percent of women in the IZA data, making them less likely to be “tied
movers”.
17 However, in a fully interacted model the coefficient on LOC × Gender is not significant (neither in the
SOEP nor the IZA sample). Results available on request from the authors.
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negatively related to regional gross value added, while individuals’ self-assessed willingness to
move increases with regional population density.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We conducted a sensitivity analysis in order to test the robustness of our results to: i)
different measures of locus of control, ii) controls for willingness to move, iii) the exclusion
of potentially endogenous variables and iv) controls for earlier moves. Our focus is on the
estimated association of our dichotomous measure of internal locus of control with actual
migration decisions. All sensitivity results are summarized in Table 3.4 and are based on the
full specification (column 6 in Table 3.3).
We begin by considering whether our estimates are driven by the choice of the median
as the threshold for identifying those with an internal locus of control. Specifically, we re-
estimated our models using: i) mean locus of control as a threshold; and ii) a four-way classi-
fication of internal locus of control, namely low (< 25th percentile), lower medium (25th - 50th
percentile), upper medium (50th - 75th percentile) and high (> 75th percentile). Our results
are robust to these alternative measures (see Panel A, (1) and (2) in Table 3.4). Moreover,
we replaced our preferred measure of locus of control which relies on factor weights with
an alternative based on an equal weighting (simple average) of the underlying eight locus of
control items. We find that our results continue to hold using this alternative measure (Panel
A, (3) in Table 3.4). Finally, although it can be argued that locus of control is relatively
stable in adulthood, we nevertheless want to investigate whether our results hold if we rely
only on between individual rather then also within individual variation in locus of control.
Consequently, we re-estimate our models using the first available measure of locus of control
for each individual, i.e. 1999 or later if individuals enter the sample after 1999 or have a
missing locus of control in 1999. The estimated effects using this alternative imputation are
even more pronounced than in the baseline specification (see Panel A (4)).
Next we consider the following question: To what extent is the relationship between in-
ternal locus of control and internal migration operating through a heightened willingness to
move? We consider this question by including a control for self-assessed willingness to move in
our model of actual migration behavior (see Panel B in Table 3.4). Unfortunately, willingness
to move is only observed in 1999, 2009 and 2014. Therefore, to retain as much sample as
possible we impute self-assessed willingness to move between observation periods using the
most-recently available measure. This effectively requires us to maintain the strong assump-
tion that willingness to move is stable across years. We find that, not surprisingly, willingness
to migrate is closely linked to actual migration behavior. Individuals who report a willingness
to move have a probability of actually migrating that is fully 1.1 percentage points higher.
Nonetheless, controlling for willingness to move has only a marginal effect on the magnitude
of the association between our indicator of internal locus of control and internal migration.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Checks (Marginal Effects): Internal Migration between t and t+ 1
All Men Women
Baseline Results
LOC Factor > Median 0.189∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.126
(0.083) (0.127) (0.111)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
A. Alternative LOC Specifications
(1) Alternative Dichotomous Variable
LOC Factor > Mean 0.177∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.124
(0.083) (0.125) (0.111)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
(2) Finer Distinction








Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
(3) Simple Index LOC Calculationa
LOC Index > Median 0.170∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.082
(0.085) (0.126) (0.113)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
(4) First LOC Observationb
LOC Index > Median 0.212∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.085) (0.125) (0.116)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
B. Willingness to Move as Intermediatec
LOC Factor > Median 0.153∗ 0.241∗ 0.071
(0.084) (0.127) (0.113)
Dummy for Willingness to Move (imp.) 1.130∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.133) (0.131)
Observations 105,446 51,027 54,222
C. Excluding Potentially Endogenous Control Variablesd
LOC Factor > Median 0.303∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.212∗
(0.082) (0.125) (0.112)
Observations 109,234 51,224 54,222
D. Control for Earlier Moves
LOC Factor > Median 0.164∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.086
(0.080) (0.121) (0.106)
Number of Earlier Moves 0.605∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.066) (0.057)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3
Regional Controls 3 3 3
Socio-Economic Controls 3 3 3
Personality Controls 3 3 3
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard
Errors are clustered on person-level. All rows of marginal effects and standard errors are from separate estimations.
a The Simple Index is calculated by averaging over the item values in the following way: [I1 + I6 + R(I2 + I3 + I5 + I7 + I8 + I10)]/8
where R indicates that all external items are reversely coded.
b The LOC is imputed forward from the first LOC observation available for the individual in the SOEP, i.e. 1999 or later if individuals
enter the sample after 1999 or have a missing LOC in 1999.
c The Willingness to Move variable is imputed forward in order to have a valid observation for all years in the full sample. The observation
from 1999 is imputed into the years 2000 - 2008, the observation from 2009 is imputed into the years 2010 - 2013 and the observation from
2014 is imputed into the year 2015.
d In this specification we exclude all controls for education and labor-market situation and history.
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We find similar results in a specification that uses a three-way categorical measure of the
willingness to move, rather than a simple indicator.
Additionally, a large literature demonstrates that personality traits, including locus of
control, are related to individuals’ human capital acquisition (see, e.g., Coleman and DeLeire,
2003; Heckman et al., 2006). Thus, many of our human capital measures, in particular ed-
ucation and employment histories, may themselves be a function of individuals’ perceptions
of control via decisions made in the past. The inclusion of these endogenous controls in the
analysis is likely to introduce selectivity bias (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.34). To
gauge the importance of these endogenous controls, we re-estimate our models excluding edu-
cational attainment and employment information from the regression (Panel C in Table 3.4).
We find that the relationship between internal migration and internal locus of control becomes
stronger. Specifically, the estimated association of internal locus of control with actual migra-
tion behavior increases from 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points, which is equivalent to an increase
from 13 percent to 20.8 percent. For men the increase is from 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points
(17.2 percent to 26.3 percent) and for women the increase is from 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points
(from 8.8 percent to 14.7 percent), making the association significant.
Finally, we investigate whether our results change when we control for previous migra-
tion. Having moved once in life probably makes a second move more likely. This is why we
include the number of earlier moves as a control into the model (see Panel D in Table 3.4).18
As expected, having moved before is associated with a positive increase in the probability
of moving again. However, the estimated effect for LOC is stable and only changes slightly.
Previous migration behavior is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics which
affect the migration decision and which are potentially correlated with locus of control. There-
fore, the stability of our results makes us confident that locus of control is not only reflecting
differences in other unobserved characteristics. However, previous migration behavior is ob-
viously an endogenous variable, and therefore we prefer to not include these in our main
specifications.
Taken together, these sensitivity tests indicate that our estimates of the positive rela-
tionship between internal migration and internal locus of control are robust to a range of
specification issues.
3.6 Discussion
There is substantial evidence that perceptions of control are related to human capital
investment decisions through the returns that individuals expect (see Cobb-Clark, 2015). This
makes it quite natural to link locus of control to internal migration through the expected
18 Earlier moves refer to moves between regions while being observed in the SOEP. Consequently, the variable




Table 3.5: Descriptives: Context of Moving
(1) (2) (3)
All Internals Externals
(1) Difficulty Level of Finding an Appropriate Position
Easy 0.19 0.24 0.15∗∗∗
Difficult 0.61 0.59 0.62∗∗∗
Impossible 0.16 0.14 0.19∗∗∗
Observations 109,234 54,514 54,720
(2) Reason of Moving - Sample: All Moversa
Work Reasons 0.13 0.15 0.12∗∗∗
Observationsb 5,611 2,823 2,788
(3a) Moving Distance - Sample: All Moversa
Distance in km 31.71 36.16 27.13∗∗∗
Observations 5,893 2,987 2,906
(3b) Share of Regional Movers - Sample: All Moversa
Inter-regional Move 0.17 0.19 0.15∗∗∗
Observations 5,893 2,987 2,906
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise. Significance stars in the last column refer to significance level of t-test for mean
equivalence between Externals and Internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a The sample consists of all individuals who indicate that they moved residence in the interview in t+1, including all inter- and intraregional
moves.
returns to job search as we have done here. This conceptual link is also consistent with
descriptive evidence that those with an internal locus of control are significantly: i) more
likely to view finding a new job as “easy”; ii) less likely to believe finding a new job will be
“difficult” or “impossible”;19 and iii) more likely to migrate for work-related reasons20 (see
Table 3.5). Migrants with an internal locus of control are significantly more likely to make
inter-regional moves, leaving them to migrate over significantly greater distances on average.21
Despite the logic of the endeavor, however, we cannot completely rule out the possibility
that locus of control may operate through some other mechanism. Our theoretical predictions
are observationally equivalent, for example, if we instead assume that having an internal locus
of control raises the efficiency of job search; if job search precedes migration, those with an
internal locus of control will have a higher propensity to migrate.
At the same time, our results are not consistent with a model in which locus of control
operates solely through labor market productivity, i.e. through wages. Were this the case,
internal migration would be driven by differences in the return to control perceptions across
19 The question is asked for employed/self-employed as well as unemployed individuals in a nearly identical
way. While unemployed individuals are asked “If you were currently looking for a new job: Is it or would it
be easy, difficult, or almost impossible to find an appropriate position?”, all other individuals respond to the
question “If you lost your job today, would it be easy, difficult, or almost impossible for you to find a new job
that is at least as good as your current one?”
20 Individuals who moved residence are asked to indicate what the reason for their move was with “work
reasons” being one of the multiple options.
21 Moving Distance is a generated variable provided by the SOEP which is based on the address data of the
new and old residential location.
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labor markets. Those with an internal locus of control would be pulled towards markets with
high returns to being internal, while those with an external locus of control would be pulled
in the opposite direction. This internal migration would contribute to equalizing the return
to locus of control across labor markets until, in equilibrium, we would expect no relationship
between locus of control and migration.
Nor does it seem likely that locus of control simply captures the effects of lower migration
costs. There is very little reason to believe that the monetary costs of migration (e.g. moving
expenses, buying and selling houses, etc.) are related to individuals’ locus of control. Bauern-
schuster et al. (2014), however, argue that lower psychic migration costs lie behind the higher
migration rates of highly-educated and risk-tolerant individuals, while Moretti (2011) models
worker heterogeneity in preferences for location which can be conceptualized in our context
as a psychic (opportunity) cost of migration. If internal locus of control affects internal mi-
gration by lowering the psychic costs of migration, internal individuals will have a greater
incentive to migrate regardless of the relative timing of migration and job search. However, to
the extent that self-assessed willingness to move captures heterogeneity in the psychic costs
of migration, our empirical results imply that differences in psychic migration costs do not
provide a complete explanation for predisposition of those with an internal locus of control
to migrate across labor markets.
Future research which assessed the empirical support for these alternative explanations
and the apparent differences in the behavior of men and women would be useful in furthering
our understanding of the mechanisms linking locus of control and internal migration.
3.7 Conclusions
Internal migration is intrinsically linked to economic opportunity, social conditions, and
demographic change, making it one of the most commonly studied phenomenon in the social
sciences. Our objective is to develop a more nuanced understanding of the process of internal
migration by drawing together several strands of the literature. Specifically, we model internal
migration as the result of a job search process and demonstrate that the relative timing of
job search, i.e. either before or after migration, has important implications for the nature of
migration flows. When migration precedes job search, migration flows will be unidirectional
conditional on skill as in Borjas et al. (1992). High-skilled workers will have an incentive
to move to markets with high returns to skills, while low-skilled workers tend to migrate
in the opposite direction. On the other hand, when job search precedes migration, those
characteristics, skills, traits, etc. that facilitate geographically broader job search will be
associated with a higher propensity to migrate.
This relationship between internal migration and job search provides an important con-
ceptual framework for understanding the psychological evidence that certain traits predispose
individuals to migrate. In particular, we explicitly model individuals’ subjective beliefs about
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the returns to job search as a function of their locus of control. Those with an internal lo-
cus of control search more intensively, across a wider geographic area, and therefore have a
higher propensity to migrate. We then test the empirical implications of our model and find
that those with an internal locus of control both report being more willing to migrate and in
fact do migrate more often. This positive relationship between locus of control and internal
migration constitutes a new stylized fact and indicates that, for many individuals, job search
is likely to precede migration. Given this, providing incentives for more intensive job search
across a wider geographical area – particularly when targeted towards those with an external
locus of control – may be more useful in increasing internal migration rates than are standard
relocation initiatives.
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3.A Appendix
Figure 3.A.1: Distribution of Locus of Control
Source: SOEP waves 1999-2015, version 33, own illustration.
Notes: Bottom panel provides the graphical illustration of the kernel density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel function separately
for movers and non-movers.
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Table 3.A.1: Sample Selection and Item Non-Response
Step Estimation Sample
Observations Individuals
Full Sample (1999-2015) 647,304 100,409
Sample Restriction
- Drop Younger 25, Older 55 279,956 48,833
- Drop Pensioneers, Mat. Leave, Milit. Service 268,190 48,347
Item Non-Response
- Migration Variable 244,087 45,570
- Locus of Control 138,100 27,419
- Socio-Economic Controls 122,562 25,498
- Personality Control 109,234 16,241
Sub-Sample for Willingness to Move (1999, 2009 & 2014)a 17,181 11,003
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: The full sample contains all available SOEP observations between 1999 and 2015 including e.g. children and persons without person
questionnaires.
a The number of observations includes all sample restrictions and item non-responses.
Table 3.A.2: Components of Locus of Control
Wave
Variable 1999a 05/10/15b
Components of locus of control (Mean, 1999 Scale: 1-4, 2005/10/15 Scale: 1-7)
I1: How my life goes depends on me 3.28 5.50
I2: Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve (R) 2.12 3.25
I3: What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck (R) 2.21 3.42
I4: If one is soc. or polit. active, one can have an effect on social conditionsc 2.29 3.69
I5: I freq. have the experience that others have a controlling influence over my life (R) 2.00 3.14
I6: One has to work hard in order to succeed 3.46 5.93
I7: If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities (R) 2.03 3.26
I8: Opportunities I have in life are determined by the social conditions (R) 2.69 4.48
I9: Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can makec 2.93 4.78
I10: I have little control over the things that happen in my life (R) 1.80 2.61
Observations 5, 419 23, 276
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Items marked with a (R) are reversed prior to factor analysis in order to indicate an internal locus of control for high values.
a In 1999 the LOC was surveyed on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 for “Totally Disagree” to 4 for ‘Totally Agree”. The scale was reversed in
the data preparation in order to indicate agreement for high values as it is also the case in the other waves. For the later harmonization,
the scale was stretched to the length of a 7-point Likert scale.
b In 2005 and 2010 the LOC was surveyed on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 for “I Disagree Completely” to 7 for “Agree completely”.
c Items 4 and 9 are not included into the prediction of the latent factor.
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Table 3.A.3: Selected Descriptive Statistics by Internal Migration Status
All Male Female
Non-Migrants Migrants Non-Migrants Migrants Non-Migrants Migrants
Willingness to Migratea 0.24 0.71∗∗∗ 0.25 0.66∗∗∗ 0.23 0.75 ∗∗∗
Locus of Controlb 4.33 4.44∗∗∗ 4.38 4.46∗∗ 4.29 4.41 ∗∗∗
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Age 41.39 34.55∗∗∗ 41.29 34.74∗∗∗ 41.48 34.36 ∗∗∗
Married 0.66 0.33∗∗∗ 0.65 0.36∗∗∗ 0.67 0.30 ∗∗∗
Number of Children in HH 0.73 0.42∗∗∗ 0.73 0.42∗∗∗ 0.72 0.43 ∗∗∗
German 0.92 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92 0.94∗∗ 0.92 0.95 ∗∗∗
East-Germany 0.27 0.24∗∗ 0.27 0.23∗∗∗ 0.27 0.26
Disabled 0.06 0.04∗∗∗ 0.07 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05 0.03 ∗∗
Home-Owner 0.52 0.21∗∗∗ 0.52 0.23∗∗∗ 0.51 0.19 ∗∗∗
School Degree
No Degree 0.02 0.01∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 ∗
Lower Secondary School 0.24 0.14∗∗∗ 0.28 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21 0.11 ∗∗∗
Intermediate School 0.37 0.28∗∗∗ 0.33 0.27∗∗∗ 0.41 0.29 ∗∗∗
Highschool 0.30 0.55∗∗∗ 0.32 0.52∗∗∗ 0.29 0.57 ∗∗∗
Vocational Education
No Vocational Education 0.28 0.42∗∗∗ 0.27 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29 0.43 ∗∗∗
Apprenticeship 0.45 0.36∗∗∗ 0.48 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43 0.31 ∗∗∗
Higher Technical College 0.27 0.22∗∗∗ 0.25 0.19∗∗∗ 0.28 0.25 ∗
University or College Degree 0.24 0.37∗∗∗ 0.24 0.36∗∗∗ 0.23 0.39 ∗∗∗
Net HH Income in KEUR 3.02 2.60∗∗∗ 3.02 2.70∗∗∗ 3.02 2.51 ∗∗∗
Occupational Characteristics
Labor Market Status
Employed 0.77 0.72∗∗∗ 0.80 0.73∗∗∗ 0.74 0.71 ∗∗
Self-Employed 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.06
Unemployed 0.07 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07 0.09∗∗ 0.07 0.10 ∗∗∗
Not Working 0.06 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.11 0.07 ∗∗∗
In Education 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07 ∗∗∗
Unemployment Experience 0.98 0.83∗∗∗ 0.92 0.88 1.05 0.79 ∗∗∗
Tenure in Current or Last Job
< 3 Years 0.32 0.54∗∗∗ 0.27 0.50∗∗∗ 0.37 0.59 ∗∗∗
3-9 Years 0.27 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27 0.29
≥ 10 Years 0.38 0.13∗∗∗ 0.44 0.16∗∗∗ 0.33 0.10 ∗∗∗
High Skilled Worker 0.18 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26 0.27 0.11 0.18 ∗∗∗
Occupation Position
Blue-Collar Worker 0.25 0.13∗∗∗ 0.34 0.21∗∗∗ 0.15 0.06 ∗∗∗
White-Collar Worker 0.46 0.48 0.39 0.41 0.53 0.55
Civil Servent 0.06 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07 0.09∗∗ 0.05 0.07 ∗
Trainee 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 ∗∗∗
Regional Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 9.37 9.30 9.39 9.25 9.36 9.34
Gross Value Added 53.19 53.94∗∗∗ 53.10 53.76∗ 53.27 54.10 ∗∗
Population Density in 100 5.27 5.98∗∗∗ 5.22 5.66∗ 5.32 6.28 ∗∗∗
Other Personality Variables
Willingness to Take Risksc 4.60 5.04∗∗∗ 5.06 5.36∗∗∗ 4.16 4.73 ∗∗∗
Opennessc 4.48 4.69∗∗∗ 4.37 4.60∗∗∗ 4.58 4.79 ∗∗∗
Conscientiousnessc 5.92 5.78∗∗∗ 5.85 5.71∗∗∗ 5.98 5.85 ∗∗∗
Extraversionc 4.84 4.90∗∗ 4.70 4.71 4.97 5.08 ∗∗∗
Agreeablenessc 5.35 5.35 5.19 5.23 5.51 5.46 ∗
Neuroticismc 3.84 3.81 3.59 3.53 4.08 4.07
Observations 107,636 1,598 52,353 788 55,283 810
Individuals 16,133 1,302 7,698 632 8,435 670
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise. Stars give results from t-test for mean equivalence: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
a Willingness to move has only 17,181 observations for 11,003 individuals.
b For this table, locus of control was adjusted to just have positive values by subtracting the lowest possible value.
c Willingness to Take Risks is measured on a Likert-Scale from 0 (= Risk-averse) to 10 (= Risk-prone) and the Big Five are measured
with 3 items each on a Likert-Scale from 1 (= Does not apply at all) to 7 (= Applied to me perfectly). Factors are generated by averaging
over the 3 items.
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LOC Factor > Median 2.462∗∗∗ 3.440∗∗∗ 1.629∗
(0.695) (1.006) (0.957)
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Age -1.417∗∗∗ -2.027∗∗∗ -0.843
(0.402) (0.583) (0.556)




Married -3.135∗∗∗ -2.765∗∗ -4.041∗∗∗
(0.858) (1.245) (1.134)
German -2.070 0.217 -4.225∗∗
(1.449) (2.006) (1.916)
Number of Children in HH -0.445 0.620 -1.540∗∗
(0.424) (0.598) (0.608)
Disabled 1.020 0.894 1.145
(1.444) (1.956) (2.030)
Home-Owner -9.539∗∗∗ -10.474∗∗∗ -8.384∗∗∗
(0.778) (1.090) (1.078)
Net Household Income in KEUR 0.413∗ -0.195 0.900∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.331) (0.319)
Highest School Degree (Ref: Lower or Intermediary School)
No Degree -0.597 1.909 -3.083
(2.326) (3.280) (3.391)
Highschool Degree 4.965∗∗∗ 2.494 6.766∗∗∗
(1.055) (1.538) (1.308)
Vocational Education (Ref: Non)
Apprenticeship 0.147 0.764 -0.496
(0.937) (1.351) (1.308)
Higher Technical College 1.387 1.856 0.884
(1.028) (1.530) (1.357)
University or College Degree 3.286∗∗∗ 2.461 3.615∗∗
(1.166) (1.689) (1.485)
Occupational Characteristics
Unemployment Experience 0.196 -0.039 0.297
(0.186) (0.289) (0.244)
High Skilled Worker 3.379∗∗∗ 4.801∗∗∗ 1.345
(1.086) (1.364) (1.622)
Labor Force Status (Ref: Employed)
Self-Employed 4.098∗∗ 3.885∗ 5.367∗∗
(1.611) (2.010) (2.269)
Unemployed 5.493∗∗∗ 3.740 7.264∗∗∗
(1.814) (2.431) (2.263)
Not Working 2.841 12.131∗∗∗ 1.910
(1.853) (4.476) (2.108)
In Education 22.817∗∗∗ 26.792∗∗∗ 13.578∗∗∗
(3.643) (4.141) (3.972)
Tenure (Ref: 0-2 Years)
3-9 Years -2.062∗∗ -1.452 -2.733∗∗
(0.807) (1.234) (1.116)
≥ 10 Years -4.545∗∗∗ -4.537∗∗∗ -5.057∗∗∗
(0.920) (1.365) (1.318)
Tenure not available -3.573∗ -16.104∗∗∗ 1.128
(2.099) (4.783) (2.664)
Occupation Position (Ref: Blue-Collar)
White-Collar Worker 2.259∗∗ 3.142∗∗ 1.911
(1.044) (1.434) (1.608)
Civil Servent 1.489 3.480 -1.798
Continued on next page...
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Trainee 4.693 5.568 3.069
(3.895) (5.367) (4.775)
NACE Industry (Ref: Manufacturing)
Agriculture -5.211∗ -8.248∗ -0.910
(3.009) (4.714) (5.484)
Mining, Quarrying, Energy, Water -2.766 -1.762 -6.955
(3.088) (3.810) (7.955)
Chemicals, Pulp, Paper 3.033∗ 3.548 0.693
(1.844) (2.297) (2.911)
Construction -1.309 -0.489 -2.990
(1.680) (2.024) (3.777)
Iron/Steel -2.183 -1.758 -4.844
(1.881) (2.366) (3.983)
Textile/Apparel -2.696 -1.806 -5.467
(3.965) (8.178) (5.205)
Wholesale/Retail 0.244 -0.521 -1.241
(1.440) (2.076) (2.263)
Transport/Communication 1.763 2.933 -1.156
(1.903) (2.333) (3.229)
Public Service 1.748 4.598∗∗∗ -1.885
(1.304) (1.778) (2.101)
Financial/Private Services 1.714 3.980∗∗ -1.738
(1.418) (1.893) (2.262)
NACE Industry Not Categorized 3.038∗ 6.676∗∗∗ -1.649
(1.677) (2.345) (2.463)
Regional Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 0.059 0.192 -0.044
(0.163) (0.236) (0.223)
Gross Value Added 0.002 0.045 -0.042
(0.056) (0.080) (0.077)
Population Density in 100 0.165∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.053) (0.077) (0.072)
East-Germany -10.911∗∗∗ -14.912∗∗∗ -8.649∗∗∗
(1.241) (2.098) (1.988)
Other Personality Variables
Will. to Take Risks (std.) 3.395∗∗∗ 3.895∗∗∗ 2.591∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.554) (0.543)
Openness (std.) 1.469∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.594) (0.568)
Conscientiousness (std.) -0.461 -0.903∗ 0.136
(0.378) (0.544) (0.523)
Extraversion (std.) -1.467∗∗∗ -1.906∗∗∗ -1.068∗
(0.417) (0.591) (0.575)
Agreeableness (std.) -1.628∗∗∗ -0.808 -2.398∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.557) (0.532)
Neuroticism (std.) 0.701∗ 1.220∗∗ 0.229
(0.401) (0.567) (0.540)
Observations 17,181 8,362 8,819
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in
parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered on person-level.
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LOC Factor > Median 0.189∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.126
(0.083) (0.127) (0.111)
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Age -0.105∗∗ -0.112 -0.074
(0.049) (0.072) (0.066)




Married -0.626∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.154) (0.147)
German 0.346∗∗ 0.353 0.420
(0.145) (0.251) (0.266)
Number of Children in HH -0.319∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.088) (0.091)
Disabled -0.102 -0.349 0.099
(0.207) (0.322) (0.293)
Home-Owner -1.140∗∗∗ -1.319∗∗∗ -1.268∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.150) (0.156)
Net Household Income in KEUR -0.028 0.009 -0.049
(0.028) (0.030) (0.044)
Highest School Degree (Ref: Lower or Intermediary School)
No Degree -0.107 -0.153 -0.047
(0.347) (0.508) (0.551)
Highschool Degree 0.526∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.172) (0.145)
Vocational Education (Ref: Non)
Apprenticeship -0.115 0.047 -0.297∗∗
(0.102) (0.141) (0.151)
Higher Technical College -0.014 -0.055 0.015
(0.117) (0.178) (0.159)
University or College Degree 0.477∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(0.132) (0.180) (0.158)
Occupational Characteristics
Unemployment Experience -0.082∗∗ -0.035 -0.135∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.051) (0.040)
High Skilled Worker 0.101 0.039 0.175
(0.120) (0.162) (0.166)
Labor Force Status (Ref: Employed)
Self-Employed 0.262 0.136 0.582∗
(0.231) (0.278) (0.317)
Unemployed 1.343∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.255) (0.283)
Not Working 0.741∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.402) (0.309)
In Education 1.778∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.277) (0.320)
Tenure (Ref: 0-2 Years)
3-9 Years -0.150∗ -0.095 -0.205∗
(0.084) (0.125) (0.120)
≥ 10 Years -0.800∗∗∗ -0.845∗∗∗ -1.161∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.193) (0.210)
Tenure not available -0.191 -0.115 -0.218
(0.205) (0.383) (0.288)
Occupation Position (Ref: Blue-Collar)
White-Collar Worker 0.274∗∗ 0.140 0.575∗∗
(0.138) (0.180) (0.235)
Continued on next page...
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... continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All Men Women
Civil Servent 0.861∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗
(0.313) (0.285) (0.329)
Trainee 1.468∗∗∗ 1.235∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗
(0.491) (0.353) (0.407)
NACE Industry (Ref: Manufacturing)
Agriculture 0.139 -0.157 0.437
(0.403) (0.469) (0.530)
Mining, Quarrying, Energy, Water -0.122 -0.034 -0.412
(0.383) (0.499) (0.570)
Chemicals, Pulp, Paper -0.077 -0.088 -0.199
(0.235) (0.292) (0.363)
Construction -0.372∗ -0.517∗ 0.186
(0.207) (0.271) (0.442)
Iron/Steel -0.396∗ -0.309 -1.390∗
(0.227) (0.288) (0.817)
Textile/Apparel 0.330 -0.145 0.223
(0.538) (1.024) (0.477)
Wholesale/Retail 0.097 0.296 -0.157
(0.187) (0.237) (0.261)
Transport/Communication -0.134 0.112 -0.632
(0.237) (0.288) (0.406)
Public Service -0.136 0.127 -0.450∗
(0.160) (0.199) (0.247)
Financial/Private Services -0.117 0.014 -0.315
(0.168) (0.214) (0.258)
NACE Industry Not Categorized -0.145 -0.179 -0.265
(0.194) (0.271) (0.289)
Regional Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 0.002 -0.014 0.021
(0.017) (0.025) (0.023)
Gross Value Added -0.019∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Population Density in 100 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
East-Germany -0.557∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗
(0.130) (0.229) (0.202)
Other Personality Variables
Will. to Take Risks (std.) 0.240∗∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.070) (0.068)
Openness (std.) 0.089∗ 0.183∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.047) (0.067) (0.066)
Conscientiousness (std.) 0.036 0.058 0.004
(0.042) (0.062) (0.058)
Extraversion (std.) -0.103∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.044) (0.061) (0.062)
Agreeableness (std.) -0.010 -0.014 0.007
(0.045) (0.066) (0.059)
Neuroticism (std.) 0.054 0.051 0.060
(0.044) (0.063) (0.058)
Observations 109,234 53,141 56,093
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 1999-2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in
parentheses. Standard Errors are clustered on person-level.
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3.B Supplementary Anaylsis with IZA Evaluation Dataset
This section contains a detailed discussion of our ancillary analysis on geographic search
range using the IZA Evaluation Dataset. We provide information about the data used, variable
measurement, estimation strategy as well as descriptive statistics and full estimation results.
3.B.1 Data
In order to shed light one of the key predictions of our theoretical framework, we conduct
an ancillary analysis of the relationship between locus of control and individuals’ geographic
search range. We are interested in knowing whether there is evidence that those job seekers
with an internal locus of control search in across a broader geographic area. The SOEP
data do not provide us with sufficient information on individuals’ job-search to conduct this
analysis; instead we make use of another German dataset – the IZA Evaluation Dataset. The
IZA Evaluation Dataset targets a sample of Germans entering unemployment between June
2007 and May 2008. A 9 percent random sample from the monthly unemployment inflows
of approximately 206,000 individuals identified in the administrative records was selected for
interview. In wave 1, 17,396 interviews were completed with job seekers who had begun an
unemployment spell approximately two months earlier. The data are ideal for our purposes
because individuals are interviewed shortly after they become unemployed and are asked
detailed questions about their job search and personality traits, including locus of control.
We restrict our estimation sample to job seekers who are 25 to 55 years old to be consistent
with our main SOEP analysis. We include observations from wave 1 as well as from waves 2
and 3 for those individuals who are still unemployed and searching for a job. This leaves us
with in total 7,915 observations of which 6,987 are from wave 1 and an additional 499 (429)
observations from wave 2 (wave 3).
Locus of Control In the IZA data, locus of control is measured using the same set of 10
items and on the same Likert scale as in the SOEP. We therefore construct a unidimensional
continuous locus of control index in an identical manner as that in our SOEP analysis (see
Section 3.4.2 for more details). An overview of the descriptive statistics of the LOC items in
the data can be found in Table 3.B.1, while Figure 3.B.1 (upper panel) depicts the distribution
of the continuous variable.
Geographic Search Range The IZA data also contain a measure of whether survey partic-
ipants have applied for jobs for which they would have to make a residential move. Job seekers
who answer this question with ”yes” are considered to engage in ”geographically distant” job
search. For those who respond that they have applied for jobs that require a residential move,
we also know the maximum search distance (in km) and, for a subset of individuals, whether
migration would involve moving across state, national or continental boundaries. Table 3.B.2
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provides a brief overview of the differences in the geographic range of internal and external
job seekers.
Standard mean equality tests indicate that the internal job seekers are significantly more
likely to indicate that they have searched for a job that would require them to change resi-
dences. This pattern is also supported by the kernel densities computed separately for movers
and non-movers in Figure 3.B.1 (bottom panel). The maximum application distance is also
significantly higher for internals (921 km) than for externals (753 km). There is an average
search distance of 234 km for internals and 130 km for externals if all local (non-distant)
searchers are set to zero. Internal job seekers engaged in distant job search are more likely to
search Germany-wide, their external counter parts are more likely to restrict their search to
their region or federal state. Although internal job seekers are significantly more likely to say
that they are willing to change their residence for a job, there is no significant relationship
between the willingness to accept long journeys to work and locus of control. This is consistent
with our hypothesis that the relationship between locus of control and migration is mainly
driven by search intensity and not by differences in the migration costs of internal vs. external
job seekers.
3.B.2 Estimation Strategy
The choice of control variables was made to match the set of variables in our main estima-
tion as close as possible. Restrictions due to data sensitivity imply that we lack information
on regional characteristics, detailed household income, and an indicator of disability. Unfortu-
nately, information on individual’s willingness to take risk is collected only for a small subset
of respondents and can thus not be included in the main analysis. Our labor market controls
include the last occupation before unemployment as well as earlier unemployment experiences.
The Big Five are surveyed with a reduced set of items in the IZA data and the construction
of these traits is based on this reduced set. Information on home-ownership, highest school
degree, highest vocational degree and unemployment experience is only available in wave 1
and is therefore imputed to waves 2 and 3. In order to identify potential non-linearities in
the effects of LOC on distant search probabilities indicators for the quartiles of the LOC dis-
tribution are included as explanatory variables as an alternative to the continuous measure.
Table 3.B.3 provides the key descriptive statistics for the estimation sample.
3.B.3 Results
The results of the main estimation can be found in Table 3.B.4. For the full estimation
results corresponding to the estimations reported in column (7) see Table 3.B.5. Consistent
with the predictions of our theoretical framework, internal job seekers are significantly more
likely to engage in geographically distant job search. A one standard deviation increase in
the extent to which someone is internal increases the probability of distant job search by 1.2
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percentage points on average in the full specification (Column 7). This effect is largely driven
by those individuals who are highly internal. Having a locus of control in the highest quartile
increases the probability of geographically distant search by 3.34 percentage points relative to
having a locus of control in the lowest quartile (Column 9). The baseline probability of geo-
graphically distant search is 22 percent, implying that these effects translate into an increase
in geographically distant search of about 15 percent. Interestingly, these effects are stronger
for women than for men which is consistent with previous evidence that the relationship be-
tween locus of control and labor market outcomes is often gender-specific (see Cobb-Clark
2015).
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3.B.4 Tables and Figures
Table 3.B.1: Components of Locus of Control - IZA Eval. Dataset
Variable mean
Components of locus of control (Scale: 1-7)a
I1: How my life goes depends on me 6.03
I2: Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve (R) 3.65
I3: What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck (R) 3.46
I4: If one is soc. or polit. active, one can have an effect on social conditionsb 3.90
I5: I freq. have the experience that others have a controlling influence over my life (R) 2.88
I6: One has to work hard in order to succeed 6.19
I7: If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities (R) 3.39
I8: Opportunities I have in life are determined by the social conditions (R) 4.54
I9: Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can makeb 5.22
I10: I have little control over the things that happen in my life (R) 2.71
Observations 7,626
Source: IZA Evaluation dataset own calculations.
Notes: Items marked with a (R) are reversed prior to factor analysis in order to indicate an internal locus of control for high values.
a The LOC was surveyed on a 7-point likert scale from 1 for “I Disagree Completely” to 7 for “Agree completely”.
b Items 4 and 9 are not included into the prediction of the latent factor.
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Table 3.B.2: Descriptives of Outcome Variables by Locus of Control - IZA Eval. Dataset
All Internals Externals
Distant Search (Dum) 0.22 0.26 0.18 ∗∗∗
[7,663] [3,831] [3,832]
Maximal Search Distance in km (incl. 0 km)a 182.17 234.02 130.33 ∗∗∗
[1,625] [966] [659]
Maximal Search Distance in km (if any) 853.00 921.54 752.54 ∗∗
[7,609] [3,804] [3805]
Distant Search Intensity
Own Town, Region 0.02 0.01 0.03 ∗∗
In Federal State 0.17 0.13 0.21 ∗∗∗
In Germany 0.55 0.58 0.50 ∗∗∗
In Europe 0.21 0.21 0.21
Outside Europe 0.06 0.06 0.06
[1,677] [993] [684]
Concessions willing to take
Long Journey to Work
No 0.09 0.08 0.10
Maybe 0.46 0.45 0.46
Yes 0.46 0.47 0.44
[2,051] [1,075] [976]
Change of residence
No 0.50 0.47 0.52 ∗∗
Maybe 0.34 0.34 0.35
Yes 0.16 0.19 0.13 ∗∗∗
[2,048] [1,073] [975]
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Notes: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise. Number of observations in square brackets. Significance stars in the last column
refer to significance level of t-test for mean equivalence between Externals and Internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a Distance is coded to 0 if individual indicates that she did not apply for a job for which she would have to move.
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Table 3.B.3: Selected Descriptive Statistics by Internal Migration Status - IZA Eval. Dataset
All Male Female
Non-Distant Distant Non-Distant Distant Non-Distant Distant
Seeker Seeker Seeker Seeker Seeker Seeker
Locus of Control (std.)a 3.10 3.38∗∗∗ 3.07 3.34∗∗∗ 3.14 3.40∗∗∗
Locus of Control > Median 0.47 0.59∗∗∗ 0.46 0.58∗∗∗ 0.49 0.60∗∗∗
Socio-Economic Characteristics
Age 39.65 36.19∗∗∗ 39.88 34.60∗∗∗ 39.38 37.12∗∗∗
Female 0.46 0.63∗∗∗
German 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95
Married or living together 0.53 0.30∗∗∗ 0.58 0.22∗∗∗ 0.48 0.34∗∗∗
Number of Children in HH 0.59 0.31∗∗∗ 0.69 0.23∗∗∗ 0.48 0.3∗∗∗6
East-Germany 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.29∗∗∗
Home-Owner 0.39 0.22∗∗∗ 0.41 0.20∗∗∗ 0.36 0.22∗∗∗
Monthly Net-Income of the HH
less or equal 1000 EUR 0.23 0.33∗∗∗ 0.20 0.36∗∗∗ 0.27 0.32∗∗∗
1001 - 2000 EUR 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.41∗
2001 - 3000 EUR 0.28 0.19∗∗∗ 0.32 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24 0.20∗∗
3001 - 4000 EUR 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗
Highest School Degree
No Degree 0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01∗∗
Lower Secondary School 0.30 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24 0.10∗∗∗ 0.38 0.24∗∗∗
Intermediate School 0.45 0.32∗∗∗ 0.50 0.34∗∗∗ 0.40 0.30∗∗∗
Highschool 0.22 0.47∗∗∗ 0.25 0.55∗∗∗ 0.19 0.43∗∗∗
Other 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00∗ 0.01 0.02
Vocational or Higher Education
No Vocational Education 0.09 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08 0.05∗∗∗
Apprenticeship 0.59 0.39∗∗∗ 0.56 0.34∗∗∗ 0.62 0.41∗∗∗
Higher Technical College 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.12∗∗ 0.15 0.18∗∗
University Degree 0.13 0.37∗∗∗ 0.15 0.45∗∗∗ 0.11 0.32∗∗∗
Other Vocational Degree 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03
Last Employment Status before Unemployment
Regularly Employed 0.73 0.71∗∗ 0.68 0.65 0.80 0.74∗∗∗
Subsidized Employment 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07
Education, Milit. Serv. 0.04 0.15∗∗∗ 0.04 0.19∗∗∗ 0.04 0.12∗∗∗
Parental Leave etc. 0.07 0.01∗∗∗ 0.12 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
Unemployment Experience 2.69 2.79 2.36 2.57 3.07 2.92
Other Personality Variables
Opennessd 4.94 5.26∗∗∗ 4.92 5.33∗∗∗ 4.97 5.22∗∗∗
Conscientiousnessd 6.25 6.26 6.33 6.40∗∗ 6.17 6.18
Extraversiond 5.09 5.20∗∗∗ 5.18 5.36∗∗∗ 4.99 5.11∗∗∗
Neuroticismd 3.83 3.55∗∗∗ 3.98 3.80∗∗∗ 3.65 3.40∗∗∗
Observations 5,984 1,679 3,214 622 2,770 1,057
Source: IZA Evaluation dataset own calculations.
Notes: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise.
Stars give results from t-test for mean equivalence: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
b For detailed information on the measurement of locus of control see Section 3.4.2. For this table, locus of control was adjusted to just
have positive values by subtracting the lowest possible value.
d Big Five are measured with a reduced set of items available from the data. See Section 3.B.2 for more details.
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Figure 3.B.1: Distribution of Locus of Control in IZA Eval. Dataset
Source: IZA Evaluation dataset, own illustration.
Notes: Bottom panel provides the graphical illustration of the kernel density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel function separately
for distant searchers and non-distant searchers.
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Table 3.B.4: Logit Estimation Results (Marginal Effects): Geographically Distant Search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
All
LOC Factor 4.693∗∗∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 1.195∗∗
(0.488) (0.468) (0.500)
LOC > Med. 7.822∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗ 1.386
(0.952) (0.912) (0.949)










Observations 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663 7,663
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.156 0.155 0.156 0.164 0.163 0.164
Men
LOC Factor 3.667∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗ 0.775
(0.611) (0.580) (0.629)
LOC > Med. 6.117∗∗∗ 1.458 0.620
(1.199) (1.120) (1.175)










Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.225 0.224 0.225 0.233 0.233 0.234
Women
LOC Factor 5.118∗∗∗ 2.212∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗
(0.748) (0.724) (0.774)
LOC > Med. 8.022∗∗∗ 2.524∗ 1.126
(1.455) (1.431) (1.477)










Observations 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.114 0.113 0.114
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Socio-Econ. 3 3 3 3 3 3
Personality 3 3 3
Source: IZA Evaluation dataset own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard
Errors are clustered on person-level.
Full estimation results for specifications (7) can be found in Table 3.B.5. The full estimation results for specifications (1) - (6) as well as
(8) and (9) can be obtained from the authors.
3.B. SUPPLEMENTARY ANAYLSIS WITH IZA EVALUATION DATASET




LOC Factor (std.) 1.195∗∗ 0.775 1.545∗∗
(0.500) (0.629) (0.774)
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Age -1.339∗∗ -0.909 -1.036
(0.538) (0.679) (0.835)




German 1.718 -0.512 3.557
(1.882) (2.423) (2.935)
Married -5.716∗∗∗ -8.465∗∗∗ -4.600∗∗∗
(1.080) (1.347) (1.738)
Number of Children in Household -2.868∗∗∗ -6.679∗∗∗ -0.637
(0.753) (1.058) (1.169)
East-Germany -0.985 1.378 -2.333
(0.989) (1.235) (1.545)
Home-Owner -5.739∗∗∗ -1.592 -8.830∗∗∗
(0.996) (1.283) (1.511)
Monthly Net-income of the HH (Ref: less or equal 1000 EUR)
1001 - 2000 EUR -1.520 -1.051 -1.648
(1.079) (1.268) (1.711)
2001 - 3000 EUR -4.648∗∗∗ -5.089∗∗∗ -3.516∗
(1.282) (1.509) (2.059)
3001 - 4000 EUR -4.331∗∗ -5.160∗∗∗ -0.625
(1.701) (1.893) (3.067)
Highest School Degree (Ref: Non)
Lower Secondary School 3.879 1.752 4.546
(5.338) (7.504) (7.904)
Intermediate School 6.117 4.851 6.011
(5.169) (6.993) (7.932)
Highschool 14.083∗∗ 8.658 16.416∗
(6.347) (8.673) (9.574)
Other School 14.301∗ -4.038 20.693∗
(8.349) (11.351) (11.432)
Vocational or Higher Education (ref: Non)
Apprenticeship 3.879∗∗ 1.453 4.781∗
(1.889) (2.516) (2.802)
Higher Technical College 12.000∗∗∗ 3.539 17.149∗∗∗
(2.514) (3.068) (3.688)
University or College Degree 23.066∗∗∗ 14.083∗∗∗ 28.694∗∗∗
(2.901) (3.874) (4.198)
Other Vocational Degree 8.740∗∗ 7.115∗ 7.181
(3.424) (4.229) (5.139)
Last Employment Status before Unemployment (Ref: Reg. Employment)
Subsidized Employment 1.170 1.146 1.238
(1.852) (2.260) (2.811)
Education, Training, Military Serv. 7.660∗∗∗ 7.901∗∗∗ 6.380∗∗
(2.034) (2.376) (3.195)
Parental Leave etc. -12.128∗∗∗ -5.895∗∗ -2.735
(2.100) (2.366) (9.953)
Ealier Unemployment Experience in Months 0.085 0.241 -0.095
(0.120) (0.150) (0.183)
Other Personality Variables
Openness 2.460∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 2.904∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.499) (0.617)
Conscientiousness 0.592 1.162 0.045
(0.586) (0.790) (0.872)
Continued on next page...
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... continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
All Men Women
Extraversion 0.213 0.381 0.246
(0.443) (0.551) (0.681)
Neuroticism -1.052∗∗ -0.642 -1.497∗∗
(0.411) (0.510) (0.638)
Observations 7,663 3,828 3,827
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Marginal effects are reported in percentage points. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered on person-level.
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CHAPTER 4
Drinking is Different! Examining the Role
of Locus of Control for Alcohol
Consumption
This chapter is based on joint work with Marco Caliendo.
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4.1 Introduction
Unlike other practices of unhealthy behavior, such as smoking, physical inactivity, un-
healthy diets, substance use or risky sexual behavior, alcohol consumption is still largely
accepted within most societies. According to data from the World Health Organisation 71.7
percent of US-Americans and 79.4 percent of Germans over the age of 15 consumed alcohol
in 2016 while the rate of lifetime abstainers was with 9.2 percent (USA) and 7.9 percent
(Germany) vanishingly low in the same year. Even heavy episodic drinking is a surprisingly
common behavior in both countries. In Germany 43.1 percent and in the USA 36.4 percent of
drinkers engaged in a heavy drinking episode in the past 30 days (World Health Organization,
2016).1 At the same time, a huge body of studies in multiple fields such as medicine as well
as all social science, including economics, have empirically identified severe negative effects of
heavy alcohol consumption, alcohol abuse and addiction on mental and physical health (see
e.g. Grønbæk, 2009; Boffetta and Hashibe, 2006; Thakker, 1998; Merikangas et al., 1998; Keil
et al., 1998; Corrao et al., 2004) as well as social and economic outcomes (see e.g. Mullahy
and Sindelar, 1993, 1996; Jones and Richmond, 2006; Macdonald and Shields, 2004). Thus,
the consequences are inextricably linked to considerable microeconomic and macroeconomic
costs, e.g. through the strain it puts on individual health care expenditures and labor market
perspectives.
As opposed to this, a growing empirical literature finds positive effects of moderate drink-
ing on health, such as e.g. mortality, heart disease, cancer as well as dementia (see e.g. Rehm
et al., 2001; Grønbæk et al., 2000; Renaud et al., 1998; Ronksley et al., 2011; Peters et al.,
2008), and on economic outcomes (see e.g. Macdonald and Shields, 2001; Peters and String-
ham, 2006; Ours, 2004; French and Zarkin, 1995; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997). Not least
because of this ambiguity in the literature about the consequences of different levels of alcohol
consumption on health as well as economic and social outcomes, decision making with respect
to drinking is associated with a high level of uncertainty about positive and negative future
consequences. This is why individual subjective beliefs about risks and personal control are
likely to play a crucial role when explaining individual differences in drinking behavior as an
important health decision.
Based on these considerations, this paper attempts to investigate the role of the personality
trait locus of control (LOC) on individual alcohol consumption. Locus of control can be
characterized as a “generalized attitude, belief, or expectancy regarding the nature of the causal
relationship between one’s own behavior and its consequences” (Rotter, 1966) and describes
whether individuals believe in the effects of their own actions on their lives’ future outcomes.
While an individual with an internal LOC believes that she is in control of the consequences of
her own actions, an external individual attributes lives outcomes to luck, chance, fate or other
1 According to the World Health Organization (2016), heavy episodic drinking is defined as the consumption
of at least 60 grams of pure alcohol which corresponds to approximately 6 standard alcoholic drinks.
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external forces. LOC has already been shown to have an important effect on behavior and
decision making in such areas as human capital investment (Coleman and DeLeire, 2003),
job search effort (McGee and McGee, 2016; Caliendo et al., 2015b), savings (Cobb-Clark
et al., 2016), occupational attainment (Heywood et al., 2017; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011),
entrepreneurial activity (Caliendo et al., 2014), labor market mobility (Caliendo et al., 2015a),
investment behavior (Salamanca et al., 2016; Pinger et al., 2018) and, most related to the
paper at hand, health behavior such as smoking, healthy diets and exercise (Cobb-Clark et al.,
2014). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet attempted to empirically
identify an effect of LOC on drinking behavior in a well-conceived and detailed manner.
Building on the existing empirical findings on the association between LOC and individual
health-investments as well as risky behavior, which are summarized in detail in Section 4.2,
our paper intends to sheet light on the role of LOC for drinking as a very important domain of
risky health behavior. We are doing so by empirically investigating the relationship between
an internal locus of control and self-reported levels of alcohol consumption and by additionally
discussing and analysing the potential mechanism and channels behind it.
The estimations are conducted using the extensive information available from the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP, 2017), a large representative longitudinal household panel from Ger-
many. The SOEP not only includes detailed socio-economic information but also regularly
surveys individuals’ locus of control as well as their health behavior including alcohol con-
sumption. Using this data, we estimate the effects of an individual’s locus of control on her
probability of indicating higher levels of alcohol consumption. We find a significant positive
effects of having an internal LOC on the individual probability to be a moderate or heavy
drinker as measured by occasional or regular consumption of at least one out of four beverage
types. The effects also hold if we control for a large list of socio-economic, health-related and
personality and preference controls and are of considerable economic significance as they are
of similar magnitude as effects of traditional preference measures such as risk aversion and
time preferences. In addition, the estimated effects are robust with respect to the definition
of the LOC variable, to the use of a more objective measure of consumption as well as to
controlling for compensating behavior in other health-domains as a potential confounder.
Based on these findings, we argue that two main mechanisms are likely to be responsible
for this relationship. On the one hand, LOC is likely to be highly predictive for the amount
of individual investment into social and occupational networks and thus also for drinking
opportunities as the attendance of social gatherings is often inextricably linked with alcohol
consumption. On the other hand, an increased perception of individual control (being internal)
might decrease the perceived importance of risk for life’s outcomes. The future risks of alcohol
consumption might thus be underestimated if individuals believe in their own ability to cope
with or prevent the negative consequences of risky behavior.
Page | 107
CHAPTER 4. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief introduction into the earlier
literature. Following this, Section 4.3 describes the data as well as the estimation strategy
and Section 4.4 presents an overview of the results of the main estimation. Based on this,
Section 4.5 argues about potential channels behind the estimated effects. Section 4.6 presents
a number of robustness checks. The paper concludes in Section 4.7.
4.2 The Economics of Risky Health Behavior
Traditional Models Analysing the drivers of risky health-related behavior, such as alcohol
consumption, smoking, unprotected sex, unbalanced diets as well as a lack of exercise, has a
relatively long tradition in the modern economic literature. Motivated by the medical liter-
ature on the severe negative consequences of risky health behavior, economists have started
analysing the drivers of these types of behavior. The standard economic approach to study
risky health-related behavior concentrated on a traditional rational choice model assuming
that individuals maximize the present discounted value of lifetime utility. In line with the
well-known health-capital model by Grossman (1972, 2000), individuals are thus assumed to
drink if the instantaneous pleasure from drinking now is higher than the expected utility
from investing in the future health stock by abstaining or reducing consumption plus the
monetary costs of purchasing the alcohol on the market. Especially relevant to the research
on alcohol consumption and smoking, another strand of literature evolved over the years,
which puts a specific focus on the economic rationale behind addictions. Based on earlier
work from psychology (see e.g. Rachlin, 1997), the literature assumes that current levels of
consumption are positively affected by past consumption levels and thus models addiction
using autocorrelation within the demand functions for addictive goods (Becker and Murphy,
1988; Chaloupka, 1991). In order to explain medium levels of unhealthy behavior, especially
non-standard approaches of time discounting, i.e. present-biased preferences as well as time
inconsistent preferences have been discussed (see e.g. Cutler et al., 2003; Gruber and Ko¨szegi,
2001).
Behavioral Approaches Over the years, multiple other approaches of explaining risky
health behavior have evolved. Peer effects have been found to be highly important2 (see e.g.
Manski, 2000; Christakis and Fowler, 2007), with the empirical literature especially showing
strong peer dependencies in alcohol consumption for adolescents (see e.g. Duncan et al., 2005;
Argys and Rees, 2008; Lundborg, 2006). But also information constraints (see e.g. Kenkel,
1991; Viscusi, 1990) as well as bounded rationality and cognitive limitations such as through
self-control failures in line with the seminal work by e.g. Simon (1982) and Thaler and Shefrin
2 An important term in this context is the so called “bandwagon effect” which describes a situation in
which individuals derive additional utility from the fact that they are consuming the same goods as peers
(Leibenstein, 2006).
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(1981) are discussed as important issues in this domain (see e.g. Suranovic et al., 1999). In
line with this, a large literature focused on the importance of education and cognitive ability
for preventing bounded rationality and information constraints in the health context (see
e.g. Farrell and Fuchs, 1982; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010). A detailed discussion of the
economics behind risky health behavior in general and alcohol consumption in specific as well
as a profound literature review can be found e.g. in Cawley and Ruhm (2011) and Cook and
Moore (2000).
Psychological Determinants While the standard economic models above would attribute
unexplained individual heterogeneity in risky health behavior to idiosyncratic shocks, behav-
ioral economics has motivated especially modern empirical studies to investigate the psy-
chological black box behind such behavior. In the past years the literature on psychological
determinants of risky health behavior in general and alcohol consumption in specific has been
on the rise. Starting with the early psychological and medical literature, largely small-scale
empirical studies have found relationships of personality traits such as susceptibility to peer
pressure, self-esteem, extraversion and neuroticism on substance use and smoking in adoles-
cence (Dielman et al., 1987; Wijatkowski et al., 1990). In line with this, the later psychological
literature managed to observe important relationships of personality traits such as the Big
Five and risky health behavior of adults (see e.g. Vollrath et al., 1999; Booth-Kewley and
Vickers, 1994; Lemos-Gira´ldez and Fidalgo-Aliste, 1997).
Locus of Control With respect to locus of control, the psychological literature largely
focused on very specific measures of LOC which are directly linked to the perceived control in
the health domain and found important relationships between health-related LOC and sub-
stance use in adolescence (Carman, 1974; Dielman et al., 1987) as well as health behavior such
as diets, exercise, smoking and seat belt use in adulthood (see e.g. Wallston et al., 1978; Wall-
ston and Wallston, 1978; Furnham and Greaves, 1994; Lemos-Gira´ldez and Fidalgo-Aliste,
1997; Holt et al., 2014). In line with this, Steptoe and Wardler (2001) find that perceptions
of high control through chance as well as powerful others are associated with higher alcohol
consumption levels. As opposed to this large body of literature in psychology, the economic
literature which attempts to incorporate locus of control into their health-behavior models is
quite rare. Mendolia and Walker (2014a) for example analyse the effect of locus of control as
well as self-esteem and work ethics on health behavior, as measured by alcohol consumption,
drug use, unprotected and early sexual activity and sports, for a group of adolescents aged 15-
16 years. With respect to alcohol consumption and locus of control, they only find a weak link
of having an external perception of control with the frequency of getting drunk when drinking
but no significant association with regular drinking. Chiteji (2010) analyses the role of future
orientation and self-efficacy on drinking and exercising. They find that self-efficacy, which
is strongly linked to locus of control, is negatively associated with drinking and positively
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associated with exercising. Most closely related to our paper, Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) dis-
cuss the role of general locus of control for individual health behavior on multiple dimensions
including diet, smoking and exercising using Australian survey data from the HILDA. They
find positive effects of LOC on healthy habits such as healthy diets, non-smoking and regular
exercises. Based on an extensive heterogeneity analysis, the authors find that for men the
likely mechanism behind this relationship is a difference in the subjective expectations about
returns to investments into health. Thus, internal men are likely to expect higher returns to
them being health conscious and are thus more likely to invest in healthy habits. As opposed
to this, women seem to have stronger preferences for health investments in general. In line
with this research, we would also expect negative effects of LOC on alcohol consumption if
drinking less or totally abstaining from alcohol is assumed to lead to positive outcomes for
the own health in the future. Nevertheless, as a side note, Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) identify
significantly positive effects of LOC on alcohol consumption in excessive amounts (i.e. binge
drinking). The authors argue that an increased perception of control might be correlated with
a higher belief about the ability to cope with the consequences of binge drinking and addi-
tionally alcohol might not be perceived as a behavior which strongly affects health outcomes
in general. Nevertheless, their data does not allow them to analyse drinking behavior in more
detail. This is where our paper is able to make a major contribution in order to complete the
picture on locus of control and risky health behavior.
4.3 Data and Empirical Approach
Building upon the existing literature, we estimate the relationship between an internal
locus of control and self-reported levels of alcohol consumption using German panel data. The
estimations are conducted using the extensive information available from the Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP, 2017), a large representative longitudinal household panel from Germany. The
SOEP not only includes detailed socio-economic information but also surveys individuals’
locus of control as well as their health behavior, including alcohol consumption, on a regular
basis. For more information on the SOEP see Goebel et al. (2018). Our sample consists of all
observations for individuals between the age of 20 to 70 years for the waves 2006, 2008 and
2010 in which we observe the self-assessed amount of alcohol consumption.
Table 4.A.1 gives an overview over the main summary statistics for the sample. The final
estimation sample consists of 36,134 observations for 15,482 individuals due to the panel
nature of the data. Individuals are thus observed up to three times. 17,418 (7,478) of those
observations (individuals) are men and 18,716 (8,004) are women. The later estimations will
always be reported separately for men and women in order to take care of important gender
specific effects which are common to the literature (see e.g. Cobb-Clark et al., 2014).
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4.3.1 Alcohol Consumption
In 2006, 2008 and 2010, individuals were asked to rate their consumption levels of four
different types of alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, spirits, mixed drinks) on a scale from 1
(regularly) to 4 (never). Based on those answers and guided by the work of Ziebarth and
Grabka (2009), we generate an ordinal measure combining all those answers. The variable
categorizes individuals into the following four groups:
Abstainers - No consumption of all four types
Rare Drinkers - Seldom drinking for at least one type but no occasional consumption
Moderate Drinkers - Occasional drinking for at least one type but no regular consumption
Heavy Drinkers - Regular drinking for at least one type
In line with this categorization, the terms moderate and occasional as well as heavy and regular
are going to be used interchangeably in the following. As is already noted by Ziebarth and
Grabka (2009), the main drawback of this measurement is the rather vague and subjective
character, as no concrete information about the exact quantity of alcohol consumption is
collected. Nevertheless, we are able to test the reliability of this measure as well as the
sensitivity of our results with respect to the subjectivity of the reported amounts using a new
measure available in the SOEP wave 2016. We find that the subjectively reported levels are
quite reliable based on a correlation of 0.634 between subjective levels in 2010 and concrete
frequencies in 2016 which is fairly high given that the observations lie six years apart. For a
more detailed discussion of the sensitivity of our results in this respect, see Section 4.6.2.
In a second step, we then generate binary indicators based on the defined groups in order
to enable the analysis of non-parallel effect as well as the calculation of marginal effects. The
following overview summarizes all four drinking indicators D:
Drinking Indicator Never + Rare Moderate Heavy
D1 Moderate + Heavy D = 0 D = 1 D = 1
D2 Moderate D = 0 D = 1 missing
D3 Heavy I (vs. Moderate) missing D = 0 D = 1
D4 Heavy II (vs. Never/Rare) D = 0 missing D = 1
Our main outcome variable is the binary indicator for moderate or heavy drinkering (D1),
which captures all individuals who reports occasional or regular consumption on at least one
of the beverage types. In order to identify non-parallel effects, three alternative indicators
D2 - D4 are used in an additional step, which are all based on a selective sample of drinkers
as either one of the three possible groups is set to missing.3 These indicators enable us to
make statements about the effects on the probabilities of moderate and heavy consumption
3 Abstainers and rare drinkers are always pooled into one reference group for the main estimations.
Page | 111
CHAPTER 4. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
Table 4.1: Descriptive Analysis - Alcohol Consumption
All Women Men
Alcohol Consumption
Abstainers 0.12 0.15 0.08
Rare Drinkers (Seldom Consumption) 0.29 0.36 0.21
Moderate Drinkers (Occasional Consumption) 0.42 0.40 0.44
Heavy Drinkers (Regular Consumption) 0.18 0.09 0.27
Moderate or Heavy Drinking D1 (Binary Indicators)
All 0.60 0.49 0.71
Beer 0.39 0.20 0.60
Wine 0.39 0.41 0.36
Spirits 0.11 0.07 0.15
Mixed Drinks 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 36,134 18,716 17,418
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
independent from each other. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the estimated effects using
those outcome variables are at risk of being biased by sample selection. The estimated results
thus have to be interpreted with care and are only ancillary evidence in addition to the main
indicator.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the shares of alcohol consumption in the sample. In the
full sample, 60% of the individuals are counted as being moderate or heavy drinkers, as they
indicate that they consume at least one beverage type occasionally (42%) or regularly (18%),
and 12% can be characterized as abstainers (no alcohol consumption at all). In line with
expectations, the share of drinkers is distinctly lower for women (40% moderate drinkers and
9% heavy drinkers) than for men (44% moderate drinkers and 27% heavy drinkers). While
15% of all women are abstainers, this is only true for 8% of men. Men and women also differ
with respect to the beverage types they consume. While 60% (15%) of men consume beer
(spirits) at least occasionally, only 20% (7%) of women do so. As opposed to this, the share
of moderate wine-drinkers is higher for women (41% as compared to 36%).
4.3.2 Locus of Control
For our sample, locus of control is available in the years 2005 and 2010. In those waves,
SOEP respondents were asked to assess their agreement with a list of 10 statements (items),
all related to the degree of influence on life’s outcomes. Responses were measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘disagree completely’) to 7 (‘agree completely’). A list of
the set of items can be found in Table 4.2.
In order to construct our locus of control variable, we conduct an exploratory factor
analysis with which we investigate the way these items load onto latent factors.4 The factor
4 A loading plot pooled for all years can be found in Figure 4.B.1 in the Supplementary Material. The
detailed results of this factor analysis are available from the authors on request.
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Table 4.2: Components of Locus of Control (waves 2005 and 2010)
No Item mean SD
Q: The following statements apply to different attitudes towards life and the future.
To what degree do you personally agree with the following statements?
Scale: 1 (Disagree completely) - 7 (Agree completely)
I1: How my life goes depends on me 5.49 (1.29)
I2: Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve (-) 3.26 (1.77)
I3: What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck (-) 3.51 (1.64)
I4: If a person is socially [...] active, he/she can have an effect on social conditionsb 3.71 (1.61)
I5: I have the experience that others have a controlling influence over my life (-) 3.12 (1.68)
I6: One has to work hard in order to succeed 5.95 (1.11)
I7: If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities (-) 3.26 (1.64)
I8: The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions (-) 4.50 (1.47)
I9: Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can makeb 4.84 (1.33)
I10: I have little control over the things that happen in my life (-) 2.67 (1.47)
Observations 24,195a
Source: SOEP, waves 2005 and 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33.
Notes: Items marked with a (-) are reversed prior to factor analysis.
a In this table, the item means and SD are computed for the observation waves 2005 and 2010 only, independent from the sample definition.
b Items 4 and 9 are not included into the final factor.
analysis reveals that items 1 and 6 clearly load onto the first factor – which is interpreted as
internal LOC –, while items 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 clearly load onto the second factor – interpreted
as external LOC. Items 4 and 9 are not included in the following due to ambiguous loadings.5
Afterwards, we use a two-step process to create a continuous unidimensional locus of control
variable, consistent with the previous literature (see e.g. Piatek and Pinger, 2016). Based on
the exploratory factor analysis, we first reverse the scores for the external items (items 2, 3,
5, 7, 8 and 10) such that all eight items are increasing in internality.6 Afterwards, we use
confirmatory factor analysis to extract a single factor. This has the advantage of avoiding
equal weighting of all item and instead allow the data to drive how each item is weighted
in the overall index. As has been shown by Piatek and Pinger (2016), simple averaging risks
measurement error and attenuation bias. The resulting factor is therefore increasing in internal
locus of control and its distribution is shown in Figure 4.1.
There is evidence that LOC is relatively stable for the working-age population (see e.g.
Preuss and Hennecke, 2018; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013) and thus concerns with respect to
reverse causality are rather small. With respect to alcohol consumption potential endogeneity
concerns are additionally likely to apply only to rather extreme levels of consumption which
are arguable very seldom also in our sample. In order to further minimize those concerns, we
ensure that the LOC factor is never measured after the period in which we measure alcohol
consumption. Thus, the information is then imputed forwards into the years in which we
observe alcohol consumption, i.e. the LOC from 2005 is used as the explanatory variable for
5 Item 4 does not clearly load onto either of the two factors and Item 9 loads onto the internal factor but
an intuitive attribution based on the item’s wording would point more in the direction of an external item.
6 These items are marked with an (-) in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Locus of Control
Source: SOEP, waves 2005 and 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own illustration.
alcohol consumption in 2006 and 2008 and LOC from 2010 is used for consumption in 2010.
Additionally, we will test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the construction and
imputation of the locus of control variable by using a list of alternative measures in Section 4.6
in which we i.a. also discuss potential attenuation bias due to state-dependent measurement
error (see e.g Preuss and Hennecke, 2018).
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy
Using this data, we start the empirical analysis by estimating the effects of an individual’s
locus of control on her probability of being in a higher category of alcohol consumption as
measured by the ordinal drinking variable in an ordered response model. In line with Long
and Freese (2014), the ordered choice situation can be presented in form of a latent variable
model with D∗it being the latent continuous drinking variable of individual i at time t, which
is divided into J = 4 ordinal categories such that
Dit = m if αm−1 < D∗it ≤ αm for m = 1 . . . 4 (4.1)
Where αm−1 and αm are the lower and upper cut-points with α0 = −∞ and αm = ∞.
The probability that a drinking outcome m occurs is given by
Pr(Dit = m|Xit) = Pr(αm−1 < D∗it ≤ αm|Xit) for m = 1 . . . 4 (4.2)
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with Xit being the vector of regressors. The vector includes the (imputed) locus of control
locit of individual i in t. In order to identify potential non-linearities in the effects, in addition
to the continuous variable locit, the LOC is alternatively also included as a categorical variable
that indicates in which tercile of the LOC distribution an individual is classified. Addition-
ally, Xit contains an extensive list of demographic information Cit (gender, age, nationality,
region of residence, number of children in the household, family status), educational controls
(school degree, vocational degree and college degree), controls for the economic situation (net
household income, gross labor income, labor force status and occupational autonomy) and
health-related controls (disability-status, subjective health and body mass index). Further-
more, averaged and standardized personality and preferences measures Pi are included, which
are the Big Five personality traits, general and health-related risk aversion as well as patience
as a proxy for individual time-preferences, and T captures year fixed-effects. See Table 4.A.1
for the full list of controls.
Equation 4.2 is estimated using an ordered logit model, such that
Pr(Dit = m) = Pr(αm <Xit
′β ≤ αm−1) (4.3)
= G(αm −Xit′β)−G(αm−1 −Xit′β) (4.4)
with Xit
′β = β1locit+β2Cit+β3Pi+β4T and G(·) being the cumulative distribution function
of a standard logistic distribution. Estimated coefficients are reported in log-odds units. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on the personal level in order to account for the serial correlation in
the error terms due to the panel-nature of the data.
This ordered response model is based on the proportional odds or parallel regression
assumption, which implies that the β-coefficient – and consequently also the effects of the
explanatory variables on the drinking variable – are constant for all J − 1 binary decision
situations. The slopes of all regressions are identical and the regression lines are parallel as
only the intercepts differ across values of J. As Long and Freese (2014) note, this assumption
is violated very frequently and the ordered response model is therefore often assumed to be
overly restrictive. To check, whether the ordered response model is the appropriate model
for the present analysis, we conduct the Brant test, a Wald test for the parallel regression
assumption (Brant, 1990), as an omnibus test for the entire model as well as separately for
each of the independent variables in the model.
Based on the results of the Brant test, we then investigate the non-parallel effects by
splitting the ordinal variable into the four binary indicators as discussed in Section 4.3.1. We
estimate the average marginal effects of an individual’s locus of control on her probability of
being (1) a moderate or heavy drinker as opposed to being an abstainer or rare drinker (D1it),
(2) a moderate drinker as opposed to being an abstainer or rare drinker (D2it), (2) a heavy
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Analysis - Mean Comparison
All Women Men
Ext. Int. Ext. Int. Ext. Int.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alcohol Consumption
Abstainers 0.15 0.09∗∗∗ 0.18 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11 0.06∗∗∗
Rare Drinkers 0.30 0.27∗∗∗ 0.37 0.34∗∗∗ 0.22 0.19∗∗∗
Moderate Drinkers 0.39 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42 0.46∗∗∗
Heavy Drinkers 0.16 0.19∗∗∗ 0.08 0.10∗∗∗ 0.25 0.28∗∗∗
Moderate or Heavy Drinking D1 (Binary Indicators)
All 0.55 0.64∗∗∗ 0.45 0.54∗∗∗ 0.67 0.74∗∗∗
Beer 0.36 0.42∗∗∗ 0.18 0.21∗∗∗ 0.57 0.62∗∗∗
Wine 0.34 0.43∗∗∗ 0.37 0.46∗∗∗ 0.32 0.41∗∗∗
Spirits 0.10 0.11∗∗∗ 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.15
Mixed Drinks 0.05 0.06∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06 0.06
Observations 17,903 18,231 9,651 9,065 8,252 9,166
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped into internals (Int.) and externals (Ext.) based on whether their LOC is lower/equal or higher than the
median. Significance stars refer to significance level of t-test for mean equivalence between externals and internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
drinker as opposed to being a moderate drinker (D3it) and (4) a heavy drinker as opposed to
being an abstainer or rare drinker (D4it):
P (Dit = 1) = P (β1 + β2locit + β3Cit + β3Pi + β4T + it > 0), (4.5)
where Dit is either one of the four indicators for alcohol consumption of individual i at time t.
Equation 4.5 is estimated using a simple logit approach. Standard errors are again clustered
on the personal level and the results presented in Section 4.4 are the average marginal effects.
The locus of control is always standardized and categorized within the sub-samples such that
e.g. having a high LOC corresponds to a high LOC as compared to all other individuals within
the two selected consumption categories and within the same gender.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of a first descriptive analysis of the relationship between
LOC and alcohol consumption. The share of individuals who indicate a certain frequency of
alcohol consumption are computed separately for internals (Int.) and externals (Ext.) with the
cutoff being the median for this simple aggregation. The results of the t-tests for mean equality
indicate that for men as well as women the share of individuals who indicate that they are
moderate or heavy drinkers is significantly higher in the group of internal individuals. While
for the full sample of internals the share of moderate drinkers is 45%, only 39% of externals are
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moderate drinkers. In this raw difference, internals are also more likely to be heavy drinkers
(19% as opposed to 16%). All differences similarly hold for men and women. In line with this,
internals are also less likely to be abstainers (9% as opposed to 15%). The significant difference
applies to all types of beverage in the full sample and is thus not driven by a certain type of
alcohol. Nevertheless, this descriptive relationship is very likely to be driven by a long list of
socio-economic characteristics that are associated with a higher consumption probability and
a higher LOC, such as education, age and earnings.
4.4.2 Main Results
Based on this first descriptive evidence, Table 4.4 summarizes the estimated coefficients of
the ordered response model using the categorical drinking variable as the dependent variable.
The descriptive raw gap between internals and externals remains significantly positive also
if additional sets of control variables are added to the model. Nevertheless, including those
controls, one set at a time, reveals that the raw gap was especially driven by educational
and economic variables being omitted (columns (1) and (2) compared to columns (3) and
(4)) while e.g. including personality and preferences measures does not strongly effect the
LOC estimates (columns (5) and (6) compared to columns (7) and (8)). Columns (7) and (8)
contain the results for the full specification and are referred to in the following.7 An increase in
the individual’s LOC by one standard deviation on average increases the log odds of being in a
higher level of alcohol consumption by 0.07 holding all other variables constant. If we instead
consider the tercile dummies as explanatory variables, no severe non-linearity in the effects
can be identified. While having a medium LOC ((LOCP33, LOCP66]) on average increases the
log odds by 0.13 as compared to having a low LOC ([LOCmin, LOCP33]), having a high LOC
((LOCP66, LOCmax]) increases the log odds by 0.162. Hence, locus of control is associated
with a higher probability of being in a higher category of alcohol consumption, i.e. higher
drinking frequencies, also if we control for a large set of potentially important endogenous
factors such as education, health or other personality traits.
Nevertheless, the size of the effect cannot be given a reasonable interpretation. Addition-
ally, the test statistics of the Brant test for parallel regressions indicates a strong violation of
the proportional odds assumption in the present case. The test statistics of the test for the full
model are significant throughout all specifications (see bottom of each panel in Table 4.4). Ad-
ditionally, Table 4.A.2 reports the test statistics for each regressor separately in the example
of the full specification (column (7) in Table 4.4). The test statistics are also highly signifi-
cant for a large number of control variables such as e.g. gender, age, nationality, vocational
degree, gross labor income, health, BMI, agreeableness, risk aversion and patience but most
importantly locus of control. This indicates that the hypothesis of equal β-coefficients can be
7 The full estimation results for the specifications in column (7) can be found in Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 4.4: Main Results (Ordered Logit Coefficients) - Categorical Drinking Variable
Outcome Variable: Categorical Drinking Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.173∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.289
∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.383
∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
Observations 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,134
Brant Test
chi2 1076.806 1047.331 1410.956 1398.826 1431.146 1423.392 1546.511 1540.867
Brant p > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Men
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.250
∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.289
∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049)
Observations 17,418 17,418 17,418 17,418 17,418 17,418 17,418 17418
Brant Test
chi2 334.568 316.539 533.773 525.065 555.237 548.821 623.704 618.986
p > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Women
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.210∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.279
∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.457
∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048)
Observations 18,716 18,716 18,716 18,716 18,716 18,716 18,716 18,716
Brant Test
chi2 541.260 534.497 758.872 759.394 759.394 761.473 777.585 778.618
p > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year Fixed-Effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Demographic Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Educational Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Economic Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Health Controls 3 3 3 3
Personality Controls 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Full estimation results for column (7) as well as
Brant test results for each of the independent variables in the model can be found in Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix. All other full results
as well as Brant test statistics are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4.5: Main Results (Logit, Marginal Effects) - Binary Drinking Indicators
Full Sample Selected Samples
Moderate/Heavy Moderate Heavy Heavy
Drinking D1 Drinking D2 Drinking D3 Drinking D4
(vs. Moderate) (vs. Non/Rare)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.025
∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.006 0.022∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.036
∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.002 0.023∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 36,134 36,134 29,736 29,736 21,574 21,574 20,958 20,958
Men
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.006 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.028
∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ -0.011 0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.031
∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.001 0.031∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 17,418 17,418 12,712 12,712 12,342 12,342 9,782 9,782
Women
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.018
∗ 0.018∗ -0.003 0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.037
∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.005 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Observations 18,716 18,716 17,024 17,024 9,232 9,232 11,176 11,176
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Full estimation results for column (1) can be found in Table 4.A.3 in the Appendix. All other full estimation results are available from
the authors upon request.
rejected for a large number of explanatory variables and the parallel regression assumption is
strongly violated in the ordered response model.
In order to estimate non-parallel effects and additionally be able to give the effects a rea-
sonable interpretation, Table 4.5 summarizes the estimated average marginal effects of locus
of control using the binary indicators as the dependent variable. All estimations are using
the full specification corresponding to columns (7) and (8) in Table 4.4.8 Columns (1) and
(2) include the estimated marginal effects on our main drinking indicator for moderate or
8 The full estimation results for the specifications in columns (1), (3), (5) an (7) can be found in Table 4.A.3
in the Appendix.
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heavy consumption, i.e. the indicator which uses the full sample. An increase in the indi-
vidual’s LOC by one standard deviation on average increases the probability of moderate
or heavy consumption by 1.5 percentage points holding all other variables constant. While
having a medium LOC ((LOCP33, LOCP66]) on average increases the probability of occa-
sional or regular consumption by 2.5 percentage points as compared to having a low LOC
([LOCmin, LOCP33]), having a high LOC ((LOCP66, LOCmax]) increases the probability by
3.6 percentage points. This effect is of considerable economic relevance. Given the overall
share of moderate and heavy drinkers of about 60 percent the effect of a high as opposed
to a low LOC translates into a 6 percent increase in probabilities. As can be seen in Ta-
ble 4.A.3, the effect size is comparable with the effects of other important variables such as
number of children in the household, university degree or employment status and higher than
the effect of e.g. household income, body mass index and, surprisingly, of similar size as the
marginal effect of important preferences measures such as willingness to take risks (general
and health-related) and patience as a proxy for time-preferences. No severe gender differences
can be observed for the absolute effect of both the continuous as well as the dichotomous
LOC measure. While the effect seems to be largely linear for women, the effect flattens out
for men as the effect sizes for a medium and a high LOC are not significantly different from
each other. Nevertheless, given the lower overall share of drinkers in the sample of women,
the relative effects are larger for women (7.5% as opposed to 4.4% increase for a high LOC).
Additionally, columns (3) to (8) give the average marginal effects for the alternative indi-
cators which only compare two of the three groups while setting the third to missing.9 These
indicators enable us to make statements about the effects on the probabilities of moderate and
heavy consumption independent from each other. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the
estimated effects using those outcome variables are at risk of being biased by sample selection.
The estimated results thus have to be interpreted with care and are only ancillary evidence in
addition to the main indicator. Additionally, the locus of control is always standardized and
categorized within the sub-samples such that e.g. having a high LOC corresponds to a high
LOC as compared to all other individuals within these two selected consumption categories.
If we abstract from potential sample selection bias, comparing the results reveals that an
internal LOC increases the probability of being a moderate drinker (columns (3) and (4)) as
well as also the probability of being a heavy drinker (columns (7) and (8)) as compared to
being an abstainer or rare drinker for the sample of all individuals. The effect is considerable
stronger for moderate drinking, which is nevertheless mainly driven by the lower share of
heavy drinkers in the population. Having a high LOC on average increases the probability
of being a moderate drinker by 4.1 percentage points (approx. 10%) whereas the marginal
effect on heavy drinking is 2.3 percentage points (approx. 13%). If we instead compare heavy
drinking to moderate drinking, LOC cannot be found to have a significant effect on being a
9 Abstainers and rare drinkers are always grouped into one reference group. An analyses which compares
rare drinkers to abstainers is presented in the robustness checks in Section 4.6.2.
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heavy drinker (columns (5) and (6)). An important heterogeneity can be found with respect
to gender. While LOC increases the probability of moderated drinking similarly for men and
women, the effect on heavy drinking is largely driven by men while the effect is distinctly
lower and insignificant for women if the dichotomous LOC indicators are used. Additionally,
the effect for men seems to be largely nonlinear with the largest effect being observable for a
medium LOC.
4.5 Theoretical Considerations
In line with first considerable doubts about the applicability of the health investment
model onto the relationship between locus of control and alcohol consumption raised by
Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) which is based on their findings of a positive effect of LOC on binge
drinking, our empirical results stand in stark contrast to the existing findings on the effect
of locus of control on (risky) health behavior in other domains such as smoking, exercise and
healthy diets. Thus, the considerations by Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) on the missing subjective
link between current alcohol consumption and future health consequences can be supported.
In line with Bennett et al. (1998), alcohol consumption might be associated with higher
amounts of uncertainty of future outcomes as individuals might not see alcohol consumption
in moderate amounts as affecting their health too strongly. This is also in accordance with the
discourse about positive and negative health effects of alcohol consumption in the medical
literature which was summarized in Section 4.1. Although individual considerations about
health investments might nevertheless be at play, they are on average dominated by other
mechanisms in the analysed population. It is thus the goal of this section to discuss two
likely mechanisms which might explain the estimated relationship. Hence, in line with the
existing literature discussed in Section 4.2, locus of control might positively affect alcohol
consumption (1) through the increased considerations about the investment in social and
occupational networks and the peer effects of alcohol consumption as well as (2) through the
decreased perception of risks driven by information constraints and cognitive limitations.
4.5.1 Investment into Social and Occupational Networks
Based on the existing psychological literature on peer effects of alcohol consumption es-
pecially in adolescence (Duncan et al., 2005; Argys and Rees, 2008; Lundborg, 2006), a first
likely mechanism might be the link via differences in the importance and in the existence of
peer and networking effects. Alcohol consumption might be associated with important posi-
tive effects on social and occupational networks as drinking is often inevitably connected to
social gatherings and abstinence has been shown to be linked to strong negative penalties
with respect to social integration (see e.g. Leifman et al., 1995; Buonanno and Vanin, 2013).
For example, Peters and Stringham (2006) as well as Ziebarth and Grabka (2009) discuss
the association between alcohol consumption and social networks as likely channels for their
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Table 4.6: Additional Results (Marginal Effects) - Social Network
(Outcome: Moderate or Heavy Drinker)
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.024
∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.016 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.038
∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Spare Time Activities (Imputed, Categorical)
Going out Eating/Drinking 0.050∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Visiting Neighbors and Friends 0.003 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Attend Social Gatherings 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Attend Cultural Events 0.026∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 35,246 35,246 16,992 16,992 18,254 18,254
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
identified positive effect of alcohol consumption on earnings. As they notice, alcohol con-
sumption still is a social norm in modern Western societies which inevitably links drinking
and the attendance of social gatherings. Thus, moderate drinking produces social capital and
can be labeled a productive activity. In line with the argumentation about locus of control
and investment into future outcomes (see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2015b; Coleman and DeLeire,
2003; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014), internals are expected to invest more into social capital and
networks by attending social gatherings and, in doing so, drinking. This is why they might,
by default, be more likely to drink alcohol in moderation.
The estimates, which are presented in Table 4.6, are intended to investigate whether
internals are simply more likely to be exposed to alcohol during social gatherings. This is done
by controlling for different categories of spare time activities such as going out eating and
drinking, attending social gatherings, visiting neighbours and friends and attending cultural
events as proxies for investments into social networks. Individuals rate the frequency with
which they participate in those activities on a scale from 1 (Weekly) to 4 (Never). The scale
is reversed in order to indicate a frequent participation for high values and included as a
continuous variable into the estimations for reasons of simplification and in order to prevent
a loss of information.10 As the activities are surveyed irregularly, they are imputed into the
10 In the years 2008 and 2013 the scale included a category ”daily”. This is considered as an additional value
5 for those years.
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relevant years and are thus only proxies for the actual level of social activity in the survey
years.11 Table 4.6 gives an overview over the estimated results of this additional analysis.
The process of imputation is accompanied by a loss in observations. In order to separate the
changes in effect size due to changes in the sample and inclusion of controls, the baseline
results where replicated using the reduced sample. The results are not substantially different
and are presented in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4.6.
The estimation results of the additional analysis presented in columns (2), (4) and (6) of
Table 4.6 indicate that for men as well as women large parts of the estimated effects are indeed
driven by different levels of participation in events and social activities. The overall effect drops
from 2.4 (3.8) to 1.5 (2.9) percentage points for a medium (high) LOC. Thus, around 37.5
(23.7) percent of the overall effect are driven by different levels of social activity between
internals and externals.12 This share is relatively similar for men and women. Nevertheless,
the effect remains significantly positive for the indicator of a high LOC for both sexes even
if the different levels of social activity are controlled for. Different levels of social interactions
in the individuals spare time are thus likely to be not the only driving factor behind the
estimated differences.
4.5.2 Underestimation of Risks
As discussed above, the uncertainty about the direct link between the behavior and neg-
ative future outcomes on health is likely to be higher for alcohol consumption than for other
domains of risky health behavior such as smoking, unhealthy diets and a lack of exercise.
In line with the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) on the effect of uncertainty on decision making, individual perceptions are
highly important in those situations. Individuals have to build own expectations about the
probabilities with which their behavior is associated with certain outcomes. In the present
case, individuals have to estimate the likelihood with which their level of consumption entails
negative future consequences for their health. The accuracy of these estimations is impor-
tantly affected by individuals cognitive resources and the information available to them (see
e.g. Kenkel, 1991; Farrell and Fuchs, 1982; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010) as well as their per-
ception about their own susceptibility to health problems (see e.g. Weinstein, 1984, 1987; Janz
and Becker, 1984). Thus, the empirical literature relatively consistently finds that individuals
on average tend to be overly optimistic especially about their own risks and underestimate
the negative consequences of e.g, smoking (Viscusi, 1990).
11 “Going out eating and drinking” and “visiting neighbors and friends” (observed in 2008) is imputed
forward and backward into all survey years 2006, 2008 and 2010 from the observation in 2008, “attending
social gatherings” (observed in 2005, 2007 and 2009) is imputed forward from 2005 into 2006, from 2007 into
2008 and from 2009 into 2010 and “attending cultural events” (observed in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009) is
imputed forward from 2005 into 2006 and from 2009 into 2010.
12 It has to be noted that the results have to be interpreted with care as the inclusion of these endogenous
controls in the analysis is likely to introduce selectivity bias (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.66).
Page | 123
CHAPTER 4. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
Various studies in medicine and psychology have already found that also locus of control
has an important effect on individual perceptions about the personal risk e.g. with respect to
myocardial infarction, AIDS, cancer and mortality (see e.g. Stu¨rmer et al., 2006; Rosengren
et al., 2004; Bosma et al., 1999; Hoorens and Buunk, 1993; Cull et al., 1999; Frijling et al.,
2004; Ka¨llme´n, 2000; Sjoberg, 2000). For example Hoorens and Buunk (1993) show that
students with an internal LOC are more likely to report a lower personal risk of having
drinking problems. Additionally, Becker et al. (2012) find a significant positive association
between LOC and subjective health. In line with this literature also Cobb-Clark et al. (2014)
argue that an increased perception of control might be correlated with a higher belief about
the ability to cope with and prevent the consequences of drinking. An increased perception of
individual control (being internal) might thus decrease the perceived importance of risk for
life’s outcomes. The future risks of alcohol consumption might thus be underestimated if the
individual control is overestimated. The relationship between LOC and risk perceptions has
first been discussed in Slovic (1992).
This argument is largely in line with the latest literature on the association between
an internal LOC and risky and inconsistent investment decisions (Salamanca et al., 2016;
Pinger et al., 2018). Salamanca et al. (2016) find that household heads with an internal
LOC are more likely to invest in equity. They assume that this is driven by a lower perceived
variance in equity and thus a lower perceived risk of these investments for internal individuals.
Additionally, Pinger et al. (2018) find that internals are also more likely to make inconsistent
investment decisions driven by a higher probability of corresponding to a hot hand fallacy.
In line with Salamanca et al. (2016) we can show that LOC is associated with risky behav-
ior over and beyond risk and time preferences. This is important to note as LOC has already
been shown to be strongly associated with time preferences (Plunkett and Buehner, 2007;
Becker et al., 2012) and in line with the findings by Becker et al. (2012) the results presented
in Table 4.B.1 in the Supplementary Material indicate the same important relationship also
for risk aversion13.
In order to assess the reasonableness of the supposed relationship between LOC, risk
perception and alcohol consumption, the heterogeneity of the estimated effects with respect
to the underlying risk aversion is empirically analysed. The reasoning behind this analysis is
the assumption that the effect of differences in perceived risks is likely to be more pronounced
for individuals with a higher risk aversion. If an individual has a high willingness to take risks,
higher perceived risks might not change the decision making as strongly.
13 While the general willingness to take risks is significantly higher for internals for both men and women,
an interesting difference between general and health-related willingness to take risks can be seen. While the
willingness to take health risks is also significantly higher for internal men, it is significantly lower for internal
women. Thus, while for men general and health related risk taking don’t seem to differ, LOC has an adverse
effect on general and health-related risk aversion for women. Additionally, the difference between general and
health-related risk attitude is significantly higher for internals in both genders. Thus, internals can be assumed
to be more health-conscious than externals if the willingness to take health risks is weighted by the overall
higher willingness to take risk.
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Table 4.7: Additional Results (Marginal Effects) - Heterogeneity Analysis by Risk-Aversion
(Outcome: Moderate or Heavy Drinker)
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] × Low Risk Taking 0.028∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.020
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013)
× High Risk Taking 0.023∗∗ 0.020 0.013
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] × Low Risk Taking 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.014)
× High Risk Taking 0.023∗∗ 0.019 0.027
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
All Controls 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Thus, Table 4.7 gives an overview over the results of this heterogeneity analysis. The
reported marginal effects are based on a model in which LOC is interacted with a binary
indicator for high willingness to take risk (“high risk taking”) based on the median as a cutoff
and are computed separately for individuals with a low and high willingness.
It is obvious from the estimation results that the effect of LOC on alcohol consumption is
highly heterogeneous with respect to underlying willingness to take risk. The positive effect of
a medium and high LOC is considerably stronger for individuals with a low general willingness
to take risk for both males and females. This is in line with the expectations and thus further
supports the idea about risk perception being an important channel.
4.5.3 Subgroup Analysis - Occupation and Educational Level
In order to draw a clearer picture about the effect of LOC on alcohol consumption and
the population groups for which we observe it, we conducted a subgroup analysis. Identifying
heterogeneity between population groups might assist us in identifying the likely mechanism
behind the estimated effects. Table 4.8 gives an overview over the marginal effects estimated
separately for combinations of educational level and occupational autonomy. Individuals are
grouped into the nine groups based on whether they have 1) a low education (less than
12 years), 2) medium education (12 - 14.5 years) or 3) high education (15 or more years)
and whether they have 1) no or a low occupational autonomy (e.g. unemployed individuals
or unqualified workers), (2) a medium occupational autonomy (e.g. overseers or qualified
occupations) or 3) a high occupational autonomy (e.g. foremen and managers). Educational
level and occupational autonomy are combined in order to potentially distinguish between
occupational effects and cognitive abilities. All estimations include the full specification using
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Table 4.8: Additional Results (Marginal Effects) - Subgroup Analysis
(Outcome: Moderate or Heavy Drinker)
Low Education Medium Education High Education
Occupational Autonomy Occupational Autonomy Occupational Autonomy
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.022
∗ 0.014 0.020 0.030 0.004 -0.032 -0.015 -0.051 0.033∗
(0.012) (0.022) (0.037) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.020)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.044 0.009 0.008 0.018 -0.004 -0.005 0.011
(0.013) (0.024) (0.038) (0.022) (0.029) (0.037) (0.031) (0.035) (0.022)
Observations 14,866 3,679 1,275 4,495 2,563 1,411 2,132 1,616 4,097
All Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the moderate or heavy consumption indicator and the discrete LOC. In order to take care of
potential selection, the LOC is recalculated within each subgroup such that e.g. a high LOC
always indicates a LOC higher than the 66th percentile within the group.
Due to in parts very low sample sizes, significance levels get lost for most subgroups which
only allows for a very careful interpretation of the resulting effects. The results nevertheless
indicate important heterogeneity. Overall, the effects are distinctly larger for individuals with
a low education pointing into the direction that cognitive limitations and information con-
straints while processing the potential risks of alcohol consumption might actually play an
important role. For individuals with the maximum level of cognitive ability (as measured by
education) the effects are remarkably lower and again highly heterogeneous. Highly educated
individuals with a high occupational autonomy seem to be the only ones who also show an
increased probability to consume alcohol through an internal LOC. This might again point
into the direction of investments into occupational networks through the attendance of events
at which alcohol is consumed. The internal manager who is interested in expanding her oc-
cupational networks might thus drink one or the other glass of wine more on all the events
she attends. Also the subgroup analysis thus indicates an important role of both proposed
channels.
4.6 Robustness Checks
In addition to the ancillary estimations in Section 4.5, which had the goal of drawing a
clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the identified effects, the sensitivity of the estimated
effects with respect to a number of measurement issues in the dependent as well as explanatory




4.6.1 Locus of Control
In order to test the robustness of the estimated effects with respect to the construction
and imputation of the locus of control measure, a number of alternative LOC measures are
generated and the estimated effects are re-estimated for these alternative explanatory vari-
ables. Table 4.A.4 in the Appendix contains the results for these sensitivity checks. All models
are estimated using the full specification and the indicator for moderate or heavy drinking as
the outcome variable. The baseline results in the top panel of Table 4.A.4 thus refer to the
results in column (2) of Table 4.5. Instead of using the weights from the confirmatory factor
analysis, the simple LOC index, used in the estimations presented in panel (1), assumes equal
weights of all 8 items used thus a simple average over all item responses is calculated. The
results differ only marginally from those in the baseline. The only considerable changes is
observed for the effect of a medium LOC for men. The robustness check presented in Panel
(2) corresponds to the potential problem with inaccurate and volatile measurement of LOC
in the surveys motivated by the discussion in e.g. Preuss and Hennecke (2018). In line with
their findings on temporary effects of unemployment on LOC, the self-reported LOC is likely
to depend on a lot of major and minor environmental and situational factors. If these state-
effects are assumed to have no behavioral consequences and are pure noise, they are likely
to lead to attenuation bias in the estimated effects when LOC is observed in different states
across the sample. In order to investigate this problem, the explanatory variable is adjusted
to an averaged LOC factor instead of the forward imputed version in the baseline in panel
(2). The LOC factor is calculated as usual for each year but is imputed into all years using
the average over the LOC observations from 2005 and 2010 for an individual. This adjust-
ment is expected to reduce measurement error in the situational measurement of LOC. As
expected, the estimated effects are considerably stronger especially for a high LOC, indicating
a downward bias, likely driven by attenuation, in the baseline results. As has already been
discussed in Section 4.3, concerns about reverse causality are rather minor in the case of al-
cohol consumption. Nevertheless, it might be interesting to see whether the effects are robust
against the use of a LOC measure with lies even further in the past. Such a measure on the
one hand might reduce reverse causality concerns but on the other hand again increases a
potential attenuation bias as it is only a vague proxy for the LOC at time t. Panel (3) presents
the estimation results of a model in which the LOC from the year 2005 is imputed forward
into all observation years. The estimated effects do decrease especially for men but are still
significant and of considerable size for the full sample.
4.6.2 Outcome Variable
Alternative Indicators In order to test the robustness of the estimated effects with respect
to the choice of the drinking indicators as the main outcome variables, a number of alter-
native dichotomous measures of consumption are constructed and the estimated effects are
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re-estimated for these alternative dependent variables. Table 4.A.5 in the Appendix contains
the results for these sensitivity checks. All models are estimated using the full specification
and the dichotomous LOC measure. The baseline results in the top panel of Table 4.A.5 thus
refer to the results in column (2) of Table 4.5. In order to investigate whether effects are driven
by differences at the extensive or intensive margin, they are re-estimated using an indicator
for being an abstainer in panel (1a) as abstainers and rare drinkers where pooled in all main
drinking indicators. In line with the main results, the effect is significantly negative, indicat-
ing a decreased probability of being an abstainer for internals. Additionally, panel (1b) adds
to this by using an indicator for rare consumption as opposed to abstaining (with moderate
and heavy consumption being set to missing). In line with expectations abstainers and rare
drinker do not significantly differ with respect to their LOC, which is why pooling them into
one reference group was suitable.
Objective Amounts More importantly, the estimated results might be biased by the sub-
jective and rather vague nature of the alcohol consumption level available in the years 2006,
2008 and 2010. As our measure for alcohol consumption in the empirical analysis is based
on the self-assessed amount of consumption, rated on a scale from “never” to “regular”, the
answer to this question not only depends on the actual consumption level but also on the
individual perception of the terms regular and occasional. If individuals perceive amounts
differently based on their locus of control, this would bias our results. As we know from the
existing literature that internals are more health-conscious, for them only a few drinks might
already be too much. They might thus only report higher levels of alcohol consumption with-
out actually consuming more. The fact that we are able to observe significant effects also
on abstaining from alcohol already is a first indication that differences in the reporting are
not solely responsible for our result if we assume honestly reporting “never” to be largely
objective. In order to further eliminate the bias of the estimated effects by differences in the
perception of amounts between internals and externals, the estimations are repeated using a
more objective measure of alcohol consumption which is available in the SOEP in the year
2016. In 2016, individuals do not self-assess their consumption levels but report objective
amounts and frequencies. Individuals are asked to rate how often they drink alcohol on a
scale from 1 (every day) to 6 (never) and how many drinks they do consume in a day when
they drink on a scale from 1 (One to two drinks) to 5 (Ten or more drinks). An overview over
the descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in Table 4.B.3 in the Supplementary
Material. Thus, the new dependent variables are generated based on the reported frequency of
consumption and the reported consumption amount per consumption day. Locus of control is
imputed from the wave 2015. The measurement of LOC in 2015 as well as the construction of
the factor is equivalent to those in 2005 and 2010 which was described in detail in Section 4.3.
The results of this sensitivity check are reported in panel (3) of Table 4.A.5. In panel (3a)
the two available information are combined. The binary indicator for drinking thus is one if the
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individual reports more then two drinking episodes per week (“high frequency”) or more than
four drinks per episode (“high amount”). The sensitivity check indicates that the results from
the baseline are surprisingly robust with respect to the type of reporting. As opposed to the
expectations, the baseline results seem to be biased downwards by the subjective reporting.
When the drinking indicator is separated into high amounts and high frequencies, it becomes
clear that the estimated effects are purely driven by differences in the consumption frequencies
(panel (3c)). This strongly supports the idea of differences in networking behavior and thus
the frequency of drinking opportunities being an important driver behind the differences.
Nevertheless, as the estimated effects in panel (3b) show, LOC has a significant effect also
on consumption amounts for men. Hence, important gender differences in the underlying
mechanisms might be at play.
4.6.3 Compensating Health Behavior
Finally, individuals might compensate health behavior in certain domains with behavior
in other domains. Thus, if an individual already invests a lot of time and effort e.g. into doing
sports and eating healthy, the individual might be more willing to drink one or the other drink
more as she considers already doing “enough” for her health. Vice versa an individual who
already has a relatively unhealthy lifestyle might reduce the amount of alcohol consumption as
the maximum level of “unhealthyness” is already reached. If locus of control now is associated
with an increased amount of investment into health in the domains diet, exercise and smoking,
this might lead to more alcohol consumption for those individuals.
In order to assess the importance of compensating, the reported behavior in the other
domains (smoking, diet and exercise) is included as controls into the estimation model. The
health behavior in the other domains is included as ordinal variables with the value mani-
festations 0 for “non” (no smoking, no exercise, no health diet), 1 for “moderate/light” and
2 for “strong/heavy”. An overview over the descriptive statistics for these other health be-
haviors can be found in Table 4.B.2 in the Supplementary Material. In line with the findings
by Cobb-Clark et al. (2014), internal individuals are significantly less likely to obtain risky
health behavior throughout all domains. The results of the sensitivity check are presented
in Table 4.A.6 in the Appendix. Controlling for the behavior in the other health domains
does hardly change the estimated effects of LOC on alcohol consumption, which indicates no
omitted variable bias in this context.
4.7 Conclusion
Based on existing knowledge about the role of locus of control for the individual investment
into future outcomes, a spontaneous ex ante prediction of the potential effect of LOC on
levels of alcohol consumption pointed into the direction of an expected negative relationship.
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Internal individuals should have higher subjective expectations about the effect of their own
efforts into drinking less or abstaining on their future health. But they do not!
As opposed to this prediction, we find a significant positive effect of locus of control on
alcohol consumption. Internal individuals are on average 10% (4.1 p.p.) more likely to be
moderate drinkers and 13% (2.3 p.p) more likely to be heavy drinkers as opposed to external
individuals. These findings are robust against controlling for an extensive list of control vari-
ables, the variation in the LOC construct as well as the outcome variable – including the use
of a more objective measure of consumption – and also hold if the health behavior in other
domains is included into the model as a potential confounder.
As has already been noted by Cobb-Clark et al. (2014), this obvious dissent with the
existing literature on locus of control and health investments is likely to be driven by the
fact that the link between behavior and potential negative future outcomes is more subject
to uncertainty than other domains of health behavior. Alcohol might not be perceived as
a behavior which strongly affects health outcomes in general. Thus, locus of control does
not affect health investments in this domain. As opposed to this, other mechanisms seem
to be at play which cause a positive relationship. Based on the earlier literature on the
behavioral consequences of LOC as well as the existing knowledge on the drivers of drinking
behavior, we discuss two potential channels. Firstly, large parts of the relationship might be
driven by differences in the social behavior and investments into social networks between
internal and external individuals. Individuals with an internal LOC invest into social and
occupational networks more strongly by attending different social events. As drinking is often
inevitably connected to social gatherings and abstinence has been shown to be linked to
strong negative penalties with respect to social integration, internals might thus be more
exposed to alcohol in general. An ancillary analysis, in which the frequency of a number of
spare time activities which are associated to social networks are included as controls, indicate
that indeed parts of the effect can be explained by different levels of social interaction. As a
second potential channel, we discuss differences in the perception of risks between internals
and externals. Based on the literature on financial investments, we suggest that internal
individuals more strongly believe in or overestimate their ability to cope with and prevent
the negative consequences of drinking. Thus, they might underestimate the risk which is
associated with drinking. A heterogeneity analysis with respect to underlying willingness to
take risks as well as a subgroup analysis, which shows important heterogeneity with respect
to individual cognitive ability, supports these considerations.
We do find indication for both mechanisms. Moreover, differential effects of LOC on con-
sumption frequencies and amounts, which are identified using an objective measure of alcohol
consumption from a more recent SOEP wave, reveal that important gender differences in
the underlying mechanisms might be at play. While the effect for women largely concerns
consumption frequencies, men are also more likely to drink more if they are internal. Thus,
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differences in the perception of risk might be especially important for men. Additionally, also
considerations about health investments might still be at play in the alcohol domain, though
they are overshadowed by the mechanisms discussed above. Further disentangling the effects
with respect to the underlying channels is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, this
might be an important path for future research as both mechanisms are expected to have
distinct economic and medical consequences. Whereas drinking as an investment decision
might improve the occupational and economic success while being related to rather moderate
amounts of alcohol consumption, an underestimation of risks is potentially associated with
regular and heavy episodic drinking and thus with the economic costs involved, e.g. through
the strain it puts on individual health care expenditures and labor market perspectives.
Our paper significantly contributed to the literature on the explanation of health behav-
ior and risky decision making. Given the consensus about the risks of alcohol consumption
for individual health and economic outcomes, knowing about this specific intrinsic driver of
drinking can e.g. crucially contribute to the targeting of interventions with the goal of reduc-
ing alcohol consumption in the population. Additionally, the paper also adds an interesting
new light to the literature on the behavioral implications of the personality trait locus of
control which was so far largely unified in the assumption that an internal locus of control is
associated with mainly positive outcomes and desirable behaviors and decisions.
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4.A Appendix





Age 46.64 46.92 46.38
German Nationality 0.94 0.94 0.94
East-Germany 0.27 0.27 0.27
Number of Children in HH 0.48 0.47 0.50
Married 0.65 0.65 0.64
Educational Controls
Highest School Degree
No School Degree 0.02 0.02 0.02
Lower Secondary School 0.30 0.32 0.28
Intermediary School 0.33 0.29 0.36
Highschool 0.30 0.32 0.28
Other School 0.06 0.06 0.06
Highest Vocational Degree
No Vocational Diploma 0.17 0.15 0.20
Apprenticeship 0.45 0.47 0.43
Higher Technical College 0.25 0.24 0.26
College or University Degree 0.24 0.26 0.22
Labor Market Controls
Net Household Income in KEUR 2.96 3.03 2.90
Gross Labor Income in KEUR 1.74 2.38 1.14
Occupational Autonomy
Low 0.34 0.28 0.39
Medium 0.26 0.28 0.24
High 0.22 0.18 0.25
Labor Force Status
Employed 0.06 0.06 0.06
Self-Employed 0.59 0.63 0.56
Unemployed 0.07 0.09 0.05
Not-Working 0.06 0.01 0.10
Pensioneer 0.18 0.18 0.17
In Education 0.02 0.02 0.02
Military Service 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maternity Leave 0.02 0.00 0.03
Health Controls
Disabled 0.11 0.13 0.10
In Bad Health 0.16 0.15 0.17
Body Mass Index (imputed) 26.13 26.92 25.40
Personality Controls
Conscientiousness (avg.) 5.88 5.81 5.94
Extraversion (avg.) 4.81 4.68 4.93
Agreeableness (avg.) 5.37 5.19 5.53
Neuroticism (avg.) 3.86 3.61 4.10
Openness (avg.) 4.49 4.40 4.58
Willingness to take general risk (general) (avg.) 4.51 4.95 4.10
Willingness to take health risk (avg.) 2.98 3.34 2.64
Observations 36134 17418 18716
Individuals 15482 7478 8004
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
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Table 4.A.2: Full Estimation Results and Brant Test Statistics (All
Individuals)
Brant Test
b/se chi2 p > chi2
(1) (2) (3)
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.070∗∗∗ 16.397 0.000
(0.015)
Year Dummies
2008 0.015 18.103 0.000
(0.016)
2010 -0.066∗∗∗ 9.581 0.008
Demographic Controls
Female -0.978∗∗∗ 280.427 0.000
(0.034)
Age 0.024∗∗ 16.189 0.000
(0.009)
Squared Age -0.000 8.789 0.012
(0.000)
German Nationality 0.809∗∗∗ 107.343 0.000
(0.075)
East-Germany 0.005 53.981 0.000
(0.033)
Number of Children -0.110∗∗∗ 3.168 0.205
(0.019)
Married -0.007 4.765 0.092
(0.034)
Educational Controls
Highest School Degree (Ref: No Degree)
Lower Secondary School 0.453∗∗∗ 2.879 0.237
(0.124)
Intermediary School 0.713∗∗∗ 7.559 0.023
(0.124)
Highschool 0.767∗∗∗ 10.138 0.006
(0.126)
Other School 0.406∗∗ 1.673 0.433
(0.135)
Highest Vocational Degree (Ref: No Diploma)
Apprenticeship 0.132∗∗∗ 57.536 0.000
(0.039)
Higher Technical College 0.066 66.540 0.000
(0.043)
College or University Degree 0.222∗∗∗ 21.453 0.000
(0.045)
Economic Controls
Net HH Income in KEUR 0.082∗∗∗ 7.469 0.024
(0.012)
Gross Labor Income in KEUR -0.012 22.485 0.000
(0.010)
Labor Force Status (Ref: Unemployed)
Employed 0.194∗∗ 1.145 0.564
(0.074)
Self-Employed 0.208∗ 1.572 0.456
(0.087)
Not-Working -0.143 4.217 0.121
(0.077)
Pensioneer -0.056 1.453 0.484
(0.075)
In Education 0.002 7.610 0.022
(0.093)
Military Service 0.289 2.354 0.308
Continued on next page...
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Brant Test
b/se chi2 p > chi2
(1) (2) (3)
(0.220)
Maternity Leave -0.375∗∗∗ 1.588 0.452
(0.093)
Occupational Autonomy (Ref.: Low)
Medium 0.017 3.284 0.194
(0.052)
High 0.018 7.326 0.026
(0.045)
Health Controls
Disabled -0.387∗∗∗ 11.908 0.003
(0.049)
In Bad Health -0.368∗∗∗ 31.446 0.000
(0.037)
Body Mass Index -0.040∗∗∗ 21.719 0.000
(0.003)
Personality Controls
Conscientiousness (avg.) -0.088∗∗∗ 2.045 0.360
(0.018)
Extraversion (avg.) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.335 0.846
(0.017)
Agreeableness (avg.) -0.069∗∗∗ 47.522 0.000
(0.018)
Neuroticism (avg.) 0.009 12.963 0.002
(0.018)
Openness (avg.) -0.014 1.653 0.438
(0.018)
Willingness to take general risk (avg.) 0.069∗∗ 30.652 0.000
(0.022)
Willingness to take health risk (avg.) 0.091∗∗∗ 4.738 0.094
(0.019)
Patience (avg.) -0.058∗∗∗ 14.094 0.001
(0.017)
Observations 36,134
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calcula-
tions.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A.3: Full Results (Marginal Effects) - Binary Drinking Indicators (All Individuals)
Moderate/Heavy Moderate Heavy Heavy
Drinking D1 Drinking D2 Drinking D3 Drinking D4
(vs. Moderate) (vs. Non/Rare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOC Factor (cont.) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year Dummies
2008 0.009∗∗ 0.006 -0.010∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
2010 -0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Demographic Controls
Female -0.205∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Age 0.004∗∗ 0.002 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Squared Age -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
German Nationality 0.118∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
East-Germany -0.009 -0.006 0.007 -0.016∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Number of Children -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Married -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Educational Controls
Highest School Degree (Ref: No Degree)
Lower Secondary School 0.052∗∗ 0.041 -0.039 0.083∗∗
(0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.033)
Intermediary School 0.098∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.038) (0.034)
Highschool 0.102∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.040) (0.037)
Other School 0.046∗ 0.036 -0.038 0.076∗
(0.026) (0.031) (0.043) (0.039)
Highest Vocational Degree (Ref: No Diploma)
Apprenticeship 0.031∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Higher Technical College 0.008 0.016 0.031∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
College or University Degree 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.006 0.038∗∗∗
Economic Controls
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Net HH Income in KEUR 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gross Labor Income in KEUR -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Labor Force Status (Ref: Unemployed)
Employed 0.039∗∗ 0.039∗∗ -0.014 0.037∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Self-Employed 0.032 0.027 -0.036 0.036
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Not-Working -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
Pensioneer -0.012 -0.015 -0.018 0.000
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
In Education 0.002 0.018 0.047∗ -0.033
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
Military Service 0.087 0.108 0.013 0.079
Continued on next page...
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Moderate/Heavy Moderate Heavy Heavy
Drinking D1 Drinking D2 Drinking D3 Drinking D4
(vs. Moderate) (vs. Non/Rare)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.064) (0.073) (0.067) (0.075)
Maternity Leave -0.094∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ 0.076∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.032)
Occupational Autonomy (Ref.: Low)
Medium 0.004 0.012 0.018 -0.012
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
High 0.007 0.014 0.016 -0.010
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Health Controls
Disabled -0.073∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
In Bad Health -0.084∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.059∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Body Mass Index -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Personality Controls
Conscientiousness (avg.) -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Extraversion (avg.) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Agreeableness (avg.) -0.003 0.005 0.029∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Neuroticism (avg.) 0.003 0.004 0.007 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Openness (avg.) -0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Willingness to take general risk (avg.) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Willingness to take health risk (avg.) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Patience (avg.) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 36,134 29,736 21,574 20,958
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A.4: Robustness Checks (Marginal Effects) - Locus of Control











Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
(1) Simple LOC Index with Equal Weights1







Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
(2) Averaged LOC Factor2







Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
(3) LOC Factor 20053







Observations 34,088 16,418 17,670
All Controls 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 LOC factor for each year is calculated using a simple average of all 8 items used and thus assuming equal weights of all items. The Index
is then imputed using the same rule as in the Baseline.
2 LOC factor is calculated as usual for each year but is imputed into all years using the average over the LOC observations from 2005 and
2010.
3 LOC factor is calculated as usual for 2005 and is imputed forward into all years.
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Table 4.A.5: Robustness Checks (Marginal Effects) - Outcome Variable
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline - Moderate of Heavy Drinking







Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
(1) Alternative Indicators
(a) Abstainer (vs. All Other Outcomes)







Observations 36,134 17,418 18,716
(b) Rare Drinkers (vs. Abstainers)
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.005 -0.010 0.015
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.005 0.006 0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 20,958 9,782 11,176
(2) Objective Measure 2016
(a) High Consumption Amount or High Consumption Frequency







Observations 9,244 4,280 4,964
(b) High Consumption Amount
Locus of Control Terciles (Ref.: [LOCmin, LOCP33])
(LOCP33, LOCP66] 0.003 0.017 -0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
(LOCP66, LOCmax] 0.003 0.021
∗ -0.006
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 9,244 4,280 4,964
(c) High Consumption Frequency







Observations 9,244 4,280 4,964
All Controls 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.A.6: Additional Results (Marginal Effects) - Compensating Health Behavior
(Outcome: Moderate or Heavy Drinker)
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)








Light 0.046∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Heavy 0.058∗∗∗ 0.016 0.054∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Healthy Diet (Ref:: Non)
Moderate -0.059∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.058∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Strong -0.142∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.027)
Exercise (Ref:: Non)
Moderate 0.041∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Strong 0.063∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 36,035 17,377 18,658
All Controls 3 3 3
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
CHAPTER 4. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
4.B Supplementary Material
Figure 4.B.1: Factor Loadings of the LOC Variable
Source: SOEP, waves 2005, 2010 and 2015, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own illustration.
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Table 4.B.1: Descriptive Analysis - Willingness to Take Risk
All Women Men
All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) General Willingness to take risk
Continuous 4.51 4.28 4.74∗∗∗ 4.10 3.92 4.30∗∗∗ 4.95 4.70 5.17∗∗∗
> Median 0.44 0.39 0.50∗∗∗ 0.34 0.30 0.38∗∗∗ 0.55 0.49 0.61∗∗∗
(2) Willingness to Take Risk in Health
Continuous 2.98 2.95 3.01∗∗∗ 2.64 2.69 2.60∗∗∗ 3.34 3.27 3.41∗∗∗
> Median 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.36 0.38 0.35∗∗∗ 0.51 0.49 0.52∗∗∗
(3) Deviation from General Willingness to Take Risk1
Health 1.53 1.32 1.73∗∗∗ 1.46 1.23 1.70∗∗∗ 1.61 1.43 1.77∗∗∗
Observations 36,134 18,716 17,418
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped into internals (Int.) and externals (Ext.) based on whether their LOC is lower/equal or higher than the
median. Significance stars refer to significance level of t-test for mean equivalence between externals and internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1 Deviation calculated as the difference between general and health-related willingness to take risk. Positive values indicating a lower
health-related risk taking.
Table 4.B.2: Descriptive Analysis - Other Health Outcomes
All Women Men
All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Smoking
Non 0.70 0.69 0.72∗∗∗ 0.74 0.73 0.75∗∗∗ 0.67 0.64 0.69∗∗∗
Light 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
Heavy 0.13 0.15 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09 0.10 0.08∗∗∗ 0.17 0.20 0.15∗∗∗
Observations 36,035 18,658 17,377
Healthy Diet
Non 0.06 0.07 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03 0.04 0.03∗∗∗ 0.09 0.10 0.08∗∗∗
Moderate 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86 0.85 0.86∗∗
Strong 0.08 0.07 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11 0.09 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.06∗∗∗
Observations 36,134 18,716 17,418
Exercise
Non 0.34 0.39 0.30∗∗∗ 0.34 0.39 0.29∗∗∗ 0.34 0.40 0.30∗∗∗
Moderate 0.28 0.28 0.27∗ 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.29∗∗
Regular 0.38 0.32 0.43∗∗∗ 0.39 0.34 0.45∗∗∗ 0.36 0.30 0.41∗∗∗
Observations 36,134 18,716 17,418
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped into internals (Int.) and externals (Ext.) based on whether their LOC is lower/equal or higher than the
median. Significance stars refer to significance level of t-test for mean equivalence between externals and internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.B.3: Descriptive Analysis - Alcohol Consumption 2016
All Women Men
All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int. All Ext. Int.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
How often do you drink alcohol?
Every Day 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.11
4-6 days a week 0.08 0.07 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.06∗ 0.12 0.10 0.13∗∗∗
2-3 days a week 0.21 0.19 0.23∗∗∗ 0.17 0.15 0.19∗∗∗ 0.25 0.23 0.27∗∗∗
2-4 days a month 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.25∗∗∗
Once a month or less 0.24 0.25 0.23∗∗ 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.17 0.18 0.16∗∗
Never 0.16 0.19 0.13∗∗∗ 0.20 0.23 0.18∗∗∗ 0.12 0.15 0.09∗∗∗
Observations 9,246 4,966 4,280
When you drink, how many drinks do you consume per day?
1-2 drinks 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.59 0.60 0.58
3-4 drinks 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.29 0.30
5-6 drinks 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08
7-9 drinks 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
10+ drinks 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Observations 7,751 3,964 3,787
Source: SOEP, waves 2006, 2008, 2010, version 33, doi:10.5684/soep.v33, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped into internals (Int.) and externals (Ext.) based on whether their LOC is lower/equal or higher than the
median. Significance stars refer to significance level of t-test for mean equivalence between externals and internals: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Abstract
Investigating the psychological black box behind individual economic decision making is, with-
out a doubt, one of the most prevalent concerns in recent empirical microeconomics. This is
based on the urge of modern behavioral economics to provide the stochastic idiosyncratic
shocks in standard economic models with meaningful content. While traditional approaches
largely characterized individual deviations from the prescriptions of the standard models as
individual error or irrational behavior, an important differentiation between normative and
positive economics has emerged again over the past decades. Behavioral approaches in mod-
ern empirical microeconomics are largely driven by the goal of drawing a picture of human
behavior which is as accurate as possible while still being informed by the prescription from
utility maximization, full rationality and perfect information as the core ideas of economic
research. Especially the growing availability of large microdata sources such as in longitudi-
nal household panel studies has tremendously supported this scientific movement. This data
regularly includes important self-reported information on inherent attributes such as prefer-
ences, expectations, concerns and personality traits which have a high potential of explaining
large parts of the deviations which have previously been labeled as stochastic shocks and
idiosyncratic errors.
This is the point at which also this doctoral thesis lines up. The present thesis contains
four studies that investigate the relationship of inherent personality traits with individual
behavior and economic outcomes. Concretely, the studies address the domains female labor
force participation, labor market mobility, drinking behavior and unemployment. All studies
make use of data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large-scale longitudinal study
of representative households in Germany. Importantly, it is goal of all studies to not only
empirically identify a relationship but also to pin down the knowledge gains and implications of
the findings for traditional economic decision making models by carefully discussion channels
and mechanism within the framework of rational choice theory.
The unifying element of all four studies is the focus on one specific personality trait
within this context: the individual perception of control or locus of control (LOC). LOC
is characterized as a “generalized attitude, belief, or expectancy regarding the nature of the
causal relationship between one’s own behavior and its consequences” (Rotter, 1966, p.2) and
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describes whether individuals believe in the causal effects of their own efforts and abilities on
their lives’ outcomes. While individuals with an internal LOC belief that their own efforts
and abilities are rewarded in their future life’s outcome, individuals with an external LOC
attribute life’s outcomes mainly to luck, chance, fate or other people. The trait is already
widely used within empirical microeconomics and has been found to have important effects
on economic behavior and decision making especially on the labor market due to its effect
on individual expectations and motivation. Within the economic and psychological literature,
LOC is thus largely assumed to be an important determinant of individual efforts, actions
and investments. All these existing ideas are supported and enhanced by the considerations
and findings of the present thesis.
Chapter 2 initiates the discussion by analyzing the implications of LOC for female labor
force participation. This is done by incorporating a vector of individual attributes into a
woman’s utility and budget function which captures LOC. The vector of attributes is argued
to affect the preferences for leisure, home production and childcare as well as participation
but also the subjective expectations about monetary returns to participation. Based on the
psychological literature which makes an important connection between LOC and indepen-
dence considerations, internal women are expected to gain higher direct non-monetary utility
from participation as they not only derive utility from the consumption level as an outcome
of participation but also from the fact that they themselves had control over the generation of
it. The empirical analysis supports these theoretical considerations. Internal women are found
to have a significantly higher probability of being available for market production, which also
translates into higher employment probabilities at the extensive margin. These effects are
additionally found to be highly heterogenous with respect to underlying monetary incentives
for participation and home production as well as prevalent social norms for working.
In a quite similar manner, Chapter 3 discusses the role of LOC for regional labor market
mobility within Germany. The empirical analysis identifies a distinct positive effect of an
internal LOC on the general self-reported willingness to move as well as the probability of
moving between regions. These findings support the theoretical considerations about LOC
being an important determinant of geographic distant job search in line with earlier findings
on the positive relationship between LOC and job seekers’ subjective beliefs about returns to
search effort. Internal job seekers are predicted to search across larger geographic areas and
migrate more frequently if job search occurs before migration.
A prove that the importance of LOC for decision making cross the boarders of labor
economics is provided within Chapter 4. The chapter is devoted to the question of whether
LOC is also able to explain alcohol consumption as an important domain of risky health
behavior. By making use of the unique information available on drinking behavior within the
SOEP, the study identifies a strongly positive effect of an internal LOC on moderate as well
as heavy drinking which is comparable to effect of traditional preference parameters such as
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risk aversion and time preferences. Based on a number of ancillary estimations, the paper
suggests and discusses two likely mechanisms for this relationship. On the one hand, internal
individuals are expected to put a higher effort into the investment in social and occupational
networks and via this have a higher likelihood to drink as the attendance of social gatherings
is often inextricably linked with alcohol consumption. On the other hand, as uncertainty
and the perception of risks play a crucial role for individual considerations about alcohol
consumption, internals consume more alcohol on average as they believe in or overestimate
their personal ability to cope with or prevent the negative consequences of consumption.
Eventually, Chapter 5 importantly contributes to the value all parts of this thesis adds to
the body of literature on behavioral consequences of LOC by carefully discussion the stability
of the trait and thus potential problems with reverse causality in the three other studies as
well as in the existing literature in general. In order to access the stability of LOC, the study
investigates the reaction of reported LOC to an exogenous unemployment shock. Reassur-
ingly, the empirical analysis finds no long-lasting effects of job losses due to plant closures on
LOC and thus cannot reject the common assumption of its stability during adulthood. Hence,
concerns with respect to endogeneity of LOC within the models and thus reverse causality can
be alleviated. Nevertheless, the study identifies an important temporary deviation in the mea-
surement of LOC during periods of unemployment and therefore concludes that the reported
LOC is affected by unemployment likely due to a situation-specific state effect. Rather than
being concerned with reverse causality, the future literature thus needs to carefully consider
potential measurement issues within LOC. The role of those findings for the studies in the





Die Erforschung der psychologischen Blackbox, welche o¨konomischer Entscheidungsfindung
zugrunde liegt, ist ohne Zweifel eines der vorherrschenden Anliegen der ju¨ngeren empirischen
Mikroo¨konomik. Dies beruht vor allem auf dem Drang der modernen Verhaltenso¨konomik, die
stochastischen idiosynkratischen Schocks in den o¨konomischen Standardmodellen mit sinn-
stiftendem Inhalt zu fu¨llen. Wa¨hrend traditionelle Ansa¨tze individuelle Abweichungen von den
Gesetzen der Standardmodelle gro¨ßtenteils als Fehler und irrationales Verhalten einordneten,
kam in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten eine wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen normativer und
positiver O¨konomik erneut zum Vorschein. Verhaltenso¨konomische Ansa¨tze in der modernen
empirischen Mikroo¨konomik verfolgen zu einem großen Teil das Ziel, ein mo¨glichst vollsta¨ndi-
ges Bild von menschlichem Verhalten zu zeichnen, und sich dennoch an den Gesetzen der
Nutzenmaximierung, der vollkommenen Rationalita¨t und der vollsta¨ndigen Informationen als
den Kernen o¨konomischen Denkens zu orientieren. Vor allem die wachsende Verfu¨gbarkeit von
großen Mikrodatenquellen, wie unter anderem großangelegte La¨ngsschnittstudien, hat diese
wissenschaftliche Bewegung entscheidend vorangetrieben. Beruhend auf regelma¨ßigen Selbst-
beurteilungen beinhalten diese Daten wichtige Informationen zu inha¨renten Eigenschaften wie
Pra¨ferenzen, Erwartungen, Anliegen und Perso¨nlichkeitsmerkmale. Alle diese Eigenschaften
haben ein hohes Potential große Teile dessen zu erkla¨ren, was bisher als stochastische Schocks
und idiosynkratische Fehler bezeichnet wurde.
An diesem Punkt reiht sich auch die vorliegende Dissertation ein. Die Arbeit beinhal-
tet vier Studien, welche alle das Ziel verfolgen, den Zusammenhang zwischen inha¨renten
Perso¨nlichkeitsmerkmalen und individuellem Verhalten sowie o¨konomischen Ergebnissen zu
untersuchen. Ganz konkret bescha¨ftigen sich die Studien mit den Themen weibliche Ar-
beitsmarktbeteiligung, Arbeitsmarktmobilita¨t, Alkoholkonsum sowie Arbeitslosigkeit. Hierbei
nutzen alle Studien die Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), einer großangelegten
Langzeitbefragung repra¨sentativer Haushalte in Deutschland. Hierbei ist das Ziel der Studien
nicht nur, einen empirischen Zusammenhang zu scha¨tzen, sondern den Erkenntnisgewinn und
die Implikationen der identifizierten Effekte fu¨r traditionelle o¨konomische Entscheidungsmod-
elle herauszuarbeiten. Dafu¨r werden jeweils potentielle Kana¨le und Mechanismen innerhalb
des Rahmens der Rational-Choice-Theorie sorgfa¨ltig diskutiert.
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Das verbindende Element aller vier Studien ist der Fokus auf ein spezifisches Perso¨nlichkeits-
merkmal in diesem Kontext: die individuelle Kontrollu¨berzeugung, der “locus of control”
(LOC). LOC wird bezeichnet als eine generalisierte Einstellung oder Erwartung bezu¨glich
der Art des kausalen Zusammenhangs zwischen eigenem Verhalten und seinen Konsequen-
zen (vgl. Rotter, 1966, S.2) und beschreibt, ob Individuen an den kausalen Effekt von eige-
nen Anstrengungen und Fa¨higkeiten auf Ergebnisse im Leben glauben. Wa¨hrend Individuen
mit einer internalen Kontrollu¨berzeugung daran glauben, dass eigene Anstrengungen und
Fa¨higkeiten mit zuku¨nftigen Ereignissen belohnt werden, schreiben Individuen mit einer ex-
ternalen Kontrollu¨berzeugung Lebensereignisse vor allem Glu¨ck, Schicksal, Zufall und anderen
Personen zu. Diese Perso¨nlichkeits-eigenschaft ist in der empirischen Mikroo¨konomik bereits
weit verbreitet und es existieren eine Reihe von Studien, welche ihr eine wichtige Bedeutung
fu¨r o¨konomisches Verhalten vor allem auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zuschreiben. Dies ist vor allem
begru¨ndet in der Rolle von LOC fu¨r Erwartungen sowie Motivation von Individuen. In der
o¨konomischen sowie psychologischen Literatur wird daher weitestgehend angenommen, dass
Kontrollu¨berzeugung eine wichtige Determinante individueller Anstrengung, Aktivita¨t und
Investitionsentscheidung ist. Alle diese existierenden Ideen und Erkenntnisse werden von den
Studien der vorliegenden Arbeit unterstu¨tzt und erweitert.
Die Diskussion wird in Kapitel 2 mit der Analyse der Implikationen von LOC fu¨r weib-
liche Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung eingeleitet. Hierzu wird ein Vektor mit individuellen Eigen-
schaften in die standardma¨ßige Nutzenfunktion und Budgetgleichung der Frauen eingefu¨hrt.
Dieser Vektor beinhaltet auch die Kontrollu¨berzeugung und es wird angenommen, dass er die
Pra¨ferenzen der Frauen fu¨r Freizeit, Hausarbeit und Kinderbetreuung sowie Arbeitsmarkt-
beteiligung, aber auch die subjektiven Erwartungen der Frauen u¨ber moneta¨re Vorteile von
Partizipation entscheidend beeinflusst. Basierend auf der psychologischen Literatur, welche
eine wichtige Verbindung zwischen Kontrollu¨berzeugung und individuellen Unabha¨ngigkeits-
bestrebungen macht, wird angenommen, dass Frauen mit einer internalen Kontrollu¨berzeu-
gung ho¨heren nicht-moneta¨ren Nutzen aus Partizipation ziehen, da sie nicht nur Nutzen
aus dem Konsumlevel als Folge von Partizipation ziehen, sondern auch aus der Tatsache,
dass sie die Kontrolle u¨ber das Erreichen dieses Konsumlevels hatten. Die empirische Anal-
yse untermauert diese theoretischen U¨berlegungen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Frauen mit
einer internalen Kontrollu¨berzeugung eine signifikant ho¨here Wahrscheinlichkeit haben fu¨r
die Arbeitsmarktbescha¨ftigung verfu¨gbar zu sein. Diese erho¨hte Bereitschaft u¨bersetzt sich
außerdem auch in ho¨here extensive Bescha¨ftigungswahrscheinlichkeiten. Zusa¨tz-lich zeigen
die empirischen Ergebnisse deutlich eine Heterogenita¨t der Effekte bezu¨glich der zu Grunde
liegenden moneta¨ren Arbeitsanreize sowie der vorherrschenden sozialen Normen zur Arbeits-
marktbeteiligung.
In einer sehr a¨hnlichen Weise diskutiert Kapitel 3 die Rolle von Kontrollu¨berzeugung fu¨r
regionale Arbeitsmarktmobilita¨t in Deutschland. Die empirische Analyse identifiziert einen
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deutlichen positiven Effekt von internaler Kontrollu¨berzeugung auf die individuelle Bere-
itschaft zum Umzug sowie die tatsa¨chliche Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Umzugs zwischen Ar-
beitsmarktregionen. Diese Ergebnisse besta¨tigen die angenommenen theoretischen U¨berlegun-
gen. Hierbei wird, auf Basis existierender Forschung zum Effekt von LOC auf die subjek-
tive Effektivita¨t von Arbeitsplatzsuche, angenommen, dass LOC eine entscheidende Determi-
nante geografisch weitangelegter Stellensuche ist. Internale Arbeitssuchende haben eine ho¨here
Wahrscheinlichkeit u¨ber gro¨ßere geografische Distanz nach Stellen zu suchen und haben des-
halb eine ho¨here interregionale Umzugswahrscheinlichkeit unter der Voraussetzung, dass die
Stellensuche vor der Migration stattfindet.
Ein Beweis dafu¨r, dass die Bedeutung von Kontrollu¨berzeugung auch die Grenzen der Ar-
beitsmarkto¨konomik u¨berschreitet, wird in Kapitel 4 gebracht. Das Kapitel bescha¨ftigt sich
mit der Frage, ob LOC ebenfalls in der Lage ist, Heterogenita¨t im Alkoholkonsum als wichtigen
Aspekt des individuellen riskanten Gesundheitsverhalten zu erkla¨ren. Unter Nutzung der In-
formationen zu Alkoholkonsum, welche im SOEP verfu¨gbar sind, identifiziert die Studie starke
positive Effekte von internaler Kontrollu¨berzeugung auf moderates und starkes Trinkverhal-
ten. Der Effekt ist vergleichbar mit dem von traditionellen Determinanten von riskantem
Gesundheitsverhalten wie u.a. der Risikobereitschaft oder der Zeitpra¨ferenzen der Individuen.
Basierend auf den empirischen Ergebnissen eine Reihe zusa¨tzlicher Scha¨tzungen, diskutiert
das Papier zwei mo¨gliche Mechanismen fu¨r diesen Zusammenhang. Einerseits wird erwartet,
dass internale Individuen gro¨ßeren Aufwand im Ausbau ihrer sozialen und beruflichen Netz-
werke betreiben. Da die Teilnahme an gesellschaftlichen Zusammenku¨nften oft unumga¨nglich
mit dem Konsum von Alkohol verbunden ist, haben diese Individuen eine erho¨hte Wahrschein-
lichkeit mit Alkohol in Beru¨hrung zu kommen. Andererseits ist Alkoholkonsum, mehr als an-
deres Gesundheitsverhalten, mit einem hohen Maß an Unsicherheit bezu¨glich der potentiellen
negativen Folgen verbunden. Aus diesem Grund konsumieren internale Individuen mo¨glicher-
weise mehr Alkohol, da sie an ihre perso¨nliche Fa¨higkeiten glauben mit den negativen Folgen
umzugehen oder diese zu verhindern.
Schlussendlich erho¨ht vor allem Kapitel 5 den Mehrwert, den alle diese Studien zur Liter-
atur u¨ber die verhaltensma¨ßigen Konsequenzen von Kontrollu¨berzeugung beitragen. Dies liegt
begru¨ndet in der vorherrschenden Diskussion zur Stabilita¨t dieses Perso¨nlichkeitsmerkmals
und hiermit der potentiellen Probleme mit umgekehrter Kausalita¨t und Endogenita¨t, welche
zentraler Untersuchungsgegenstand der Studie in Kapitel 5 ist. Um die Stabilita¨t von Kon-
trollu¨berzeugung zu bewerten, analysiert die Studie den Effekt von exogenen Arbeitsplatzver-
lusten auf LOC. Als positives Signal fu¨r die Validita¨t der empirischen Ergebnisse der anderen
drei Studien sowie der Literatur im Allgemeinen, findet die Untersuchung keine langanhal-
tenden Effekte von Arbeitsplatzverlusten durch Firmenschließungen auf die Kontrollu¨berzeu-
gung und damit auch keinen Hinweis auf ein Problem in der allem zu Grunde liegenden
Annahme der Stabilita¨t von Perso¨nlichkeitsmerkmalen im Erwachsenenalter. Sorgen u¨ber
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mo¨gliche umgekehrte Kausalita¨t oder Endogenita¨t in den Modellen ko¨nnen daher weitestge-
hend gemildert werden. Allerdings identifiziert die Studie eine wichtige tempora¨re Abweichung
in der Messung von LOC wa¨hrend Arbeitslosigkeitsperioden und kommt aus diesem Grund
zu dem Schluss, dass die von Befragten angegebene Kontrollu¨berzeugung von einem wichtigen
situationsspezifischen Statuseffekt beeinflusst wird. An Stelle von Bedenken zu umgekehrter
Kausalita¨t sollte die zuku¨nftige Literatur aus diesem Grund vor allem mo¨gliche Probleme in
der Messung von Perso¨nlichkeitsmerkmalen beru¨cksichtigen und diskutieren. Die Implikatio-
nen dieser Ergebnisse fu¨r die Scha¨tzungen in den anderen Kapiteln werden in den einleitenden
Bemerkungen sowie in den Studien selbst vorsichtig diskutiert und analysiert.
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